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ABSTRACT
This research examines mainland China's reunification policy 
towards Taiwan with a particular focus on the years of 1979-1987. 
Following the establishment of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations in 
January 1979,Communist leaders in Beijing carried out a series of 
intensive campaigns to woo the Nationalists in Taiwan to accept 
peace talks and to re-unify Taiwan and mainland China under the 
formula of "One Country Two Systems". The formula implies that, 
after unification, two different systems will remain - Socialism 
on the mainland and Capitalism in Taiwan for at least 50 years. 
Although Beijing's reunification policy has been further developed 
and persistently propagated, its efforts, so far, have met with 
little success. The Taiwan issue is by no means solved, neverthe­
less, the peaceful initiatives from Beijing have significantly 
changed Taiwan-China relations as well as the situation in East 
Asia.
The questions this study is seeking to answer are: What are
the origins and development of contention over the issue of 
Taiwan ? In the period 1979-8 7, what have been the main factors 
which have led China's decision-makers to change their position 
on Taiwan from that of an antagonist seeking military liberation 
to one of a seeming conciliator seeking benign-sounding peaceful 
reunification ? To what extent has the "One Country Two Systems" 
policy been effective in shaping Taiwan-China relations ? In what 
sense does the policy theoretically and practically modify the 
continuing contest over the separation of Taiwan and China ? 
Internationally, how has the "One Country Two Systems" formula 
been applied to solve the issues of Hongkong and Macao, as they 
have become important models for the future settlement of the 
Taiwan problem ? And how has the policy been conditioned by 
Washington-Beijing and Washington-Taibei relations ? Because 
these questions are closely interlinked, the study makes detailed 
review from international and intranational perspectives so as to 
disentangle the complexities of the Taiwan issue.
Although the policy readjustment made in 1987 by the Taipei 
government in response to the PRC peaceful proposal signalled a 
crucial change on the route of China's national reunification and 
in relations between Taiwan and the mainland, the One Country Two 
Systems formula, as the study argues, has continued to fall short 
of providing an acceptable political solution of the Taiwan issue. 
However, as long as the Chinese Communists are in power, it seems 
certain that the formula will be maintained as their paramount 
principle for managing China-Taiwan relations.
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1 N T R O D U C TI O N
The reunification of Taiwan with mainland China is a complex 
issue in Chinese politics as well as in international relations. 
The issue not only has broad political, economic, strategic and 
moral ramifications for the People's Republic of China (PRC) and 
Taiwan, but it also contains crucial factors which potentially 
could destabilise the area of East Asia. Ever since the founding 
of the PRC in 1949, relations between Taiwan and mainland China 
have been hostile, as their rulers each vowed to annihilate the 
other side. All peaceful and, indeed, non-peaceful, efforts in 
the search for an acceptable and lasting solution which would 
allow the two communities to live in tranquillity, or provide a 
consensus in the international domain, have so far failed to 
produce results. However, the establishment of Sino-American 
diplomatic relations in early 1979 created a new situation in the 
Taiwan Straits area, enabling the Chinese Communists to present 
to their long-term enemy, the Nationalists, an ostensibly benign 
initiative for the reunification issue.
In proposing a peaceful settlement of the question of China's 
reunification, the PRC relinquished the long-familiar cry of 
"liberating Taiwan by force" and adopted instead a new, sweet- 
sounding term "peaceful reunification of the motherland". The new 
initiative by mainland China for reunification with Taiwan was 
soon to be encapsulated in the formula "One Country Two Systems".
Despite the principle that Socialist China should not accommodate 
within itself a centre of Capitalism, the urge for national unity 
has pushed the Communist Party of China (CPC) to make, what from 
its perspective,j/S a major concession on this point: that as long 
as Beijing's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan is acknowledged,the 
PRC will allow Taiwan to retain its existing political & economic 
system. So, by putting together the terms of One Country and Two 
Systems, the CPC is proclaiming its pledge that the two different 
systems - Socialism in mainland China and Capitalism in Taiwan 
(and in Hongkong & Macao) will be maintained for a certain period 
under the aegis of the PRC.
This study examines the origins and development of the PRC's 
reunification policy towards Taiwan, focusing particularly on the 
y e a r s  of 1979-8 7. Since the PRC's reunification policy is intri­
cately tied to other factors, such as political legitimacy(or the 
mandate for ruling China), Beijing's external relations, national 
security and territorial integrity, the following matters will be 
treated in detail: the origins and character of the Taiwan issue, 
including the historical evolution of relations between Taiwan 
and mainland China; the reasons that have led the PRC leaders to 
change their position on Taiwan from that which envisaged a 
military solution to a benign-sounding peaceful reunification; 
the development of the policy within the PRC in the course of the 
last decade and the impact of the new approach on the conduct of 
relations between Taiwan and the mainland during that period; the 
repercussions of the One Country Two Systems proposal, which have 
modified the contest over the separation of Taiwan and China and
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shaped relations between these two areas. The study also examines 
how the One Country Two Systems policy has been applied to solve 
the issues of Hongkong & Macao, and, more broadly, how the policy 
has been affected by the interactions of Beijing-Washington and 
Washington-Taibei relations in that decade.
The issue by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress of "A Message to Compatriots of Taiwan" on Jan. 1, 1979, 
marked a significant gesture of reconciliation by the PRC towards
I
the Taipei authorities over the problem of Taiwan. In response to1 
Beijing's peaceful proposal, and associated with the development 
towards a greater degree of democracy, the KMT government finally 
reviewed its mainland policy in 1987. Taking into account the ex­
tensive reforms that had taken place in the mainland, it allowed 
its people to visit Communist China. This move, as later shown, 
was a vital turning-point in Taiwan-mainland relations. Even 
though the research is mainly concerned with the PRC's policy 
towards the reunification with Taiwan in the period of 1979-87,it 
is not only necessary, but important to retrace what had happened 
before 1979. On the other hand, while analysing the One Country 
Two Systems policy, it seems inevitable that, in some points, 
events occurring after 1987, which have been greatly influenced 
by the PRC proposal, should also be considered.
For over four decades, contention over the Taiwan issue has 
been enmeshed in the unfinished Chinese Civil War and complicated 
by the persistent involvement of foreign powers. This prolonged 
dispute has been contested in at least four interrelated arenas:
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the global strategic arena; the arena of Sino-US bilateral rela­
tions, as they affect China's reunification; the arena of the 
dispute between the PRC in mainland China and the ROC on Taiwan; 
and the domestic politics of Beijing and Taibei. The issue of 
Taiwan first became embroiled in global strategic antagonisms in 
the 1950s, particularly during the Korean War and the Taiwan 
Straits crises. Changes in the strategic relations of the US with 
the PRC since the late 1960s gradually transformed the character 
of the Taiwan issue from the main subject of contention between 
Beijing and Washington to the "symbol" of their agreement to 
disagree. The improved Sino-US relations, following normalisation 
in early 1979, opened the door for Beijing to offer a peaceful 
solution to the Taiwan issue. However, the differences between 
Chinese reunification policy and the US commitments to (and its 
interests in) Taiwan were too wide for total reconciliation. In 
the 1980s, due to the decline of Soviet military expansion, the 
need for a US alignment with China to check the former USSR 
decreased, and the Taiwan issue was then marginalised into an 
East Asian regional problem. The sustained contention between the 
CPC and the KMT show that the Taiwan issue is itself interwoven 
with the Chinese power struggle for the mandate to rule a unified 
China, while the dissensions over when and how the issue should 
be settled, and who should have the ultimate right to govern the 
island,have exerted influence on the domestic politics of Beijing 
and Taibei. The rhetoric of the protagonists does not always 
reflect the actual realities and ambiguities of the situation. 
Furthermore, the existing secondary literature, often, tends to 
be too narrow in its focus. This study aims to take the
aforementioned four arenas as an analytical framework, so as to 
disentangle the complexities of the Taiwan issue.
After the PRC initiated the peaceful proposal for China's
reunification, articles and comments on,the issue, mainly echoing 
the official stances, poured out both in mainland China and on 
Taiwan. However, for political reasons, perhaps, a clear picture 
of three distinct periods in the CPC's attitude towards Taiwan 
was still lacking.(1) In order to assess the causes and effects 
of the One Country Two Systems policy and to explore the back­
ground of the PRC's changing attitude to Taiwan more thoroughly, 
a chronological review of the CPC's Taiwan policy has been made.
For the purpose of illuminating, specifically, the policy of
One Country Two Systems towards Taiwan unification, the research
concentrates mainly on: a review of the PRC's strategies for 
bringing Taiwan into its fold; an evaluation of Taiwan's official 
and non-official attitudes toward the China reunification issue; 
and an analysis of the international (the U.S.) involvement in 
the case of Taiwan. Mainland China, Taiwan, and the US being the 
main variables in the Taiwan issue, the wish of each of these 
three key players to proclaim its role in the resolution of the 
issue has brought about a series of interactions among the three 
parties.(2) Having looked into the advocacies of these three on 
the settlement of the dispute over the island, their convergences 
and divergences over the One Country Two Systems formula, one can 
see that they have truly reflected the continuities and changes 
of their policies towards Taiwan in the 1980s.
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In the opening chapter, an attempt is made to discuss the key 
problems of the Taiwan issue. The problems, though controversial, 
reveal the essential characteristics of the chronic issue of 
Taiwan. The fundamental peculiarities not only show the complexi­
ties of the question, but also indicate what the Taiwan issue is 
really about. These problems can be identified as follows!
1). As the Taiwan problem has often been compared with the 
former Vietnam and German partitions, as well as the North-South 
Korean separation, how far can the Taiwan issue be categorised as 
the question of a divided country ?
2). Even though the majority of countries recognise the PRC 
as the lawful authority in China, when Beijing claims sovereignty 
over Taiwan, the major powers in the world community still 
perceive the international legal status of Taiwan as uncertain;
3). The difficulty which the PRC confronts, when nationalism 
is being argued to justify China's unification, while separatism 
(Taiwanese nationalism) is asserted by some people in Taiwan in 
defence of the idea of Taiwan independence;
4). To what extent the confrontations concerning Taiwan have 
become entrenched due to differences in the strategic interests 
of China and international powers;
5). And in what sense does the ideological conflict between 
Communism and Capitalism still endure in the disputes between the 
two regimes of the PRC and the ROC.
Chapter two outlines the historical development of the Taiwan 
issue before 1971. The four centuries of recorded history of 
Taiwan show that the crucial events which changed the history of
11
the island were decided in Amsterdam, Beijing, Tokyo, Cairo, Pots­
dam, San Francisco and Washington - never in Taibei. The histori­
cal international disputes over the island suggest that, though 
China has consistently claimed its right to repossess the island, 
international opinion has not shared China's view on this issue. 
The historical relationship between China and Taiwan was, by and 
large,not a happy one, but it lies at the root of this unresolved 
controversy.
Chapter three examines the Chinese Communist Party's policy 
towards Taiwan in the period before the adoption of the peaceful 
reunification concept of One Country Two Systems. In particular, 
it considers such initiatives as were taken towards Taiwan prior 
to open advocacy of reunification by peaceful means. Did these 
initiatives,in effect, pave the way for the change in policy that 
was announced in January 1979 ? In order to answer this question 
the chapter gives a brief account of the changes in the attitude 
of the CPC towards Taiwan, before and after it seized power. It 
discusses the impact of Sino-American reconciliation on the CPC's 
approach to Taiwan. It also examines the implications of the 
deaths of the two predominant leaders, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai- 
shek, and the ensuing political changes in both capitals. Only 
against this background can the changing policy on reunification 
with Taiwan proposed by the CPC be properly scrutinised.
The fourth and fifth chapters look mainly at the formation and 
development of the policy of One Country Two Systems. In the last 
ten years, there have been two distinct,but continuing, phases in
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Chinese strategy for reunification. From 1979 to 1984, the PRC 
intensively advocated a peaceful solution, and the concept of One 
Country Two Systems gradually took shape. In the years 1984 - 8 7, 
not only was the specific meaning and content of the policy 
confirmed by the Chinese government, but the formula also became 
a guideline for the transfer of Hongkong and Macao back to China. 
The One Country Two Systems formula, is no longer a concept or 
proposal but, rather, it has become a policy, with substantial 
content for the implementation of national reunification.
Chapter six analyses the policy of One Country Two Systems in 
the light of Sino-American relations. For decades, the US has 
been the only international power which has the will and capabi­
lities to deter the PRC from a military venture to regain control 
over Taiwan: and the softening of the PRC's attitude towards the 
Taiwan issue was made possible, because of the accomplishment of 
the diplomatic normalisation between Beijing and Washington. To 
seek an understanding of the US moves and countermoves in dealing 
with the Taiwan issue, and of Sino-US bilateral relations, this 
chapter traces the interactions between Beijing's reunification 
formula and Washington's China policy in the last decade. Apart 
from the strategic significance of the position of Taiwan in 
Sino-American relations (including arms sales to Taiwan), the US 
policy makers' responses to the resolution of the Hong Kong issue 
and the emerging new trends of China/Taiwan relations under the 
guideline of One Country Two Systems, are also considered.
Chapter seven reviews Taiwan's reactions to the policy of One 
Country Two Systems. Since the PRC had been able to take the
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initiative on the conspicuous reunification issue with a moderate 
proposal, the KMT government in Taiwan faced tremendous pressure 
for a thaw. But, the KMT was aware, in the early 1980s, that any 
sign of willingness to negotiate with the PRC would undermine its 
already isolated international status, and might cause domestic 
unrest. What reasons were given by Taibei for refusing to talk 
directly with Beijing ? What conditions is the KMT asking for 
China's reunification ? How has the KMT government tried to make 
its rigid foreign policy more flexible under the new internal and 
external situation created from the other side of the Taiwan 
Straits ? What effect has the policy of One Country Two Systems 
had in changing Taiwan's self-defence strategy ? And what 
repercussions would the policy of One Country Two Systems have on 
Taiwan's domestic political development ? All these questions are 
actually raised by the strategic policy for peaceful unification 
proposed by the PRC, and are direct responses to what the Taibei 
authorities have interpreted as "the options for survival".
The concluding chapter summarises the main themes argued 
throughout the research and looks at the problems that the PRC 
will still have to confront regarding the reunification of Taiwan 
with China.
Finally, it is necessary to clarify the vexed problems of the 
transliteration of Chinese names and the translation of Chinese 
terms into English. The "Pinyin" system, which was standardised 
in the PRC, and is widely accepted in academic circles is still 
not in use in Taiwan. A further complication comes from the fact
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that the "Gwoyeu Juyin" system, developed and used in Taiwan, 
uses different spelling from both the "Pinyin" and the "Wade- 
Giles" systems: for example, Deng Xiaoping (Pinyin), Teng Hsiao- 
p'ing (Wade-Giles) and Deng Syau-ping (Gwoyeu Juyin). In this 
research, Chinese names are transcribed in the "Pinyin" system, 
~ with the exception of some familiar forms which are customarily 
used in the English world: for instance, Mao Zedong, not Mao Tse- 
tung; but Chiang Kai-shek, not Jiang Jieshi, and Kuomintang not 
Guomindang. The translation of terminologies, in the thesis, also 
follows mainly the usage current in the PRC, not in Taiwan, e.g. 
"Tongyi" is translated as "reunification" in mainland China, but 
"unification" in Taiwan; "Zhongguo Dalu" is translated as 
"Mainland China" in China, but "the Chinese Mainland" in Taiwan. 
However, the terms CPC, the Beijing authorities, and the Chinese 
Communists, referring to the PRC are used interchangeably in the 
study, as are the terms Kuomintang(KMT), the Nationalists, and the 
Taibei authorities implying the Republic of China(ROC).The use of 
the term "Taiwan" has become ambiguous. It is no longer regarded 
by either side of Beijing and Taibei as simply a province of 
China, rather it is treated as a political entity that cannot yet 
be defined in international law and whose future is uncertain.
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FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES
1. The CPC's attitude towards Taiwan falls into three distinct 
stages: 1928-1949, China-Taiwan separation; 1949-78 liberation by 
force; and after 1979, peaceful reunification. For details refer 
to chapter 3.
2. As for less essential variables such as Sino-Japanese 
relations, Korean factors and the South China Seas dispute etc., 
their impacts on the issue of Taiwan are notable, but they seem 
unlikely to derail the course of Taiwan-China development, hence, 
will not be included in the study.
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CHAPTER 1 : THE CHARACTER OF THE T A I W AN  I S S U E
"The problem of Taiwan is a mixture of historical, 
political, national, international and ideological 
components; combined with psychological and even 
emotional factors affecting the people on both 
sides of the Taiwan Straits. Whether the strategic 
policy of One Country Two Systems, can solve this 
highly controversial problem has yet to be 
comprehensively discussed, and more time needs to 
be given to testing its likely durability."
.... Extract from "Nature of The 
Taiwan Issue and The One Country 
Two Systems Policy", The Taiwan 
Veracity Monthly, November 1989,
A .  A CASE OF A D I V I D E D  N A T I O N
"The regrettable issue of Taiwan is a festering tragedy of 
national division, which always tugs at heart-strings of the 
Chinese".(1) For the past four decades, many Chinese, especially 
the Chinese leaders in Beijing, have sentimentally lamented the 
agonising separation of Taiwan from China. Is the Taiwan question 
a unique case of an intolerable situation that only the Chinese 
people have to suffer ? The answer, obviously, is "no". In modern 
international relations,political partition is a common procedure 
for the establishment of new nation states in the international 
community and it has extensively re-shaped the world political 
map.(2) Indeed,apart from the new states created through peaceful 
processes, coercive political partition of countries has taken
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place several times in the world community since World War II in 
attempts at conflict management. The latter have also become com­
plicated international problems. These non-peacefully partitioned 
states are, therefore, denoted distinctively "divided nations". 
Furthermore, non-peaceful partition has usually occurred as a 
result of the conjunction of internal political division with 
international conflict. The best known examples include Germany, 
Korea and Vietnam. And the case of Taiwan is also, sometimes, 
included in this category.(3) The China/Taiwan separation was the 
result of the Chinese Civil War, as it later became embroiled in 
a larger international conflict.(4) For decades, it has clearly 
been an issue of political partition, notwithstanding its parti­
cularities, closely resembling numerous other cases in the modern 
world.(5)
In spite of the trends towards deeper interdependence and 
towards the globalisation of certain problems, notably those 
concerning the environment, the adhesion to statehood and
territorial integrity has not diminished in intensity at all. 
Hence the problems of political partition have been to the
forefront of many of the major international conflicts in the
Cold War period and beyond. In fact, the intensity of the
conflicts over the division of states or claimed political
communities is such that short of forcible unification, as in
Vietnam, or voluntary union as in Germany, any other alternative 
is often seen as temporary and contingent.
Political partition, according to Norman Pounds, is the 
division of a state, so that it loses its identity or even
disappears from the political map; or, the creation of two or
18
more systems within a territory which had previously been subject 
to only one system.(6) A similar definition, given by Roy 
Johnston, states that; "Political partition is a legal, political 
and behavioural process, as opposed to a decision by which a 
group of people advocate disassociation from other groups and 
from the structural relationships within a particular society."(7) 
With reference to the above definitions, one could argue that 
political partition is a phenomenological process through which a 
people draws apart and attempts to secede, divorcing themselves 
from the problems and concerns of a "host society". The causes 
for the political partition, whether internally accompanied by a 
disjuncture of specific relationships with its old ties from a 
host society, or externally supported by the international 
influential powers to meet a particular international situation, 
give an impulse to fulfilling the goal of separation. Judging 
from the practical facts, political partition is also a method of 
gaining or re-establishing a majority status. For instance, when 
a minority group can detach itself from a big main group, and 
sets up an autonomous or even a semi-autonomous political unit, 
the members of the minority group will, ipso facto, be the ruling 
majority.(8)
The case of the political partition between Taiwan and main­
land China is concerned, on the one hand, with political coercion 
from the Chinese authorities, asseverating the island as part of 
China, on the other hand, with demands for maintaining the ad hoc 
separation by many in Taiwan, for the purpose of gaining majority 
rule. The PRC and some of the ROC supporters in Taiwan regard the 
partition of Taiwan from China as an unbearable negation towards 
China's unity, while local Taiwanese expect the continuing polit-
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fical separation to be the best opportunity for them to establish 
a new state on Taiwan. (P,} Unlike the Taiwanese residents, none of 
the people of the other divided nations i.e., Korea, Germany and 
Vietnam,has ever specifically rejected the proposals and purposes 
of national unification. Perhaps that was the main reason why, 
nearly thirty years ago, L, Sulzberger did not even included the 
Taiwan/China separation in his article "New Labels for a New Era" 
- a pioneer research into the politics of divided nations.(10)The 
Taiwan issue has often been treated by scholars as a problem of 
nation-building or as a political arena in which local people are 
searching for their new state.(11)
The aforementioned particular points underline the complexities 
of the Taiwan issue, indicating the difficulties for the PRC in 
claiming that Taiwan is, apparently, recognised world-wide as a 
national division of China. Further notable differences single 
out the Taiwan/China partition from the other divided countries 
mentioned above. Taking the definitions of western language 
dictionaries or encyclopaedias, as general evidence, the lack of 
clarity and common perception in the international community on 
the issue of Taiwan as a divided nation is revealed. Collins 
Dictionary, for example, gives definitions of the aforementioned 
divided countries as follows:(12)
" Germany - a country in central Europe,......
defeated in World War II and divided by the Allied 
Powers into four zones, which became established as 
East and West Germany in the late 1940s."(Note: 
this definition should soon be changed.)
" Korea - a former country in East Asia, annexed to 
Japan in 1910 and divided in 1945 into two 
occupation zones ( Russian in the north, American
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in the south), which became North Korea and South 
Korea in 1948.
" Vietnam, or Viet Nam - a republic in SE Asia: an
ancient empire conquered by France in the 19th 
century; occupied by Japan (1940-45.). In 1954 the 
country was divided along the 17th parallel,
establishing North Vietnam and South Vietnam......
Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops and 
the eventual defeat of the South Vietnamese
government......  In 1976 an elected National
Assembly proclaimed the reunification of the 
country."
"China - 1. People's Republic of. Also called
Communist China, Red China, a republic in E. Asia: 
third largest and most populous country in the
world the People's Republic was formed in 1949.
2. Republic of. Also called: Nationalist China,
Taiwan, a republic in E. Asia occupying the island 
of Taiwan, 13 nearby islands, and 64 islands of the 
Penghu(Pescadores) group: established in 1949 by 
the Nationalist government of China under Chiang 
Kai-shek after its expulsion by the Communists from 
the mainland; under U.S. protection 1954-79."
"Taiwan - An island in SE Asia between the East 
China Sea and the South China Sea, off the SE coast 
of the People's Republic of China: the principal
territory governed by the Nationalist government 
of China, (emphasising underlines added.)
Despite the PRC and the ROC leaders repeatedly claiming the 
Taiwan issue to be a similar case to that of the divided nations 
of Korea, Germany, and Vietnam, the above definitions, provide a 
clear indication that the issue of Taiwan is not the same as that 
of other "divided" nations, at least from the Western point of 
view.(13)
As part of the particularities of the Taiwan case, it can not 
be overlooked that the governments of both the PRC and the ROC 
are strongly wedded to the position of a greater unitary China, 
partly for nationalistic and historical reasons. Traditionally, a
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good government in China is regarded presiding over a unified 
country, even though, in fact, for about half of the last three 
thousand years of recorded history, China has been divided.(Table 
1.) This historical fact provides a basis for people on Taiwan to 
feel they have a viable claim to separation from the mainland, 
while at the same time the contentions of the two governments who 
each seek to bolster their legitimacy by up-holding the tradi­
tional view of good government and their own unifying mission are 
intensified.(14)
< T A B L E  1 .  >
U N I F I C A T I O N ,  D I V I S I O N  AND S U B J U G A T I O N  OF C H I N A :
A C H R O N O L O G I C A L  C H A R T
Periods(dynasties) Periods of division Periods of Subjugation
of Unity (Non--Han Chinese rule)
Zhou Dynasty, West
(1122-771 (B.C.)
Zhou, East (770-249 B.C.) 
Chunqiu (722-481 B.C.) 
Warring State (480-221 B.C.)
Qin (221-202 B.C.)
Han, Former 202 (B.C.
9 A.D.)
Han, Later (9-220 A.D .)
Three Kingdoms (220-280 A.D.) 
Jin, West (280-317)
Jin, East (317-420)
South and North Dynasties 
(420-590.)
Sui (590-618)
Tang (618-906)
Five Dynasties (907-960)
Song(North),(960-1126)
Song, South (1127-1279)
Yuan (Mongolian) 
(1260-1368)
Ming (1368-1644)
Republic of China (1912-49) 
People’s Republic (1949-
Qing (Manchurian) 
(1644-1912)
* Data Source Duan Li, The Ageless Chinese; A History, 3rd Ed., Taibei 
1988.
Of course, there are some good reasons for including the case
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of Taiwan in the category of the partitioned nations, because all 
the above-mentioned divided countries (including Taiwan) have 
common features. For instance, their separate status is a result 
of the bipolar confrontation after the Second World War, and they 
exist because of the establishment of spheres of influence by two 
differing ideological and political systems (i.e., Communism and 
Capitalism). The division of East/West Germany, North/South Viet­
nam, North/South Korea and the Mainland/Taiwan between communist 
and non-communist political systems; the Korean War, the Taiwan 
Straits Crisis, the Berlin Blockade and the Vietnam War, all 
developments involving the main world powers, were characteristic 
of the political divisions and international confrontations 
during the Cold War period.(15)
No two divided nations are entirely identical, rather, the 
similarities between the partitioned countries are only partial. 
It can not be denied, however, that all these nations have one 
political factor in common: a strong tendency of pursuing
unification, in particular where national division has been 
imposed by international involvement. The partitions of Vietnam 
and Germany have ended, as mentioned, in extremely different 
ways. The forceful annexation of the South by the North in 
Vietnam through the so-called "war of national liberation" only 
serves as a painful reminder to the non-communist side of the 
divided nation that unification is not at all the wish of the 
people concerned. The peaceful take-over of East Germany by West 
Germany proved again that Communism has been, by and large, 
discredited in the most recent international politics. These two 
cases of national unification did not assist the PRC in achieving 
its goal of bringing back to the fold the divided land and people
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of Taiwan. In fact, although the leaders in Beijing have shown 
both their concern about the separatism in Taiwan and their 
patience in trying to solve the issue, they are still facing 
difficulties in mobilising the people in Taiwan to support the 
cause of Chinese national unification.
B .  U N C E R T A I N T Y  OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L  L E G A L  S T A T U S
The second characteristic of the Taiwan issue is also one of 
the most controversial issues between the PRC and international 
powers: how to define the attribution of sovereignty over the
island. Never in the past, have scholars and politicians been 
able to reach a consensus about the international legal status of 
Taiwan.It has never been clear whether both the ROC on Taiwan and 
the PRC on the mainland should be regarded as two legal govern­
ments, or as sharing sovereignty over the lands they control; 
whether they qualify as two independent states, or if each part 
of the "country" can legitimately exercise sovereign power.
"The question of sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu 
(the Pescadores), avoided for nearly thirty years 
(up to 1974), can no longer be deferred, for the 
radical shifts and sudden realignments in Far 
Eastern politics have thrust the controversial 
status of the island-state into the political 
foreground. The international legal issue has been 
joined over the sufficiency of China's claim to the 
islands. Despite an intervening civil and domestic 
ideological war, that claim has been remarkably 
consistent, whether pressed by adherents of the 
Nationalist or Communists cause. Indeed, both 
Nationalist and Communist Chinese have pretensions 
to the territory, while Peking has confirmed 
Nationalist aspirations, if only to claim benefit 
as the successor state........." (16)
24
The above observation was made in 1974 jointly by W. Reisman 
and Lung-chu Chen of Yale Law School, in their thought-provoking 
work "Who Owns Taiwan ? - a search for international title". At 
present, there is still no sign of a settlement as to who should 
eventually possess the island. The most recent report, issued by 
the Pentagon, categorically stipulates that "the international 
legal status of Taiwan is yet to be settled."(17) Although both 
the Beijing and Taibei authorities have claimed and counter­
claimed that the other side has no legal right to retain 
sovereignty over Taiwan, the actual issue of the international 
legal status of Taiwan still remains to be dealt with.
In particular, since both the San Francisco Peace Treaty and 
the ROC's-Japanese Peace Treaty failed to achieve the return of 
Taiwan to China by international legal process,(18) the question 
whether sovereignty over the island belongs to China or remains 
to be finally decided by all concerned has been frequently raised 
in the international political arena.
The PRC's Attitude
In 1949, following the successful armed struggle in the Civil 
War, the Chinese Communists reversed their long-held position of 
supporting the cause of Taiwan independence.(19) Since then, the 
PRC government and Chinese scholars have made various assertions 
and arguments in support of the PRC's claim to the right to take 
over Taiwan. After Chiang Kaishek and his followers retreated to 
Taiwan in 1949, despite its invocations of the Cairo Declaration 
and the Potsdam Proclamation in 1949,(20) the CPC changed its
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interpretation of the two documents in its favour. The PRC's main 
lines of argument on the claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, can be 
summarised in the following three ways:
a). Historical connection: The PRC argues that Taiwan was Chinese 
territory from ancient times, hence, the Sino-Japanese peace 
treaty after the War transferring the title back to China was not 
necessary. In June 1950, Xiao Jingfu, the Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the PRC rebutted the controversial U.S. claim 
that the legal title to Taiwan was unclear. He wrote::
"As a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, and 
the humiliating defeat of the Qing government, 
unfair treaty of Shimonoseki ceded Taiwan to Japan.
With the outbreak of China's War of resistance 
against Japan in 1937, in accordance with interna­
tional law, the treaties between the two countries
became null and void. The treaty of Shinomoseki was
no exception. After the victory of 1945, China 
recovered these islands (Taiwan and Penghu).
Whileas no question has been raised about the legal 
status of Taiwan. Since Taiwan has always been 
Chinese territory, it is a matter of course for 
China to take it back like a thing restored to its 
original owner. It is not a case of China taking a 
new territory from Japan which must be affirmed by 
a peace treaty...."(21)
b). International acknowledgement: The PRC's other argument for
the legitimacy of its claim to exercise control over Taiwan was
attested by Chinese scholars in international law, stating that
China had recovered its sovereignty over Taiwan as a result of
the abrogation of the Sino-Japanese treaties in its declaration
of war against Japan, issued on December 9, 1941. Professor Chen
Tiqiang of Beijing Diplomatic College, for example, elaborated
Zhou Enlai's statement of June 28, 1950:
" With its formal proclamation of war on Japan
on December 9, 1941, China had solemnly declared 
the abrogation of all treaties between China and 
Japan. Since the Shimonoseki Treaty, on the basis 
of which Japan occupied Taiwan, was among the
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treaties abrogated, Japan's rule over Taiwan
naturally became void ab initio, and the post-war
peace treaty with Japan was not necessary. " (22)
Whether the Japanese possession of Taiwan could be regarded as 
"void ab initio" when the KMT government unilaterally announced 
the invalidity of all unfair treaties in December 1941 was a 
debatable point. Many scholars and officials in mainland China, 
however, repeatedly claim that Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan 
dates from the proclamation of war. The 1952 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and the ROC-Japanese Peace Treaty were merely the US ploy 
of preventing Chinese people to regain control over Taiwan.
c). A successor state* The last, if not least, reason which the 
PRC supporters urge for the legitimacy of China's claim over the 
island, is that Japan, de facto, renounced Taiwan on October 25, 
1945, and that the island then became part of the ROC territory. 
Since the PRC is the successor of the ROC government, it should 
be entitled to obtain all the territory originally possessed by 
the ROC by invoking the principle of occupation to its advantage. 
Accordingly, the PRC claimed, on the one hand, that the defeated 
KMT refugees had no right whatsoever to sign a treaty on behalf 
of the Chinese people. On the other hand, it argued that whatever 
did the KMT sign with Japan concerning Taiwan would not affect its 
ultimate right to take over the island because the PRC has been a 
successor of the KMT regime. But one has to point out that there 
is no document to support the view that Japan renounced its title
to Taiwan on Oct. 25, 1945.
The above PRC declarations have not been accepted by the ROC 
on Taiwan. Instead, it gives several reasons to justify its de
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jure and de facto exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan. (23) The 
KMT considers that "the Communist regime in China cannot invoke 
the ROC-Japanese Peace Treaty to support its claim over Taiwan, 
since the Communists totally deny the right of the ROC government 
to conclude any treaty in the name of China after 1st October 
1949. Similarly, since the Communist regime has categorically 
rejected the validity of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, neither 
can it invoke this treaty to its advantage."(24)
Time and again, the KMT authorities have cited the arguments 
of its few western supporters, such as Frank Morello, to justify 
the ROC government's acquisition of sovereignty over Taiwan by 
the following prescription:
"Except for the claim of Red China, it can be said 
that the occupation of Formosa by the Nationalist 
[ROC] government has been undisturbed. In addition, 
this de facto exercise of governmental authority 
has been continuous for nineteen years [up to 1966]
The possession of Formosa by the Nationalist 
Government has been steadily maintained by an 
assertion of right. It follows that if the 
principle of prescription, as interpreted and 
applied within the framework of international law, 
is to be accepted in the case of China, there can 
be no lawyer's doubts as to the legitimacy of 
Nationalist China's title to Formosa."(25)
Throughout the past four decades, the KMT, in resisting the 
CPC's challenge to its legitimacy and the local Taiwanese demands 
for self-determination, has argued rhetorically that Taiwan has 
been incorporated into its territory in accordance with the 
principle of occupation in international law. However, both the 
PRC's and the ROC's proclamations of their sovereignty over 
Taiwan has not deterred the international powers from arguing 
that sovereignty over the island has not yet been settled.
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n c e p ts  o f  T a iw a n 's  l e g a l  s t a t u s .
In 1945-49, little has been mentioned about the international 
status of Taiwan. After the outbreak of the Korean War, decisions 
and commitments made at the Cairo summit and Potsdam conference 
were regarded, by most western powers, as lacking effectiveness 
in international law*(26) Since then the U.S. and the Western 
powers have taken the view that the legal position of Taiwan has 
not yet been resolved. First and foremost, President Truman 
announced that "the determination of the future status of Formosa 
must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace 
settlement with Japan, or consideration by the UN."(27) Secretary 
of State John F. Dulles went even further when the US-ROC Mutual 
Defence Treaty was signed in 1954, he argued:
"We and most other peace-loving countries understand 
that the issue of sovereignty over Formosa and the
Pescadores has never been settled The question
of the title ( over Taiwan ) is dependent upon 
developing facts... but certainly the United States 
has not the power alone by this treaty to convey 
title, because title is not in the United States."
(28)
The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony 
Eden also commented that: "Under the Peace Treaty of April 1952, 
Japan formally renounced all rights, title and claim to Formosa 
and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer 
to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China 
or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pesca­
dores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, 
territory, the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or 
undetermined."(29)
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The position of the Western Powers was: they believed that 
China could acquire de jure sovereignty over Taiwan only through 
provision of settlement in a peace treaty. The legal transfer of 
sovereignty was in fact incomplete. The authority of the ROC 
government to rule Taiwan since 1945, has virtually rested on the 
"General Order No. 1" issued by General Douglas MacArthur, the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. According to the Order, 
the Japanese field commanders and Armed forces in China, Taiwan 
and French IndoChina from latitude 16 degrees north, shall extend 
their surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek. Chiang's govern­
ment, in taking over the islands of Taiwan and Penghu therefore 
acted as an agent of the Allied Commander. The situation was not 
much different from the occupation of Germany by the forces of 
the four Allies. A long term settlement of the situation in 
Taiwan and in Germany still needs to be made by a peace treaty.30
When China and Japan established diplomatic recognition in 
1972, and at the time of the normalisation of Sino-U.S. relations 
in 1979, the confirmation of the legal entitlement to sovereignty 
over Taiwan was again deliberately avoided. Japanese Premier 
Tanaka's agreement with Zhou Enlai, the Nixon-Zhou Shanghai 
Communique and the Joint Communique on the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations between Beijing and Washington in Jan. 1979, 
all avoided the subject of transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan to 
the PRC, although the U.S. would "acknowledge"(not recognise) the 
Chinese position, and would not challenge the assertion by all 
Chinese, on either side of the Taiwan Strait, that there is but
one China and that Taiwan is part of China....... (31) To date, of
the 134 countries which have established diplomatic relations 
with the PRC, only 6 have specifically stipulated in their
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diplomatic documents that "the PRC is the sole legal government 
of China and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of 
the PRC." Most other countries refrained from expressing agree­
ment with the PRC's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. (32) And the 
island's international legal status still remains ambiguous and 
has yet to be finally determined.
C . I M P A S S E  OF N A T I O N A L I S M  AND S E P A R A T I S M
The third feature which characterises the Taiwan issue is 
the dilemma of the unyielding Chinese nationalism and the covert 
Taiwanese separatism. This deadlock basically derives from the 
Chinese traditional expectations of national unification and from 
the ideas of modern Western-style nationalist movements which 
have stimulated the people of Taiwan to seek to establish a new 
nation-state on the island.(33) During their long revolutionary 
struggle, both the KMT and the CPC, regarded China's unification 
as their primary target. They believed that, whichever political 
party could successfully re-unify the country, would certainly 
win people's support and become the most popular political group 
in China and would be entitled to claim the highest authority to 
govern "the Middle Kingdom". The people in Taiwan, however, have 
not only experienced colonial occupation in past centuries, but 
they were also badly treated by the rulers from China. The hopes 
for Taiwanese self-rule which were stirred up by nationalism, 
(from the PRC's point of view, the unforgivable and unacceptable
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separatism), therefore, vitalised a nation-building movement.(34) 
The Taiwanese separatist tendencies, actually, originated from; 
the inspiration of the anti-colonial campaigns; the impetus for 
self-determination; the geographical separation from China; and 
the independence of the economic links from that of the mainland.
As in many other countries, nationalism became a main theme 
in Chinese politics from the time of the powers' encroachment on 
its territory in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
But the feeling of nationalism in China was fostered, first by 
anti-Manchu resentment which the Nationalists, led by Dr. Sun Yat 
-sen, promoted in order to overthrow the non-Chinese Dynasty and 
restore (Han) Chinese majority rule; then by resistance to 
Japanese and Western imperialist interventions in modern Chinese 
revolutions.(35) Hence, Chinese nationalism, in the past century, 
has developed as an instrument first for anti-subjugation, then 
for anti-imperialism and finally for national integration. Above 
all it becomes synonymous with irredentism and patriotism.
The significance of Chinese nationalism w^s further enhanced 
by the traditional myth of ascriptive authority,Without exception 
in Chinese history, when a new Dynasty was established the rulers 
had always laid claim to the so-called "Mandate of Heaven" (Tian- 
dao), to legitimise its right to reign over the Middle Kingdom. 
Like the KMT, the Chinese Communists did not, though, explicitly 
claim the Mandate of Heaven when they seized power. However, they 
turned to the extensive empire of the Middle Kingdom for their 
delineation of China's territorial sovereignty*(36) Occupied by 
the defeated enemy which supported by the American imperialists, 
Taiwan stands as an unliberated part of the national motherland.
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The CPC, combining the nationalist perspective with irredentist 
attitudes, vowed to redeem Taiwan.
In the past century and a half, having suffered numerous 
humiliating defeats at the hands of colonial powers,the recurring 
xenophobia in China accentuated the development of Chinese 
nationalism. Militant Chinese accused foreigners of destabilising 
and dismembering their country. The issue of Taiwan, since 1950, 
provided ready substance for Communist diatribes against the 
foreign imperialists. The Chiang Kaishek "Bandits" in Taiwan were 
blamed for betraying the Chinese nation, shamefully serving the 
interests of the U.S. imperialists by distracting from the issue 
of national independence and splitting national integrity.(37)The 
Taiwanese independence movement was, therefore, not surprisingly, 
regarded by the leaders of the PRC as a monkey show, manipulated 
by ambitious imperialists, for the purpose of jeopardising the 
Chinese government's exercise of its sovereignty over Taiwan.
The Nationalist party, on the contrary, has, by its name and 
deeds, regarded itself as the legitimate Chinese "nationalist" 
movement. It argued that the Chinese Communists are no more than 
a surrogate of the Soviet Union, subjugating the Chinese nation; 
never could a Chinese Communist be a real nationalist. It makes 
strenuous efforts to convince the Chinese people and the rest of 
world that Dr.Sun's "Five Principles of Chinese Nationalism" have 
been permanently adopted as party policy.(38) To prove their sin­
cerity as nationalists, the KMT upheld such slogans as "mainland 
recovery" and "Taiwan as part of China", and has always treated 
Taiwanese separatist activities as treasonable and punishable.
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Nationalism is originally, as Elie Kedourie put it, a doctrine 
invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It 
is presumed to supply a criterion for the determination of the 
unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its 
own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for 
the right organisation of a society of states.(39) In the 20th 
century, in particular after the end of first world war, interna­
tional society has been made safe for nationalism, the hierarchy 
of the traditional dynastic world giving way everywhere before 
the permissive and popular principle of national self-determina­
tion. (40) It has not only served, first as a spearhead of anti­
imperial and anti-colonial wars of liberation, then as an 
initiative of national integration, as well as of state renewal; 
but more importantly, it also stands in opposition to both multi 
national integration and unification - and becomes the course of 
ethnic separatisms of minorities.(41) Furthermore, nationalism is 
universally regarded as a state of mind, in which the supreme 
loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation­
state. (42) Consequently, nationalism becomes a sense of identity, 
usually aroused by common experiences in a struggle against over­
lords from another locality, while it needs no single religion, 
language, or other objective basis, nor can it be denied on the 
grounds of previous inexperience in self-governing. All in all, 
national identity is essentially emotional.
Since the people in Taiwan have experienced five different 
rules of outside strangers, in the last four centuries (Table 2), 
the growth of "Formosan identity" started from socio-politico 
heterogeneity of Chinese setting. A proto-type of nationalism has 
emerged on the island, enhanced by the advocates of Taiwan
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independence. Like many other separatisms in the modern world, 
the aims and specific context of "Formosan Nationalism" are quite 
clear and consistent. It is what nationalists of all ages and 
climes have demanded: group autonomy, group cohesion and group 
identity. The people of Taiwan want to be self-governing citizens 
with equal rights and duties, without external regulation and 
interference.
< T A B L E  2 .  >
P R O P O R T I O N  OF THE R U L E R S  AND R U L E D  P O P U L A T I O N  I N  T A I W A N
1624 - 1662 A.D.
-\ 10.000 ( Dutch Rulers.)
-/ \
 / 100.000 ( Taiwan Inhabitants.)
1662 - 1683 A.D.
■\50.000 (Dongdu Rulers.)
■/  —  - \
----------------------------1200.000 ( Taiwan Inhabitants.)
1683 - 1895 A.D.
---------------- \ 100.000 ( Manchurian Rulers.)
 / > < \
3.000.000 Taiwan Inhabitants |
 > < 1
1895 - 1945 A.D.
 > ....... <.........\
500.000 Japanese rulers |
.......... > ........ <......... i................... -....... \
6.000.000 Taiwan Inhabitants |
 > < 1
1945 -
 >   <—   \
1.500.000 Nationalists Rulers |
 >  <---------------------- /--->  < \
18.500.000 Taiwan Inhabitants |
\ ^  1
@ Sources refer to Shi Ming, The Four Hundred Years* Taiwanese History,
1980, Re-organised by author.
While the Chinese on the mainland suffered from a prolonged 
and destructive Civil War in the first half of this century, and 
have been under Communist totalitarian reign in the second half,
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people on Taiwan have experienced a very different century of 
Japanese colonial rule followed by the KMT rule. The setting up 
of an autonomous government was already the unfulfilled dream of 
a vigorous Taiwanese nationalist movement campaigning during 
Japanese occupation in the 1920s, 30s and 40s. The movement deve­
loped in the aforementioned period was, directly and indirectly, 
influenced by world-wide anti-colonial movements, such as those 
in Indo-China, Korea, India and even Ireland.(43) Naturally, the 
Japanese rulers tried their best to suppress, subvert and disrupt 
the Formosan nationalism, but the spirit of anti-colonialism was 
alive and was carried forward to the period of the KMT rule.(44)
Since the February 1947 incident (See chapter 2), the native 
Taiwanese have kept an unmentionable resentment towards the main- 
landers. Distrust and ill feeling have deeply affected these two 
groups of people. Although the KMT regime,taking advantage of its 
control of the propaganda machine and the educational apparatus, 
made strenuous efforts to "re-educate" the local Taiwanese to be 
loyal to the Nationalists, these efforts were, quite often, 
counterproductive.
After many decades, the political situation in Taiwan started 
to move fast, particularly in the mid 1980s. When the KMT leaders 
finally decided to opt for "Taiwanization" as the party's new 
strategy for survival, the Taiwanese nationalist (separatist) 
movement accordingly revised its terms and the content of Taiwan 
independence. Taiwanese identity and the Chinese culture complex 
were, for the first time, declared to be compatible.(45) More and 
more people argue that self-identification should range from 
p o l i t i c a l  l o y a l t y  t o  c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t y .  "M any p e o p le  i n  S in g a p o r e
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are politically Singaporian citizens,but are ethnically Chinese". 
This is a popular argument among the people of Taiwan, "There are 
Italian-Americans who are Italian by origin, but full-fledged 
Americans in terms of political loyalty."(46) To avoid a direct 
challenge to the KMT authorities, the Taiwanese separatist 
movement seems more inclined to envisage the future of Taiwan as 
being settled by means of self-determination by the 20 million 
people in the island, rather than being accomplished by a non­
peaceful nationalist revolution.
Documents relating to its policy towards Taiwan, issued by 
the PRC since Jan. 1979, show a great deal of evidence that the 
leaders in Beijing still prefer to play on feelings of Chinese 
nationalism as a method of winning the hearts of the people of 
Taiwan on the issue of unification. Sentimental terms such as kith 
and kin, brothers and sisters, kinsfolk, heart-strings, blood 
thicker than water, compatriots, beloved motherland etc., fill 
most of the PRC's official documents. Many people in Taiwan have, 
however, become all too familiar with them to give any serious 
consideration to the practical meanings of these terms, and they 
still doubt the intentions and sincerity of the PRC. After all, 
deeds would be more convincing than words, as one of the 
prominent Taiwanese political activists commented.(47)
"Wir sind ein Volk" (We are one people) chanted the Germans. 
What George Kennan once called "romantic linguistic nationalism", 
had toppled the Berlin Wall, then, in less than a year, it re­
glued East and West Germany into a reunified country. The Chinese 
leaders in Beijing would certainly very much like to hear "Women 
dou shi Zhongguo-ren" ( we are all Chinese ) from the people of
37
Taiwan. But would they say this ? When ? In the 1980s, Chinese 
nationalism and Taiwanese separatism remained a vital character 
of the Taiwan issue.
D . C O N J U N C T I O N S  OF C H I N A ’ S S T R A T E G I C  R E L A T I O N S  
W I T H  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  POWERS
In the traditional Chinese view of the world, the Sons of 
Heaven (the Chinese emperors), like the popes in Rome, assumed 
that they had the right to rule over all human affairs. The idea 
of universal dominion within the context of the Sinocentric 
cosmology not only justified their authority over the Middle 
Kingdom, but also over all other foreign nations. Till the early 
19th century, Western countries such as Britain, France, Russia, 
Germany and so on, were regarded as "tributaries" subordinate to 
China. Moreover, the Bureau of the Department for Tributary 
states was called "Yiwu Guan" (the Barbarian Chamber). Some small 
countries bordering on the Middle Kingdom displayed their 
humility by adopting Chinese as the language of diplomacy and by 
paying formal tribute at specific intervals. In turn, they were 
given permission to trade with China and were sometimes honoured 
by the dispatch of Chinese ambassadors to confirm the tributary 
rulers in office. These peripheral nations included Korea, Tibet, 
the small states of South-East Asia, and the Island Kingdom of 
RyuKyu. In terms of its historical-geographical situation, Taiwan 
was an exception among these. Taiwan has never been China’s 
tributary nation nor an inalienable territory. Before the Ming
38
royalist Zheng Chengong (Koxinga) defeated the Dutch and gained 
the island as the base of his Dongdu Kingdom in 1661, Taiwan had 
no official association with Chinese authorities.(see chapter 2)
During the 19th and 20th centuries, this Sino-centric global 
view was drastically reversed by the encroachment of the colonial 
powers. As a result, French pressure from Indo-China, British 
pressure from Burma and India, Russian pressure upon Xinjiang, 
Mongolia, and Manchuria, and Japanese pressure upon Korea, the 
Ryukyus, and Taiwan all combined to evoke an image of China being 
carved like a melon at the will of foreign powers.(48) From 
Chinese point of view,the regaining of China's extensive frontier 
by legitimate rulers or by any symbolic authority, therefore, 
became an important goal, both because of internal psychological 
needs and for external political reasons. To the leaders of the 
PRC, the determination to advance, recover and secure disputed 
and vulnerable boundaries is both strategically important and a 
symbolic requirement of legitimacy. Since 1949, the rival Chinese 
regimes of the KMT and the CPC, consistently drew their political 
maps well into their neighbours' countries.(49) Those unsettled 
boundaries and strategically disputed territories have been a 
main cause of conflicts between China and other powers.
In its four-hundred-year recorded history, Taiwan has, 
repeatedly, been the subject of a see-sawing conflict between the 
international powers and continental China, and recurrently a 
trouble spot in East Asian waters. Looking from mainland China, 
Taiwan strategically represents the easternmost thrust of Chinese 
ambitions. For the oceangoing powers the island was the western­
most point on the Western Pacific rim; a maritime frontier formed
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by Japan, the RyuKyus, and the Philippines, a world of sea-borne 
trade and international politics. These conflicting visions made 
it more or less inevitable that Taiwan's history would be one of 
invasion and intervention by colonial powers. Taiwan was both 
controlled by the Manchurian empire from the Asian mainland and 
colonised by the maritime world including the colonial powers of 
Europe, by Japan, and, to a certain degree after the Second World 
War, the US. Since the mid-19th century, the ambitions of 
colonising forces toward the island, mainland China's intention 
to possess it and the struggle of the Taiwanese for self-rule 
have waxed and waned, but never disappeared. This friction was 
even more in evidence during the PRC-US conflicts over Taiwan 
after the Japanese left the island.
The physical aspect of Taiwan is, perhaps, one of the few 
points on which China, the international powers and the local 
inhabitants all agree. It lies in the Western Pacific, 340 miles 
south-west of Okinawa, 200 miles north of the Philippines, and 
120 miles east of the Chinese mainland coast of Fujian. The 
shortest crossing between Taiwan and Fujian is at least four 
times longer than that between Dover and Calais; and the distance 
is twice as long as that between Holyhead on the British mainland 
and Dublin. The island covers 14,000 square miles which is about 
three times the size of Northern Ireland or slightly bigger than 
Holland. A census taken at the end of 1989 reveals its population 
as just over 20 millions.
After the Korean War, in the global geo-political picture, 
Taiwan was considered by the U.S. as a vital strategic point of 
resistance to Communist expansion. In academic circle, assessment
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of the strategic significance of Taiwan became one of the most 
popular subjects in the PRC's armed-forces colleges, in the ROC's 
national security institutes and among the U.S. strategists.(50) 
Although they may have been regarded as obsolete and somewhat 
discredited, nevertheless, the three major geo-strategic theories 
e.g., the Sea Power theory, the Heartland theory and the Rimland 
theory, were understood by strategists in 50s and 60s as ways to 
global hegemony.(51) Among them the Rimland Theory was generally 
argued as the most practical method of illustrating the contest 
between the "Free World" and the Communist World. (52) With refer­
ence to the Rimland theory, Taiwan stood in the central position 
of the Island-Chain-Defence(ICD) Strategy in the Western Pacific 
waters .(53) In other words, the island was important in both the 
global strategic confrontation and in regional security. The PRC 
was fully aware that the strategic location of Taiwan played a 
vital role in the U.S. "Containment" policy during the Cold War 
period. Neither the U.S., nor the PRC could neglect the strategic 
significance of Taiwan, nor could either side unilaterally 
surrender its security interests to the other in the area of the 
Taiwan Straits.
Thirty years ago, John King Fairbank, the leading student of 
Chinese affairs in America, pointed out that:
"...... With a constructive Sino-American program,
Taiwan can give the non-Communist world all these 
advantages of contact and competition, as an 
unsinkable military-defence, political and cultural 
base, at comparatively low cost. The hundred miles 
of water in the Formosa Straits form the most 
defensible barrier on the frontier of any major 
power, close enough for some contact, too far for 
invasion (from China)...".(54)
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The United States, with its invincible sea-air power from 
across the Pacific, was opposed by unconquerable land-power based 
on the Chinese subcontinent. Taiwan became a major strategic 
point for consolidating American power in the West Pacific, and 
for containing any possible expansion outward and southward by 
Chinese Communist power. To the PRC, however, confined by its 
lack of strength in naval and air power, possessing Taiwan would 
mean not only an opportunity for breaking through the US contain­
ment, but would also release the island from being used as a base 
to attack the Mainland. The strategic stalemate between Beijing 
and Washington over Taiwan was further evidenced by the fact that 
"throughout the Indochina War, the island was a forward logistics 
and R&R centre for American forces".(55)
The detente in Sino-U.S. relations, since the early 1970s, 
became possible, mainly because both powers sensed the immense 
threat of the former Soviet military build-up. The PRC and the US 
perceived that they were sharing a common strategic interest; to 
confront the USSR's military expansion. Throughout the 1970s and 
80s, the Taiwan Strait and its surrounding waters, e.g. the Bashi 
Channel, then turned out to be vital strategic "choke-points" to 
check the Russian Pacific Fleet, regularly navigating from 
Vladivostok to Cam Ranh Bay of Vietnam.(56) It is true that after 
1983 Sino-US contest over Taiwan has been localised, (see chapter 
6). However, in terms of strategic and military significance in 
East Asia, the island is by no means down-graded.
Due to geographical proximity, historical connections, and 
international strategic interests, Japan and other East Asian and 
South-East Asian countries have regarded the Taiwan issue as an
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international dispute of regional significance, rather than just 
a Chinese problem.(57) But for various reasons,the Taiwan dispute 
remains substantially an issue between the PRC and the U.S.: the
other countries have so far refrained from directly involving 
themselves in this matter. But this does not mean that the other 
powers would absolutely rule out their involvement in the issue, 
should their security or economic interest conflict with the 
PRC's actions on Taiwan.
In view of the strategic contests between the PRC and the 
other powers (i.e., with the U.S. over Taiwan), the three charac­
teristic factors can be summed up as follows: A). The PRC claimed 
that Taiwan, unjustly controlled by U.S. imperialists, played a 
strategic role during the Cold War period, against its nation and 
people. The U.S. containment strategy was obviously designed to 
serve the interests of American hegemony. Should Taiwan be re­
possessed, the advantage of the geo-strategies will, in turn, 
shift to China and thereby its national security will be greatly 
enhanced. B). Apart from US legal and moral commitment i.e., the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the Geo-economic significance of Taiwan 
underlies the pledge of the U.S. in protecting its economic 
interest in Taiwan. In particular, as Taiwan has been gradually 
developed, with US support, to be one of the newly-industrialised 
countries in the area of the Pacific Rim, a great deal of 
investment and many economic ties with America have been set up 
in the island. The loss of Taiwan would involve a great loss of 
economic interests for the American people; C). Finally, Taiwan 
is strategically important, not only because it can afford the 
international powers an assurance of their continuing influence 
in East Asia, but also because, potentially, it can be used by
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the Chinese to challenge the international powers, long regarded 
as a threat to Chinese national security. To this end, any change 
in the present situation of Taiwan would drastically affect the 
strategic balance in East Asia. There is, therefore, very little 
chance of the issue being solved merely by Chinese themselves. 
External involvement in the Taiwan issue has been,and will 
continue to be, one of its complicating characteristics.
E .  I D E O L O G I C A L  P O L E M I C S  OF C A P I T A L I S M  AND C O M M U N I S M
The last of the significant characteristics of the Taiwan 
issue, as revealed in the power struggle between the CPC and the 
KMT, is the argument about what socio-politico system would be 
more suitable for China. It is axiomatic that substantially the 
most difficult part of the Taiwan issue is the conflicting 
political ideologies of the two parties. Ostensibly, the stakes 
in the uncompromising conflict between Beijing and Taibei have 
been clear. Both claim to be pursuing ideological goals from 
which it would be dishonourable and irresponsible to retreat. At 
the same time, each has condemned the opponent's ideological 
"fixations" or "aberrations" and has held out the promise of a 
happier world for its people, if the adversary could be made to 
relinquish its position. The Chinese Communists have long 
predicted that the capitalist world and the Communist world are 
inevitably headed for a showdown and that the final victory will 
certainly belong to the Communist Camp. The KMT supporters have, 
however, been no less self-righteous in proclaiming the universal
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validity and sanctity of their principles, and in condemning the 
ideological position of the CPC's leadership.
Ideologies and ideological campaigns have been a constant 
feature of both domestic and external policies in China for much 
of this century. Abundant documentation attests to the long 
standing ideological struggles between the two sides on all the 
basic issues that divide them. During the revolutionary Civil War 
both sides sought to mobilise the people through ideological 
campaigns. After the Nationalists were driven off the mainland in 
1949, Taiwan became the final base of the KMT against Communism. 
The Capitalist camp, led by the U.S., regardless of its previous 
declaration of non-involvement in the Chinese Civil War, found 
common ideological ground with the KMT, i.e., anti-Communism, to 
contain, as well as to resist, Communist expansion in East Asia. 
Although, actual military conflict did not extend to Taiwan, 
ideological battles between the two camps of Communism and 
Capitalism, have never stopped.
Superficially, the CPC and the KMT have long shared the same 
view that "there is but One China, and Taiwan is an inseparable 
part of China". Yet the KMT has shown no sign of compromise on 
several basic issues. Ideological polemics, then turned out to be 
a significant obstacle to the re-incorporation of Taiwan into 
China.(58) The KMT has repeatedly claimed that Dr. Sun Yat-sen's 
Principle of "Sanmin Zhuyi" (Three Peoples) would be a better 
political guideline for forming a government in China, while the 
CPC, on the contrary, denounced the 22 year KMT rule in China as 
a disaster for the Chinese people. Instead,the Communists adopted 
the tenet of Marxism-Leninism, and adhere to the idea of people's
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dictatorship as the basis of government. Till now, there has been 
no possibility whatsoever that either side would accept even part 
of the ideology and economic-political system of the other.
When the CPC modified its policy towards Taiwan, from the 
pursuit of armed liberation to the search for a peaceful resolu­
tion in the 1980s, it encountered much difficulty in establishing 
political rapport with the KMT. The ideological dogma of the so- 
called "Four Cardinal Principles"(59)stipulated by the reformists 
of the PRC government as a foundation for socialist system 
practice on mainland China, and the existence of a non-socialist 
system to be permitted for a certain period under the One Country 
Two Systems policy, did not at all impress either the rulers or 
the public in Taiwan. While it may be true that the people who 
sought refuge in Taiwan from the mainland in the late 40s still 
retain strong Chinese sentiments linking them to the mainland, 
yet the fear has never disappeared that, should they return to 
China, they would not be exempt from the struggle to eliminate 
the "class enemy", nor avoid the nightmare of "class 
suppression". In particular, in the late 1970s, gloomy stories of 
former Nationalist officials who had been kept for twenty odd 
years in the PRC's prisons for re-education, deterred many KMT 
followers from thinking about a return home.(60)
As far as ideology is concerned, the native Taiwanese, to 
some extent, share the mainlanders fear of what would happen to 
them if the PRC were to take over their island. Politically the 
islanders could hardly feel secure under Communist rule. Although 
the PRC promised Taiwan that it would enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy, the Taiwanese did not respond positively, as many were
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conscious of the fate of Tibet, which had also been promised 
considerable autonomy.(61) Land owners and businessmen feel 
particularly uneasy that their properties and enterprises would 
be nationalised or confiscated and that their standard of living 
would deteriorate drastically. The fear that mainlanders and 
islanders alike would fare badly under a Communist ideology in 
Taiwan, is, undeniably, a serious barrier to any possible resolu­
tion of the Taiwan issue.(62)
The recent crumbling of Communism in the East European 
countries and in the former USSR has changed little of the CPC 
ideological assertiveness. Instead, the elderly guardians of 
Communist orthodoxy in Beijing are stepping up their efforts to 
bring the once tarnished thoughts of Mao Zedong back into the 
mainstream of the party doctrine. Many Maoist ideas, such as the 
fight against bourgeois liberalisation, the importance of self-
reliance, and even the continuing need for class struggle, have
again become current slogans in ideological campaigns. And the 
CPC documents proclaim the de-Communisation in the former Eastern 
Bloc to be an aberrant contravention of the popular will, doomed 
to fail in the end.(63) Accordingly, the CPC advocates that China
should insist firmly on the road toward the dictatorship of the
proletariat. However, the KMT argues, self-assuredly, that "three 
or four years ago, people dismissed our ambition to re-unify 
China under the principles of freedom, democracy and equitable 
prosperity (i.e., Dr. Sun's principles) as mere self-delusion. 
But now,most people believe that Communism in facing its complete 
demise and (that) one-party dictatorships, even the one on the 
Chinese mainland, cannot last much longer "(64) What the KMT
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intend, seemingly, is to contend that the Communist ideology can 
never be a suitable system for China and will soon be abandoned. 
The Taiwan issue is, therefore, linked, characteristically, to 
arguments about their ideological options, but, so far, there is 
no sign of a solution to the issue of Taiwan through ideological 
dispute.
F .  SUMMARY
Having analysed above the character of the Taiwan issue, it 
is clear that in attempting a solution, many strings of connected 
"problems" have to be comprehended and tackled. Because the 
interests of the PRC, KMT and the native-born Taiwanese, as well 
as the bilateral and multilateral aspects of the Taiwan issue are 
so enmeshed, significant and complicated, changes in each sphere 
would deeply impinge on the others. Hence, whatever proposals for 
settling the issue are put forward would inevitably have to 
disentangle the various controversial particularities mentioned 
above.
Furthermore, the issue of Taiwan is not as simple as the PRC 
has indicated (e.g., that all Chinese are longing for unification 
or that the issue is an entirely domestic affair). The question 
of Taiwan is rather different from the other divided countries
i.e.,former East and West Germany, former North and South Vietnam 
and the Two Koreas. In fact, the Communists, the Nationalists, 
and the native-born Taiwanese, have had to agree, willingly or 
unwillingly, to sleep in the same bed (e.g.,to pursue a one China
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policy), yet they are still dreaming very different dreams (e.g., 
as to what the future of Taiwan ought to be). Moreover, despite 
the PRC protests strongly that the international powers must not 
be involved in the Taiwan problem, yet the international status 
of Taiwan will be solved internationally, not unilaterally by 
Beijing. Due to its strategic position, Taiwan could not be 
regarded as a piece of unrecovered Chinese property,but rather as 
the potentially controversial site of an international dispute. 
Finally it is vital to recognise that a policy designed purposely 
for the resolution of the Taiwan issue, such as the One Country 
Two Systems formula, would have to deal with many difficulties 
and formidable obstacles.
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C H A P T E R  2 :  H I S T O R I C A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  OF T H E  T A I W A N  I S S U E
B E F O R E  1 9 7 1
The main reason why we decided to propose the
policy of "One Country Two Systems" to solve the
problem of Taiwan, is because the long lamentable 
history of Taiwan should not be forgotten. We ought 
to respect the historical facts and the ad hoc 
political situation on Taiwan. Most importantly, we 
should not repeat nor prolong the unhappy 
relationship with our compatriots on Taiwan.(1)
.........Deng Xiaoping, July 1984
Whatever may be the intention in stipulating the strategic 
policy of One Country Two Systems, Deng Xiaoping has pointed out 
that one of the main reasons he, and the PRC leaders, would 
prefer to opt for this policy to solve the Taiwan issue is the so 
called "historical consideration." It is true that the history of
Taiwan is very different from that of any province of China. The
issue of historical international disputes; the character and 
movements of separatism; the scars and scares of the Civil War; 
and the stalemate of international polarisation are all important 
in explaining the background of development of the Taiwan issue.
A .  R E V I E W  OF THE I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H I S T O R Y  
OF T A I W A N  B E F O R E  1 9 4 5
According to the official statements of both the ROC and the 
PRC, Taiwan was linked to the mainland in remote antiquity. The 
island was called Daoyi during the Warring States period. In the 
Han Dynasty it was called Dongti,and in the Three Kingdom period,
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Yizhou. In the Sui, Tang and Song dynasties the Chinese called it 
RyuKyu. Not until the late Ming period did the Chinese call the 
island Taiwan. It is worth noting that the PRC primary school 
text-books claim that China's rule of Taiwan dates back 1,700 
years: in 230 AD, Sun Quan the King of Wu sent a task force with 
10.000 naval personnel to Taiwan. This was the beginning of the 
exploration of Taiwan by the Chinese.(2) In spite of the repeated 
announcements that Taiwan is historically part of China, a close 
examination reveals, however, that the Chinese had very little 
knowledge of the island lying in the sea east of Fujian, before 
the Portuguese navigators first arrived on the island in 1517.(3) 
The Portuguese gave the island, they had discovered, the name of 
"Ilha Formosa" (Beautiful Island) which became widely used in the 
western world and among the people on the island.
At the time the Portuguese landed on Formosa, the island was 
a formidable wilderness, inhabited mainly by native tribesmen who 
had no common leaders with which the Chinese could communicate. 
They had no established trade, and they were not prepared to pay 
tribute. The aborigines, unlike other peripheral nations, showed 
no desire at all to learn the Chinese language. Under China's 
long-standing isolationist policy, which forbade travel overseas, 
only a few Chinese fishermen, pirates and outlaw adventurers ever 
visited the island's shores. The Japanese were the first to main­
tain a hamlet which they named "Takasago" on a sandy islet by the 
coast. This was,in fact, a shelter for merchantmen and buccaneers 
who passed between Japan and China's forbidden coastal ports, or, 
made the long run to the ports of South-East Asia and the 
Philippines.
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The Dutch, based on Java, landed on Formosa in 1622, and soon 
built a castle,a colonial town and a shipyard, making the settle­
ment a midway station for Dutch shipping passing from the Dutch 
East Indies to the ports of China and Japan. The fort and town, 
called Zelandia ( Peaceful Land.), stood on an islet named "Tayo- 
von", later spelt "Tai-uan" by the Chinese emigrants. The name 
was extended to include the whole of the interior when the Dutch 
gradually brought it under their control.
Spaniards based in Manila were the first to chart Taiwan's 
northern coasts and to settle a garrison, a mission outpost, and 
a depot on the northern tip of the island, which they proposed to 
use as a base for a military, mercantile and evangelical campaign 
westward into China and northward through Okinawa into Japan.
Not the Chinese, but the Dutch opened up Taiwan as a plant­
ation settlement, explored the interior lowland and set up scores 
of aboriginal village councils. The Dutch officers and Protestant 
missionaries gave the local languages written form,introduced new 
food plants, trees, oxen, poultry, and European farm utensils, 
while extracting such commodities as sugar, rice, rattan, camphor 
and sulphur for the European market. In July 1642, they drove the 
Spaniards from their narrow foothold in the north of Taiwan, and 
for twenty years thereafter held the island without challenge.
The Dutch steadily developed Taiwan for nearly forty years. 
The so called "European half-century" was a period of European 
style colonialism for the island. The Dutch recruited thousands 
of hardworking Chinese from the impoverished coastal districts of 
Fujian and Guangdong as cheap labour. Tens of thousands more,
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defying Beijing's ban on emigration, crossed over on their own 
initiative as soon as it became known in the mainland coastal 
districts that the red-haired barbarians (the Dutch) had brought 
the fierce black-haired barbarians (the native aborigines) under 
some control. The waves of immigrants dramatically changed the 
composition of Formosa's population, and soon the majority of the 
islanders were Chinese. Most of the new-comers were single males, 
who soon found wives among the aboriginal women or married girls 
who were smuggled in from the mainland by pirates and merchants. 
They eventually settled down in Formosa, and their way back to 
China being completely cut off.
Dutch colonial rule in Formosa came to a sudden end in 1662. 
While the Dutch were opening up the island, the Ming court had 
collapsed. The new Manchu rulers of China and their collaborators 
gradually brought all the Chinese provinces under firm control 
between 1644 and 1662. The last resistance of the Ming loyalists 
was led by Zheng Cheng-gong (Koxinga), who built a fleet of ships 
and organised a Ming administration in exile on the Fujian coast, 
intending to destroy the newly formed Manchu regime in Beijing 
and restore the Ming rulers. Zheng was born in Japan, the son of 
a Japanese mother and an immensely wealthy Chinese father, and 
was brought up in Hirado in Japan. In 1661 Zheng was forced to 
retreat to the island of Jinmen (Quemoy). Seeking a safer place, 
he decided to take the Dutch colony of Formosa. After an eight 
month siege, he captured Zelandia and compelled the Dutch to 
leave the island. Instead of adopting the title used by the Ming 
dynasty, Zheng called his new territory the Dongdu (East Kingdom) 
on Formosa.(4)
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The Dongdu Kingdom was an entirely independent territory, 
cut off from continental China and sustained by wide-ranging sea­
borne commerce with Japan, South-East Asia, the Philippines and 
Europe. In the 22 years of Zhengs' rule, Formosa was essentially 
converted from a European colony to a de facto independent poli­
tical entity. Since a number of proposals for a peaceful settle­
ment with the Dongdu Kingdom were turned down,the Manchus decided 
to rid themselves of the intolerable nuisance of Formosa. (5) In 
September 1683 an imperial expeditionary force overwhelmed the 
little kingdom. The new king of Dongdu (Koxinga's grandson), and 
his senior officers were thrown out, as the Dutch had been, and 
sent back to Beijing. Most of the lower-ranking officers and 
soldiers were forbidden to return to their continental homes. The 
Manchus renewed the Ming edicts which banned people from the 
coast, and free communication between China and Taiwan was cut 
off once more.
Although the Manchus had taken a military campaign against 
the Dongdu Kingdom, it had not envisaged occupying the island 
permanently, and had no plan for its long-term development. The 
question of whether the new island territory should be protected 
directly by the central government was the subject of acrimonious 
debate at the Court, and Beijing finally decided to send a swarm 
of officials and a garrison to Taiwan to enforce its will. (7) The 
Qing rulers declared Formosa to be a dependency of the province 
of Fujian and so it remained until 1887, eight years before it 
was ceded to Japan.
During the Qing dynasty, Taiwan experienced the inefficiency 
and corruption of the Manchu administration.(8) Furthermore, its
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distance from the mainland made it a tempting target for the 
ambitions of the colonial powers. The British government was the 
first to act. In March 1842, it accused Beijing of covering up a 
case in which two British ships were captured off Taiwan and 
their crews killed. The British government brought this case onto 
the negotiating table of the Nanjing Treaty (Opium War) yet 
failed to include Taiwan in their list of ports to be opened to 
British trade.(9) In the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin, however, Britain 
achieved its long unfulfilled aim of opening up Taiwan as a 
trading post and it exploited the opportunities offered to the 
full. In 1874, Japan, fearing that the Western powers might take 
the island and thus threaten its southern frontier, sent an expe­
ditionary force to occupy the south of Taiwan, on the pretext of 
punishing the aborigines who had murdered shipwrecked Japanese 
there in 1871. Through the intervention of Britain, Japan withdrew 
its force after receiving compensation from Beijing. In 1884 the 
French extended the scope of the Franco-Chinese War in Annam, 
when their navy occupied the Pescadores and put northern Taiwan 
under siege for eleven months. Taiwan was once again involved in 
international conflicts.(10)
These foreign encroachments forced the Qing Court to change 
its policies towards Taiwan. The Manchu government at last put 
some effort into reforms in Taiwan in an attempt to prevent the 
occurrence of incidents which could act as pretexts for foreign 
invasion. The imperial edicts restricting Chinese "emigration" to 
Taiwan were finally revoked. In 1887 the Manchus raised Taiwan's 
status from that of a dependency of Fujian to the rank of a 
province, although nearly two-thirds of the island at that time 
still lay outside official control.
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The change in status and the reform programme came too late. 
Japan went to war with China over a quarrel concerning Korea, and 
defeated the Qing forces in 1894. China sued for peace. Under the 
terms of the Shhionoseki Treaty, signed in April 1895, China had 
to pay an indemnity and cede the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan and 
Penghu to Japan. The powers were worried that Japan had gained 
too much from the Treaty and was threatening their interests in 
mainland China. One week after the Treaty was ratified, Russia, 
France and Germany "advised" Tokyo to give up its claim to the 
Liaodong Peninsula. Japan was obliged to bow to this "triple 
intervention". Nevertheless Japan was left in unchallenged 
possession of Taiwan until the end of World War II.
Within two days of the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty, 
the administration in Taibei received a cable from Beijing, 
informing it that Taiwan had been ceded to Japan and was no 
longer a part of China's territory. It called upon all government 
officials to return to the continent without delay. This offhand 
treatment shocked and angered the islanders, who considered they 
had been deserted by the central government and betrayed by the 
imperial negotiator, Li Hongzhang.The Taiwanese refused to accept 
the new situation especially when they learnt that the Liaodong 
Peninsula was to remain in Chinese hands in return for an 
increased indemnity paid to Japan. Many on the mainland also 
opposed the cession of Taiwan, but it was too late. The Manchu 
government was too weak to do anything other than abide by the 
treaty obligations.
The Taiwanese, however, anxious about their future, did not
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give up so easily. They inaugurated the independent "Taiwanese 
Democratic Republic"(Taiwan Min Zhu Guo.) and formed a Parliament 
in Taipei. The former governor-general Tang Jingsong was made 
president, although still protesting his undying loyalty to the 
Qing Court. The formation of the first "Republic" in Asia took 
place in very peculiar circumstances. The people of Taiwan had 
neither sufficient political knowledge nor the experience to 
handle the state machine. The Taiwanese Democratic Republic was 
created primarily for the purpose of resisting the rule of Japan. 
Several telegrams were sent out appealing for international 
support, but none was forthcoming.(11)
After the cession was completed, Japan took the first step 
of cutting off Taiwan's previous connections with the mainland. 
In the first two years of Japanese rule, the islanders were 
offered a choice in determining their own future. Anyone who 
wished to take their movable property and return to China across 
the Strait was encouraged to do so. Those who wished to remain 
on the island, but to retain Chinese nationality, could register 
as resident aliens. All those who had not made a choice by May 1, 
1898 were then automatically considered to be subjects of the 
Emperor of Japan. In these two years, less than 20 thousand of 
the three million islanders went back to the mainland or chose to 
keep Chinese nationality. More than 99 percent registered as 
Japanese subjects. This acted, as the Japanese wanted, as a kind 
of informal referendum, revealing that the Taiwanese regarded 
themselves as non-Chinese.
During over half a century of Japanese colonial rule, the 
Taiwanese went through a traumatic socio-politico transformation;
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nevertheless, the islanders' anti-Japanese movement never ceased. 
The brutal suppression of rebellions on the island gradually made 
the islanders realise the futility of armed resistance, and they 
shifted their attention to attempts to reform the colonial system 
through political struggle. Taiwanese leaders, such as Lin Xian- 
tang, Jiang Weishui, believed that people in Taiwan should try to 
improve their political status through gradualism and moderation, 
winning concessions from the Japanese until, eventually, self- 
government was achieved. At that time, the Chinese Nationalists 
and the Chinese Communists both supported the Taiwanese anti- 
Japanese colonialism and self-rule movement.
B .  C H I N E S E  N A T I O N A L  R U L E ,  C I V I L  WAR 
AND T A I W A N  1 9 4  5 - 4 9
In December 1943, while the Second World War was still being 
fought, the allied leaders, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt 
and Chiang Kaishek met in Cairo. At the end of their meeting, 
they declared that after the war Japan would be stripped of all 
"stolen territories", and Formosa and the Pescadores should be 
"returned" to China. The pledge was reaffirmed at Potsdam in 1945 
by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. When 
Japan finally surrendered on August 14, 1945 Washington accepted 
that Formosa to be handed over to the Nationalists, and this move 
has had tremendous repercussions thereafter. So international and 
intranational politicking once again determined Taiwan's future.
When the news of the unconditional surrender of Japan was 
conveyed to Taiwan, people on the island were at first enthusia­
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stic and stirred by profound emotion at the prospect of their 
future reunion with China. To some extent they were pleased to be 
free from the ruthless Japanese colonial rule. However, some were 
worried, as the aged recalled their early experiences under the 
mainland maladministration. The majority of the islanders, never­
theless, looked forward to the change and expected that Chiang 
Kaishek and his government would bring them a better life.
Not until ten weeks after the Japanese surrender, did the KMT 
government manage to send off its officers and security forces to 
Taiwan. The Kuomintang was preoccupied with the enormous problems 
of Manchuria and Northern China where the Russians had begun 
looting the factories and the Chinese Communists were taking over 
with Russian help. The transfer of Taiwan was a comparatively 
minor affair, less important to the Nationalists than their other 
difficulties. Furthermore, in order to fulfil the mission of 
taking over the island, Chiang and his appointed Governor Chen Yi 
desperately needed assistance from the Allies to deal with the 
release and return to Japan of half a million Japanese soldiers, 
officers, and their dependents. To help the Nationalists, General 
Wedemeyer organised a US Army Advisory Group to assist with the 
transport of Chinese troops to Taiwan and the repatriation of 
Japanese forces and civilians. On October 25, 1945 the Japanese 
Governor General formally signed the surrender documents. Fifty 
years of Japanese colonial rule then officially ended.
Enthusiasm for "liberation" was short-lived on Taiwan, for 
the KMT proved themselves objectionable. Instead of being treated 
as a liberated province, Taiwan was governed by the mainlanders 
like an occupied territory. The economic collapse of Taiwan was
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the most serious consequence of the first 18 months of Chinese 
rule. Nationalist officers were accustomed to supplementing their 
low pay by various methods. Merchants, and even citizens, had to 
pay for government permits. The consequent "red tape" provided 
opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. The mainlanders placed 
all Japanese property under their own control. Fishing-boats were 
diverted by the officials to deliver food to the mainland. Banks 
began making heavy loans for private purposes and the value of 
the currency dropped dramatically. There is substantial evidence 
to prove that wealth was drained from Taiwan with little or no 
return to show for it. All this maladministration was, however, 
justified by the KMT rulers in the name of supporting the central 
government in the elimination of the "Communist bandits".
The further frustration of the Taiwanese crystallised in Jan. 
1947, when it was proposed that the introduction in Taiwan of the 
new constitution of the ROC should be postponed.(12) The reason 
given was that the Taiwanese had been under Japanese rule for too 
long and would be unable to abide by Chinese law. Throughout the 
year of 1946 they had been told that, when the new constitution 
took effect, the locally elected officials would exercise greater 
control over the police and public services. But now it appeared 
that the KMT military occupation would go on for an unspecified 
period. This not only caused insecurity about personal & property 
rights but the citizens continued to be precluded from participa­
tion in political affairs.lt was not an incomprehensible accident 
when on Feb. 27, 1947, the police fired on an angrily protesting 
crowd, and an overall uprising ensued.(13)
Like the many previous uprisings in Taiwan's history, the
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incident was a spark which ignited the whole anti-suppression and 
anti-exploitation movement throughout the island.In the following 
week, the governor's office was occupied, governor Chen Yi at one 
period had to go into hiding; the broadcasting station and news­
papers were taken over; the airfields and mass transportation 
systems were controlled by the "rebels"; even the military powder 
magazines were destroyed. Within a short time, the island was 
entirely under the islanders' control. A political Ad hoc Settle­
ment Committee was set up and a self-rule government proposed.
The uprising in Taiwan shocked many people and embarrassed the 
Nanjing government. Chiang Kai-shek asserted that the rebels were 
incited by the Communists. In order to prove that the CPC were 
responsible, the KMT claimed the incidents were purposely timed 
for Feb. 28, which in Chinese could be written as the character 
"Gong" Communist.(14) Chiang then ordered a task force to Taiwan. 
As soon as the expeditionaries arrived, Chiang instructed Chen Yi 
to make a brutal massacre of the rebel islanders in retaliation. 
At least 20.000 people were killed, executed or disappeared.(15) 
The international repercussions of the massacre were substantial. 
A letter from General Wedemeyer to the Secretary of State of the 
U.S., General Marshal^ described the incident as follows:
"Our experience is most enlightening. The adminis­
tration of the Governor Chen Yi has alienated the 
people from the Central Government.Many were forced 
to feel that conditions under autocratic rule (i.e.
Japan's rule) were preferable ........  The Central
Government lost a fine opportunity to indicate to 
the Chinese people, and to the world at large, its 
capability to provide honest and efficient adminis­
tration. They can not attribute their failure to 
the activities of the Communists or of dissident 
elements. The people anticipated sincerely and en­
thusiastically their deliverance from the Japanese
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yoke. However Chen Yi and his henchmen ruthlessly, 
corruptly and avariciously imposed their regime 
upon a happy and amenable population. The army con­
ducted themselves as conquerors. Secret police ope­
rated freely, intimidating and facilitating exploi­
tation by Central Government officials........There
were indications that Formosans would be receptive 
towards U.S. guardianship and UN trusteeship. They 
fear that the KMT government contemplates bleeding 
their island to support the tottering and corrupt 
Nanking machine, I think their fears well founded 
 n(16)
In May 1947 Chiang Kaishek dismissed Governor Chen Yi on the 
advice of Secretary Marshall, and appointed a moderate Governor, 
Wei Daoming. During his 18 month governorship, Wei tried to make 
a sincere, though largely ineffective, effort to ameliorate the 
living conditions of the Taiwanese. While the CPC was preparing 
their last assault across the Yangze river in the winter of 1948, 
Taiwan was assigned by the Nationalists to be the last resort for 
retreat. Wei was abruptly dismissed and his plans for improving 
economic and political conditions were completely wrecked. Chiang 
sent General Chen Chen, (who became Vice President and Premier of 
the ROC in the 50s and 60s) to govern Taiwan so as to ensure the 
safety of the island. Meanwhile, Chiang's elder son Ching-kuo was 
appointed KMT party chief on Taiwan.
While the Taiwanese experienced a painful time with the KMT, 
people on the mainland suffered no less severely. The end of the 
war with Japan did not restore peace in China. The power struggle 
between the KMT and the CPC, which had been suspended when Japan 
invaded China's heartland in 1937, was again resumed. Though long 
lasting, but fruitless, political negotiations were somehow kept 
alive, the two parties nevertheless were resolved to settle their 
differences in a final showdown. The Chinese Civil War once again 
exploded in 1946. The U.S. had tried to prevent the disaster for
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the sake of maintaining her interests in China and in East Asia. 
President Truman attempted to impose a more even-handed policy - 
proposing that Chiang should share power with Mao. To further 
this, the U.S. had reduced military aid to the KMT in order to 
restrain Chiang's attacks on the CPC. Meanwhile, General Marshall 
was sent to China to bring about a peaceful unification of China. 
After long and tiring peace-making efforts, he failed to achieve 
any satisfactory result for either side.(17)
The Civil War resulted in fatal disaster for Chiang Kaishek. 
The KMT were swept out of Manchuria and Northern China by the end 
of 1947. Beijing fell to the CPC, with the help of Chiang's most 
reliable top-ranking military officials. They defected to the CPC 
with 3 quarters of a million of the best equipped troops. Chiang, 
therefore, lost the great post-war advantage which U.S. support 
afforded him. The real turning-point of the Civil War came after 
the KMT troops were decisively defeated at the battle of Huaihai 
on the plain of the Yellow River. When the PLA safely crossed the 
river on the way south, the total collapse of the Nanjing regime 
was only a matter of time. Chiang was blamed by his political 
rivals within the KMT group for initiating the war and it was 
claimed, should take personal responsibility. His authority in 
the party weakened and his leadership in doubt, Chiang was forced 
out of his post as president. He resigned at end of 1948, and the 
Presidency was assumed by Vice-President Li Zongren, one of 
Chiang's long-term precarious partners. The change of leadership 
was welcomed by the US government. Having support from the White 
House, Li made a serious effort to negotiate with the Communists. 
Due to the weakness of the KMT, the lack of sincerity of the CPC,
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and discord among the KMT group, hardly any substantial agreement 
was anticipated.
Chiang Kaishek's decision to take refuge on Taiwan was crucial. 
Following the collapse of the Nationalists on mainland China, he 
quietly instructed his son to make the final preparations for the 
retreat to the island. Taiwan, obviously, was the most defensible 
place to which Chiang and his followers could retreat. Separated 
from the mainland by a hundred miles of choppy water and further 
isolated by the unfriendly monsoon weather, the island would be a 
difficult fortress for the Communists to attack, lacking, as they 
did, sufficient strength on the sea and in the air. Internally, 
after the incident of February 1947, the anti-KMT dissidents had 
been either executed, imprisoned or exiled. The newly-formed 
Taiwanese Independence Organisations in Hongkong and Japan lacked 
sufficient strength to challenge Chiang's position in Taiwan.(18)
From Jan. 1948 to the Autumn of 1949, about 1.5 million main­
landers moved into Taiwan to live among the 6 million Taiwanese. 
To prevent communist underground agents from stirring up local 
dissatisfaction with the defeated Central Government, and to cir­
cumvent the impact of the Taiwan independence movement on the un­
reliable islanders, Martial Law was imposed on Taiwan. The so 
called "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of 
Communist Rebellion" were adopted, suspending the implementation 
of the Constitution of 1947, and empowering Chiang Kaishek to 
promulgate his own laws»(19) For the forty ensuing years the 
people of Taiwan had been living under martial law.
On Oct. 1, 1949, with most of the mainland provinces already 
held by the CPC, Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the
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PRC. The day after the "People's Central Government" was founded, 
the Soviet Union extended recognition to the new regime. Having 
been cold-shouldered by the PRC leaders, the U.S. then issued a 
statement on 3rd October, reaffirming its recognition of the KMT 
government, which had moved down to Guangzhou from Nanjing.(20) 
At the same time Chiang Kaishek set up his "temporary" Capital of 
the defeated regime in Taibei. Taiwan, then, was established as 
his last base from which to seek to attack the Communists and re­
cover the mainland. "Xiaomie Gongfei, Guangfu Dalu" (Wipe out the 
red bandits and recover the mainland.) became the official slogan 
of the KMT. With this slogan Chiang tried to justify and 
legitimise his minority rule of Taiwan.
Chiang arrived in Taiwan on Christmas Eve of 1949 and resumed 
his presidency in March 1950. Soon international history turned 
another page. The Korean War led the US and the newly-formed PRC 
into direct confrontation. Chiang was at that time on his way to 
India, Korea and the Philippines in an effort to form an Anti- 
Communist Front League. Although Chiang failed to win any subs­
tantial support from the Asian leaders for his anti-communist 
cause, the American intervention, however, protected the KMT from 
possible Communist attack. The Taiwan issue was hence inter­
nationalised and it was to become a major point of international 
conflict in the years ahead.
C .  THE  KOREAN WAR AND T A I W A N  1 9 5 0  - 5 3
Although they are separated by 700 miles of the western
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Pacific Ocean, Taiwan and Korea have shared a, somewhat, similar 
destiny for much of the past hundred years. The Sino-Japanese war 
of 1894-85, concerning a dispute over Korean suzerainty, resulted 
in Taiwan being ceded to Japan in perpetuity.The attack by the 
North Korean forces against the South in June 1950, which brought 
the PRC and the U.S. into direct conflict, also changed the fate 
of Taiwan.
After the military victory of the CPC on the mainland, it 
became obvious that without Soviet air and naval support, Beijing 
could hardly fulfil their ambition to cross the Strait and rid 
themselves of the Nationalist remnants. During his lengthy stay 
in Moscow, between Dec. 1949 and Feb. 1950, Mao and Stalin had 
signed a treaty of Sino-Soviet Alliance which included the clause 
"In the event of an invasion of the signatory countries by a 
third country, the other signatory coun-try shall render 
assistance by all means at its disposal"(21^This agreement, 
seemingly,would give the CPC the green light to attack the KMT on 
Taiwan. In December 1949 and January 1950, Kim II Song of North 
Korea and Ho Chi Min of North Vietnam made their secret trips to 
Moscow to meet Mao and Stalin. According to a research by Liang 
Jindong, the four communist leaders had set out a schedule that 
the liberation of Taiwan and the unification of Korea were the 
first priority of the world communist liberation movements in 
1950.(22)
While the communist leaders were having their clandestine 
meeting in Moscow, Washington had made an announcement concerning 
its policy towards Taiwan. The statement of President Truman of 
America reads
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".......  the United States has no desire to obtain
special rights or privileges or establish military 
bases in Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any 
intention of utilising its armed forces to inter­
fere in the present situation.... The United States
government will not pursue a course which will lead 
to involvement in the civil conflict in China. 
Similarly, the United States government will not 
provide military aid or advice to Formosa.1 (23)
In the light of this statement, it seems that the stance of
the U.S. could be explained in two ways; 1). to tell Soviet
Russia that no other power should intervene in China's unfinished
civil war i.e., the liberation of Taiwan. 2). to indicate tacitly
to the PRC that the US government was prepared to accept and even
recognise China's new regime, so long as the PRC did not pursue
its policy of ^ Leaning to One Side**. Underlying Truman's statement,
then, was the expectation that the US and the PRC would establish
a better relationship. But, this expectation was not fulfilled.
The formation of the Sino-USSR Alliance meant that no possible
modus vivendi between the PRC and the US could be envisaged.
The full-scale attack by North Korean forces against the South 
provided the US with a good pretext for reversing its policy on 
Taiwan. Washington claimed that Kim II Song was fighting a Soviet 
proxy war, that the US was therefore justified in protecting the 
KMT on Taiwan as a way of stopping Communist expansionism. Forty- 
eight hours after the war broke out, President Truman declared a 
U-turn in U.S. policy on Taiwan;
" The attack upon Korea makes it plain 
beyond doubt that communism has passed beyond 
the use of subversion to conquer independent 
nations and will now use armed invasion and 
war. It has defied the orders of the Security 
Council of the United Nations issued to 
preserve international peace and security. In 
this circumstances, the occupation of Formosa 
by Communist forces would be a direct threat 
to the security of the Pacific area and to
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United States forces performing their lawful 
and necessary functions in that area. 
Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet 
to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a 
corollary of this action, I am calling upon 
the Chinese government on Formosa to cease all 
air and sea operations against the mainland.
The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.
The determination of the future status of 
Formosa must await the restoration of security 
in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, 
or consideration by the United Nations."(24)
This emergency measure of neutralising the Taiwan Strait not 
only impelled Washington to intervene directly in the unfinished 
Chinese civil war, but also forced the PRC to regard the US as 
its implacable enemy. Moreover, the decision to abandon Chiang 
Kaishek to his fate and to eschew legal quibbling over Taiwan had 
been duly reversed.
A few hours after Truman's statement, Zhou Enlai, the PRC's 
Premier and Foreign Minister asserted that the U.S. actions cons­
tituted naked aggression against the territory of China and total 
violation of the UN Charter. Zhou also charged that Truman's 
statement openly exposed and put into operation his premeditated 
plan of invading Taiwan and other Asian nations. The PRC angrily 
rebutted the U.S. assertion that the status of Taiwan was unde­
termined and accused Washington of seeking to gain control over 
Taiwan with its imperialist "wolf in sheep's clothing" ambitions. 
Zhou then declared that "no matter what obstructive action the US 
imperialists may take, the fact that Taiwan is part of China will 
remain unchanged. And Chinese will fight to the end to 'liberate' 
Taiwan from the grasp of the American aggressors."(25)
The highlights of the conflict between the PRC and the US on 
the Korean peninsula have been discussed in many books, and one
73
would not wish to repeat them. The effects on the Taiwan issue of 
the Sino-US war in Korea were, however, l).a radical change in US 
policy towards Taiwan and 2). the prolonging of the Nationalists 
controversial status in the international arena.
Before the Korean War broke out, the PRC had demanded the seat 
in the United Nations. However, at that time, the majority of the 
members of the UN were strongly influenced by the foreign policy 
of the US, and still recognised the ROC as representing China in 
this world body. On July 6, 1950, ten days after the US dispatch 
of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, Zhou Enlai telegrammed 
the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie protesting that the US action 
constituted an act of open aggression. On August 24 and September 
17, Zhou cabled twice to the Security Council stating that as the 
sole legal government representing the Chinese people, the PRC 
government accused the US of armed aggression and requested the 
Council to take action against the US. Furthermore, Zhou claimed 
that being the accuser in this case his government had the right 
and indeed, the obligation, to send its delegation to participate 
in the proceedings of the Security Council. The Security Council 
adopted the solution of inviting the PRC to attend its meeting. 
The agenda item "Complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan" was duly 
set for debate on November 27th, 1950.(26)
The PRC accepted the invitation of the Security Council. On 
November 28, 1950, Wu Xiuquan, leader of the PRC delegation, made 
a lengthy speech attacking the US armed aggression against China. 
Wu categorically rejected the US view that the status of Taiwan 
had yet to be decided by international negotiation, and asserting 
that "...long before Christopher Columbus discovered America, the
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Chinese people were already in Taiwan, and long before the United 
States achieved its own independence, Taiwan had already become 
an inseparable part of the territory of China. In particular, the 
US had never questioned the Chinese right to exercise sovereignty 
over the island, after World War II".(27) Wu repeatedly protested 
that,in no sense whatsoever,can the civil war in Korea be used as 
a justification or pretext for US aggression against Taiwan. He 
asked the members of the Security Councils "....Is it conceivable 
that because of a civil war in Spain, Italy should be entitled to 
occupy the French territory of Corsica ? If a country dispatched 
its naval fleet between Hawaii and the US mainland,divided up its 
territory and prevented the US from exercising sovereignty there, 
while at the same time alleging that such action has been taken 
for the military neutralisation of Hawaii in order to safeguard 
security in the Pacific, would American tolerate that 1"(28) In 
his speech, apart from demanding that the delegates of the KMT 
should be expelled and the delegates of the PRC admitted, Wu also 
proposed that the UN Security Council:(29) -
1). - openly condemn and take concrete action against the US
government for its criminal acts of armed aggression against the 
Chinese territory of Taiwan.
2). - adopt effective measures to bring about the complete
withdrawal by the US government of its forces from Taiwan.
3). - immediately adopt effective measures to bring about 
the withdrawal from Korea of the armed forces of the US and other 
countries and leave it to the Korean people to settle their 
domestic affairs.
Despite the strong speech of Wu Xiuquan, the draft resolution 
of "condemnation of the US armed aggression" against China was
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rejected by the Council by nine votes to one with one abstention. 
During the same period, the USSR and the US each sponsored an 
agenda item concerning Taiwan in the General Assembly. The debate 
in the General Assembly reached no conclusion on restraining US 
forces from exercising in the Taiwan Strait. The motion then pro­
posed by Britain, that to adjourn consideration of the item "in 
view of the unsettled state of the situation in the Far East" was 
accepted.(30) From then on, no further debate on the Taiwan issue 
was held, until the Taiwan Strait Crisis reappeared in 1954-55.
While the Taiwan issue was being heatedly debated in the UN, 
the MaCarthyite red scare convinced many American people that the 
Chinese communists were a dangerous, aggressive power threatening 
world peace. The U.S. then pursued a controversial policy towards 
Taiwan. A delegation sent from General MacArthur's headquarters 
in Tokyo arrived in Taiwan to assess the military needs of the 
KMT. Soon the US 13th Air Force set up liaison offices in Taipei; 
92 million dollars of military and economic aid was allocated for 
the KMT government in 1951 and increased annually thereafter.(31) 
Thousands of army personnel were prepared for a long-term, if not 
permanent, stay on Taiwan. The American charge' d'affaires in 
Taiwan, Karl L. Rankin later commented on the policy:
"The US program for Taiwan was on a comprehensive, 
medium to long-term basis which foresees making the 
island economically self-supporting except for such 
assistance as may be required to maintain a larger- 
than-normal military establishment until peace and 
security are re-established in the Far East,"(32)
The outbreak of the Korean War also caused a problem regarding 
the international legal status of Taiwan, because the signing of 
the post war Japanese peace treaty had been delayed and the out­
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come of the Chinese civil war had made it difficult for Tokyo and 
Washington to insist that the ROC government on Taiwan still be 
regarded as the sole legal signatory on behalf of China.(33)After 
the PRC's assertion in the UN that the US had perpetrated armed 
aggression against Chinese territory, the US would need a legal 
basis to justify its positions that it was necessary "to prevent 
the Chinese Communists' attempting to invade Taiwan, so as to 
maintain the security and peace of East Asia".(34^ Washington, 
then, repeated that the international status of Taiwan was yet to 
be determined. Later, the US inserted some ambiguous provisions 
about the unsettled legal status of Taiwan in the Japanese Peace 
Treaty.
The negotiations on the Japanese Peace Treaty started in June 
1951 in San Francisco. Neither the PRC nor the ROC was invited to 
the peace conference. On the one hand,Britain and others that had 
recognised the PRC as the legitimate government of China strongly 
opposed the ROC's participation; on the other hand, the US would 
in no way consider accepting the PRC as a participant, since the 
hot war was continuing in Korea and Zhou Enlai repeatedly charged 
that the US draft peace treaty violated the Cairo Declaration and 
the Potsdam Proclamation by failing to provide for the return of 
Taiwan to the PRC. The treaty was signed in Sept. 1951, however, 
the status of Taiwan remained uncertain. Article 2 reads "Japan 
renounces all rights, titles and claims to Formosa and the Pesca­
dores." Article 26 makes the provisions that "Japan will prepare 
to conclude a bilateral treaty with any state which signed or 
adhered to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, and 
which is at war with Japan."(35)
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Under American instruction, the ROC-Japanese peace Treaty was 
initiated with a formula that 1) it should avoid the possible 
implication in the wording that after the conclusion of the 
treaty, Taiwan legally became a part of Chinese territory, 2) the 
treaty is applicable only to those areas under the control of the 
ROC. Chiang Kaishek was angry and disappointed at the proposal, 
for it would impair his claim to the Chinese mainland and the 
ROC's position in the UN as the only legal government of China. 
Potentially more damaging was the likelihood that, if he signed 
the peace treaty, the KMT regime, for as long as it was based on 
Taiwan, would have to face a challenge of its legitimacy from the 
Taiwanese who made up 85% of the population of the ROC yet shared 
no power in the government. Taking into consideration the whole 
situation at that time, however, Chiang had no option but to bow 
to the US formula. It was hard to "drink poison to quench ones 
thirst" as Chiang at the time told his Foreign Minister, George 
Yeh, sometimes one may have to.(36)
The PRC faced a harder U.S. policy after General Eisenhower 
was elected president in November 1952, and appointed John Foster 
Dulles as his Secretary of State. Eisenhower's first act was the 
unleashing of Chiang Kaishek, by modifying Truman's orders to the 
Seventh Fleet; no longer would it have to prevent the KMT attacks 
upon the mainland from Formosa.(37) It was understandable that a 
major Nationalist attack was unlikely without US support, but the 
gesture signalled the new administration's tougher attitude. The 
main purpose of unleashing Chiang, according to Eisenhower, was 
to put the PRC on notice that the days of stalemate in Korea were 
numbered; that the War could either end or be extended beyond the
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Korean Peninsula. Following the death of Stalin,the tough gesture 
of Washington, somehow, did bring the Korean war to an end. The 
hostilities between the PRC and the US however did not diminish.
D.  T E S T I N G  OF THE NEW M O D A L I T I E S  1 9 5 4  - 5 8
During the Korean War, the US had completed several mutual 
defence treaties with East Asian and Pacific countries. When the 
cease fire agreement of the Korean War was finally signed in July 
1953, the US concluded a similar security treaty for the protec­
tion of South Korea.(38) Since the conclusion of Korean Military 
Armistice Agreement, the reason for US intervention in the Taiwan 
Strait area no longer existed. A US-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty was 
therefore considered necessary. Moreover, in hardening the US 
attitude toward Communist expansion in South East Asia, President 
Eisenhower promoted the formation of the South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO), which was designed to support the US global 
strategy of containment. Beijing regarded these measures as 
offensive and reacted decisively.
Five days before the SEATO treaty was signed, the PRC laid 
down a heavy artillery barrage against the offshore islands of 
Jinmen (Quemoy), Mazus (Matsus) and Dachens (Tachens) which were 
still occupied by the Nationalists. The crisis intensified as the 
PLA took over the Dachens. Meanwhile, the concentration of troops 
on the mainland opposite Taiwan increased. The US response to the 
new crisis was to complete a Mutual Defence Treaty with the ROC
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in December 1954. The treaty committed the US to defending Taiwan 
and Penghu, and left open the question of the defence of the off­
shore islands. The PRC again denounced the treaty and reaffirmed 
its determination to liberate Taiwan.(39)
In April 1955, the tension of the Taiwan Strait crisis was 
somewhat reduced by Zhou Enlai, during the course of the Afro- 
Asian conference at Bangdung, Indonesia. At the conference, Zhou 
issued a statement expressing "the Five Points Principles of Co­
existence" .(40) He also indicated that the PRC's willingness to 
negotiate with the US. Secretary Dulles cautiously examined the 
proposal and later accepted the holding of talks at ambassadorial 
level. The negotiations started first in August 1955, in Geneva, 
later moved to Warsaw. The Sino-US talks lasted about 16 years, 
until President Nixson's visit to Beijing in 1972. During these 
long negotiations, apart from the mutual return of civilians, no 
crucial issue was conceded by either side. The US was determined 
to maintain the ROC on Taiwan and was anxious to get the Chinese 
to agree to renounce force in the Taiwan area. The PRC, however, 
were not prepared to surrender their right to use force in the 
settlement of a dispute over the unfinished civil war.(41)
With the ultimate objective of securing the removal of the 7th 
Fleet from the Taiwan area, the PRC made a counterproposal to get 
the US to agree to mutual renunciation of force as its long term 
strategy. The PRC then openly advocated a peaceful liberation of 
Taiwan. (42) This offer was rejected by both the KMT and the US. 
The Kuomintang argued that the Communists' offer was an insulting 
gesture; what needed liberation was not Taiwan but the mainland. 
It also regarded the peace offensive as an attempt to"bewitch the 
people of the free world, wreck the unity among the free loving
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countries and isolate the United States".(43) The US did not make 
any positive response to the proposal, since the PRC's position 
at the Geneva talks had not changed.
From Beijing's point of view, the dangers inherent in the 
stalemate over the Taiwan issue were partly due to the KMT's 
reliance on what was known as US brinkmanship and containment 
policy toward the PRC; and partly stemmed from the need to keep 
the status of Taiwan undetermined in order to justify US forces 
remaining in Taiwan. For this reason, the PRC started to accuse 
the US of intransigence, and to denounce American dilatoriness at 
the Ambassadorial talks.
The Chinese posture in foreign affairs had become harder in 
1957,when Mao Zedong made his celebrated speech at the 20th World
Communist Conference in Moscow declaring that "the East Wind had
prevailed over the West Wind". When the Middle East crisis broke 
in July 1958,Mao believed that that was an opportunity to test US 
intentions, to see how much protection it would give Taiwan.(44) 
On August 23, the PLA laid down a massive artillery bombardment 
of Jinmen and Mazu islands. The US prompt reaction was not only 
to pledge American support for the ROC in the event of an attack 
on it,but also to deploy 6 aircraft carriers and nearly a hundred 
warships along the Taiwan Strait to protect Taiwan from further 
PRC attacks. Despite this firm attitude of the US, on September 
4, the Chinese claimed that their territorial waters extended for 
12 miles offshore. This was a clear challenge to the American
navy which convoyed Nationalist supply vessels to the offshore
islands. Dulles staunchly rejected the 12-mile claim and 
justified his right to defend the Nationalists under the terms of
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the "Formosa resolution".(45)
The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 caused much alarm in the 
world community. It had also revealed problems between the PRC 
and the USSR. Mao was rather disappointed by Mpscow's reticence 
during the crisis. Khrushchev was equally unhappy about the way 
the Chinese had initiated a new conflict which could threaten the 
safety of the tense bipolar world. The Chinese Foreign Minister 
Chen Yi recalled in his unpublished memoirs that "In relation to 
the problem of Taiwan, Moscow did not honour the promise made in 
the Treaty. It was inevitable that our relationship was seriously 
jeopardised because of this unfair master and servants mentality 
which still remains.... We should understand that the recovery of 
our fatherland can not depend on any one but ourselves".(46) At 
some point in 1959 and 1960s, Mao made a decision to struggle 
against the Soviet foreign policy and Khrushchev personally which 
he worked for peaceful coexistence with America.(4 7)
Chen Yi also commented on the issue stating: "I fully agree 
with Comrade Enlai, to solve the Taiwan problem by negotiation 
would be better, even though the US imperialists have not been 
talking to us sincerely, but time is on our side."(48) This idea, 
indeed, contradicted Mao's speech at the Supreme State Committee 
Conference on September 5, 1958, in which he expressed the belief 
that the Taiwan Straits crisis had brought the US to the gallows. 
What was the point of negotiating with a person whose head lay in 
one's noose ? The difference in attitudes between China and the 
USSR and among the PRC leaders,in a certain sense, had prolonged, 
as well as stabilised the crisis on the Taiwan issue. Beijing 
Radio first broadcast that the PRC would be ready to wait "five
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or ten years" to settle the problem of Taiwan, then on October 25 
the PRC Defence Minister, Peng Dehuai, announced an "even-date" 
cease-fire on the offshore islands. Meanwhile the Sino-US talks 
in Warsaw which were suspended by the Straits crisis resumed, but 
"changed from the diplomatic talks to that of s t a l e m a t e (49)
The US, on the other hand, was also put in an awkward situa­
tion by the Straits crisis, for it had caused the Western powers 
to put tremendous pressure on the US Government to abandon the 
defence of the offshore islands. The Western Bloc worried that a 
direct confrontation between the PRC and the US would turn the 
Cold War into a world-wide conflict. President Eisenhower and his 
Secretary of State therefore pressed Chiang Kaishek to reduce the 
Nationalist garrisons on the islands, once there was a ceasefire. 
During the offshore islands crisis, US-ROC high level talks were 
held in Taibei. Dulles stressed that the US would restrain the 
ROC's military activities. Chiang therefore realised that the US 
protection was limited and conditional.
The Chinese did not respond positively to Dulles' remarks on 
the offshore islands. They seem to have become concerned lest the 
Americans were attempting to force the Nationalists' withdrawal 
from the mainland coast in order to secure the so-called "Two 
Chinas" solution to end the Chinese civil war. The People's Daily 
Editorial on October 30, 1958 clearly expressed this fear:
The creation of "Two Chinas", it must be pointed 
out, is merely a matter of expediency for the 
United States. The United States wants first to 
separate Taiwan from China and then to isolate it 
completely, so as to facilitate its control over 
the Chiang Kaishek clique and strengthen its
occupation of Taiwan  Once Taiwan becomes a "de
facto political unit" independent of China, the 
United States could use some pretext or other to 
place it under trusteeship. In this way, the United
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States would make a double gain: on the one hand, 
it would legalise its seizure of Taiwan and turn 
that island into a US colony; at the same time, by 
involving certain other countries, it would get 
them to share its responsibility for the 
aggression. The Chiang Kaishek clique clearly has 
no place in this sinister scheme. Nixon (the Vice- 
President) declared that the aim of the United 
States in the Far East was to make Taiwan an 
"island of freedom" rather than "to tie the United 
States policy to Chiang Kaishek." Isn't the meaning 
of these words clear enough ? (50)
A similar stance could be found in Peng Dehwai's broadcast,
in which he appealed to "compatriots in Taiwan" to join the PRC 
and achieve national unity so as not to fall into the US subtle 
plot to isolate Taiwan and place it under trusteeship.(51^Chen Yi 
also told foreign diplomats in Beijing on December 16, 1958 that 
"the PRC's policy was either to liberate all the offshore islands
Taiwan together, or to preserve the present situation".(52) The
1958 Straits crisis did not change any territorial controls, and 
the PRC has thereafter not attempted to seize or blockade the 
offshore islands.
During Taiwan Straits crises in 1954-55 and 1958, the PRC 
attempted to solve the Taiwan issue by military means. But, in so 
doing, they ran the risk of confrontation with the US. Despite 
being stalemated by the excessive intransigence, emotionalism and 
mistrust of both sides, the Sino-US talks held in Geneva and 
Warsaw, totalling over 130 rounds of negotiations, considerably 
reduced the risks of escalation of their political sparring. All 
these military and non-military attempts to settle the Taiwan 
dispute have reflected themselves as the new modalities of Sino- 
U.S. relations combining external and internal interactions: both 
sides were testing the response of their enemy. The leaders of 
the PRC and the U.S. realised that seeking a solution to the
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potentially explosive issue of Taiwan was almost impossible at 
that time and in such a sensitive international atmosphere. 
Therefore, each side tacitly acquiesced in maintaining a fragile 
peace in the area of the Taiwan Straits. For the PRC, a prolonged 
impasse over reunification with Taiwan was consequently 
inevitable. On the other hand,instead of overtly claiming its 
global strategic interests, the U.S. was asserting that to fight 
Communist expansionism by preventing Taiwan from being ravaged by 
the PRC was a matter of moral principle.
E .  THE S T A B L E  C R I S I S  1 9 5 9  - 71
The Great Leap Forward, initiated by Mao Zedong in 1958, soon 
turned out to be a calamity to the Chinese on the mainland. With 
the decline of agricultural production in the newly established 
communes, the total failure of the project of so-called the 
backyard steel mills and further suffering caused by adverse 
weather conditions, China painfully struggled through the three 
bitter years(1959-62). In terms of international relations, the 
worst was that while external pressure from the US showed no sign 
of lessening, it was evident that the Sino-Soviet alliance had 
been damaged when Moscow abruptly stopped its economic aid and 
withdrew its technicians from the PRC in 1960. The deep Sino- 
American hostility and the new Sino-Soviet rifts put China in the 
position of being challenged by both superpowers. Mao and the 
other PRC leaders therefore perceived that domestic conditions 
and the international situation impelled China either to be a 
member of the socialist camp under Soviet leadership, or to stand
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on its own feet and play a critical role in the world community. 
Mao led the PRC to choose latter. China proclaimed that it would 
achieve socialist reconstruction through self-reliance and pursue 
its fully independent international status.(53) From 1960 onwards 
the PRC's major foreign policy goals, such as security, political 
and economic independence, and reunification, have remained in 
remarkably high profile. But the Taiwan issue which had long been 
complicated by international involvement was not susceptible to 
an internal solution as the PRC had always hoped. The issue, 
therefore, has remained in a rather delicate but stable balance.
While leaders in Beijing were drown into the problems of 
domestic, political disputes and socialist family quarrels, the 
U.S. showed its interest in pursuing a "Two Chinas" or "One China 
One Taiwan" policy. When John Kennedy was elected president of 
the US in 1960, he felt dissatisfied with his predecessors' 
failure to break new ground on China policy. And the difference 
between his new administration and Eisenhower's has been much 
demonstrated. Throughout his White House years, Eisenhower 
supported Chiang Kaishek's claim that the ROC on Taiwan was the 
sole legal Government of China. Kennedy, however, indicated, even 
before his election, that he was prepared to think in terms of 
some form of a two-Chinas solution. In an interview with a 
correspondent of the British Sunday Times on July 3, 1960,
Kennedy confirmed that "it might be possible that Formosa could 
be recognised as an independent country".(54) The PRC, disturbed 
by the new attitude, in return, spewed unremitting vituperation 
upon President Kennedy throughout his presidency.
During John Kennedy's administration, various formulas for
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"two Chinas" were proposed:(55)
1). An independent state of Taiwan : According to this formula, 
the US would force the KMT to withdraw their troops from the off­
shore islands, and then Taiwan would be declared "Independent" 
and made a new member of the UN, while the PRC would be admitted 
into the UN and the Security Council on condition they undertook 
not to liberate Taiwan by force.
2). Placing Taiwan under the UN trusteeship or protection : The 
rationale behind this formula stemmed from the the fact that the 
"status of Taiwan remained unsettled". It was vital to allow the 
inhabitants of Taiwan to determine their destiny by plebiscite, 
supervised by the United Nations.
3). The "two successor states" formula : This "successor states" 
formula was explicitly advocated by US Under-Secretary of State, 
Chester Bowles in July 1961. He envisaged that both the PRC and 
the ROC on Taiwan could be regarded as "successors" to China and 
Taiwan. The ROC would be allowed to continue to sit in the UN, 
while the PRC should apply to the Credentials Committee of the 
General Assembly for approval to occupy a seat in the General 
Assembly.
4). One and a half Chinas: The main idea behind this formula was 
to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Taiwan, and turn Taiwan into 
an autonomous area which would retain the right to handle its 
foreign affairs independently. To achieve that, the PRC should be 
accepted as having the right to a seat in the UN, while giving 
Taiwan a separate seat in the international body. The formula was 
initiated by one of Kennedy's senior advisors, John K. Fairbank.
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All the overtures made by the US were linked with the UN seat. 
Since 1951, the US had secured a majority in the General Assembly 
to postpone discussion of the Taiwan issue and the Soviet move to 
seat the PRC. But this support declined over the years. Having 
rejected the PRC's claim to Taiwan, Kennedy's tactical change on 
the Chinese seat in the UN, was to reclassify Chinese representa­
tion as an important question which required a two-third majority 
to be passed. The device of the "important issue" resulted in 
excluding the PRC from the UN for another ten years.
The PRC denounced the aforementioned "Two Chinas" formulas, 
as absurd. The People's Daily Editorial of July 14, 1961, "There 
is only one China, Not two" vehemently accused the US government, 
declaring that:
"The Kennedy government, like his predecessor's, 
still recognised the KMT clique as an independent 
political entity and is now attempting to name the 
KMT clique as a successor state to China in the UN 
so as to create a situation of a big China and a 
small China existing side by side and on a par with
each other......  The only difference is that
Kennedy's predecessor used the 'half and half' 
division method to break China up into two, while 
Kennedy is using the 'two-times-one-is-two' 
multiplication method to transform one China into 
two Chinas. In fact this 'two Chinas' policy is a 
continuation of the US policy of aggression and
hostility towards China ........  The Chinese
people will never tolerate any interference in 
China's internal affairs, - in the liberation of 
Taiwan, or any encroachment on China's sovereignty 
or splitting of China's territory."(56)
It is important to note that the above fourth formula of "One 
and a half Chinas". John Fairbank thought the Two Chinas concept 
was unpopular,therefore he proposed that "instead of imposing the 
obnoxious term 'Two Chinas' from the outside, we might better 
describe the situation realistically in Chinese terms as one of 
Peking's suzerainty and Taipei's autonomy".(57) Officially, the
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PRC though never accepted the idea,Chen Yi's Memoir mentions that 
Premier Zhou Enlai had discussed this issue with Mr. x x(58)
Mr. x x : " Prime Minister, what do you think of the Fei
Zhengqing's (Fairbank's) formula of a One and a half China(s)
solution to Taiwan ?"
Premier Zhou:" I think it's interesting, don't you ? He had 
lived in China for long enough to know Chinese tastes and 
appetite, but this small appetiser seems mixed with the wrong 
ingredients, prepared by the wrong chef and served at the wrong 
occasion, I suppose."
Mr. x x : "Who can cook Jingcai (Peking style dishes.) then
Prime Minister, and what are the right ingredients ?"
Premier: "Would you mind if one day Chiang Kaishek were
sitting beside us here ? I believe that would be a good thing for
all Chinese people. Nevertheless, the Americans are always naive. 
How can two hats be put on one and a half heads ? The Chairman 
(Mao) joked with me the other day saying Generalissimo Chiang was 
quite right to hate Fei Zhengqing, because he attempted to cut
off half of Chiang's head."
This conversation reveals that the leaders of the PRC did
consider the feasibility of peaceful negotiations with Chiang 
Kaishek, even in the early 1960s. But the PRC leaders certainly 
would not accept any settlement of the Taiwan issue arranged by 
the international powers, nor would the PRC accept two China 
seats in the UN. Chen yi has clearly written conditions for a 
settlement of the Taiwan issue including;
1). Taiwan to be permanently recognised as an autonomous 
region, but within Chinese sovereignty.
89
2). The Nationalists to retain armed forces on Taiwan and 
Penghu. Jinmen and Mazu should be kept as non-military areas. 
Beijing send no armed forces to Taiwan and Penghu for a specified 
period, (ideally 10-20 years).
3). The Kuomintang leader to be appointed a Vice-Chairman of 
the PRC. Chiang Kaishek to be considered as a Co-chairman of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
4). The PRC to assume all diplomatic representation abroad. 
Taiwan could retain cultural, trading and non-official relations 
with other countries or international organisations under the 
Central Government's consent.
5). Following a third instance of co-operation between the 
CPC and the KMT, Taiwan would be requested to dissolve the US 
alliance, and the US forces to be withdrawn.(59)
Due to the "three bitter years", food shortages and unrest 
were acute in many parts of the mainland. In addition there were 
border tensions between the Soviet Union and China, and India and 
China. Chiang Kaishek then announced in his New year message that 
his army was ready to take the opportunity to launch an attack on 
the Communists to "recover" the mainland. Kennedy did not support 
this idea. Instead, he reaffirmed the defensive character of the 
American commitment to Taiwan and Penghu.(60) A potential Taiwan 
Strait crisis was once again defused.
Since 1963 the Taiwan Straits have been relatively quiet. 
The even-date ceasefire to the offshore islands initiated by the 
PRC in October 1958, had been tacitly regularised by both sides. 
Although Washington had, as mentioned, carefully shifted to a de 
facto "Two Chinas" policy, the Sino-US talks were maintained
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uninterrupted in Warsaw. The failure of the PRC to take Taiwan by 
force compelled it to adopt a long-term political strategy on the 
Taiwan issue, to keep the PRC's claim to the sovereignty over 
Taiwan alive; otherwise, a de facto status quo could gradually 
have crystallised into a de jure situation which would eventually 
undermine the PRC's ultimate goal of "liberating" Taiwan. Apart 
from making overtures to the KMT, the PRC lost no opportunity to 
show its continuing concern over the Taiwan issue.(61)
In 1964, two events crucial for Beijing's Taiwan policy 
occurred.In January the PRC announced the establishment of diplo­
matic relations with France. At the suggestion of the US, Taibei 
did not follow its previous practice of breaking diplomatic ties 
with any state which had recognised the PRC; meanwhile,Paris also 
made no move to sever relations with Taibei. Zhou Enlai then 
issued a statement that the PRC would never tolerate an attempt 
by any country to create "two Chinas" and would never establish 
diplomatic relations with such countries. Two weeks later, the 
French President de Gaulle changed his attitude and stated that 
France would recognise only one China. The second important event 
in that year occurred on October 16, when Zhou announced that the 
PRC had successfully completed its first nuclear test. The reper­
cussions of this were, perhaps, indicated by the 47 to 47 vote on 
the Chinese representation issue in the following year's UN 
General Assembly. In facing up to the new situation, the majority 
of US Senators favoured a shift in China policy from that of 
thorough antagonism to "containment without isolation". Scholars, 
too, advised that the U.S. would not be able to continue 
indefinitely sustaining the fiction that the Nationalist regime
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is the government of all China.(62)
Soon the Cultural Revolution broke out and created enormous 
turmoil in China. The convulsions of the Cultural Revolution left 
the PRC leaders with little time to spare for foreign affairs. 
Chiang Kaishek, now in his eighties, had less ambition to fulfil 
his long-held dream of recovering the mainland. Despite a message 
declaring that counterattacks should be considered, no military 
action was undertaken by the KMT. Throughout the 1966-69 Cultural 
Revolution, the PRC maintained an uncompromising attitude on the 
issue of Taiwan. (See chapter 3.)
In 1969 the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution began to calm 
down, but the tension in Sino-Soviet relations deepened, culmina­
ting in armed conflict at Zhenbaodao (Damansky Island) in the
Ussuri River. In order to escape from the mounting pressure
applied by the US and the USSR at that time, with the further
need of releasing itself from its isolated position created
during the Cultural Revolution, the PRC then made a tactical
change in its policy on the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with others countries. For example, in negotiations with Canada 
on the establishment of diplomatic relations, the PRC agreed to
adopt a more flexible policy on the issue of Taiwan.(63)
Seizing the opportunity of the Sino-Soviet schisms to adjust 
his new China policy, President Nixon lost no time in hinting his 
willingness to improve relations with the PRC. Since Jan.1969, he 
had made a series of statements and good-will gestures concerning 
future relations with China. At first the PRC's response to the 
Nixon overtures was negative. But in April 1971, after attending 
the 31st World Table Tennis Championships held at Nagoya, Japan,
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surprisingly, the US team was invited to visit China. The so- 
called "Ping Pong Diplomacy" had started. On July 15, 1971, more 
unexpected news was announced by the US. After a secret trip to 
Beijing by Kissinger, Security Adviser to the President, the US 
government announced that the President had reached an agreement 
with Premier Zhou Enlai to visit China in 1972 for the purpose of 
seeking "the normalisation of relations between the two countries 
and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two 
sides"(64) This message signalled that the dead lock in Sino-US 
relations, which had lasted 21 years since the Korean War, would 
be gradually eased. The message to the KMT was more significant; 
that the phase of American protection might have eventually faded 
away.
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C H A P T E R  3 :  CHA NGES FROM L I B E R A T I O N  BY F OR C E  TO
P E A C E F U L  R E U N I F I C A T I O N  B E F O R E  1 9 7 9 .
" Dear Compatriots in Taiwan;
The bright future of our great motherland belongs 
to us and to you. The reunification of the mother­
land is the sacred mission that history has handed 
to our generation. Times are moving ahead and the 
situation is developing. The earlier we can fulfil 
this mission, the sooner we can jointly write an 
unprecedented, brilliant page in the history for 
our country. Let us join hand in hand and work 
together for this glorious goal!
NPC Standing Committee's Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan Jan. lf 1979.
A .  T H E  C P C ’ S T A I W A N  P O L I C Y  P H A S E  O N E ,  1 9 2 8 - 4 9
Since Jan. 1979, the CPC's policy towards Taiwan has veered 
between hostility and peaceful proposals for reunification. As 
discussed in chapter 2, the Chinese Communists' animosity towards 
Taiwan caused both by the Civil War, from which its archenemy, 
the KMT, had fled the mainland; and by the Korean War, in which 
the US had intervened and "neutralised the Taiwan Straits". But 
what was the CPC's Taiwan policy before 1949 ? The CPC's position 
towards the people of Taiwan during the period of its revolution­
ary struggle for power and its war with Japan was, indeed, one 
of support for a political settlement based on what might be 
called the simple principle of "One System (Communism), Two 
Countries (Taiwan & China)".(1) Throughout this period, the party 
documents of the CPC upheld the f o l l o w i n g  p o s i t i o n s :  1 )  the party
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leaders consistently hinted that the Taiwanese are a distinct 
"nation*' or "nationality" (Minzu), different from the Chinese(Han) 
nation; 2) they described the "national liberation movement" on 
Taiwan as the struggle of a "weak and small nationality" separate 
from the Chinese revolution, and potentially sovereign; 3) they 
supported the Taiwanese uprising of February 1947 and the Taiwan 
Independence League in Hongkong until March 1949; 4) At one point, 
the CPC anticipated that the Taiwanese Communist Party would take 
over power, so that Taiwan would become a friendly neighbouring 
nation similar to the Korean & Vietnamese Communist brothers.(2)
But, after the KMT retreated to Taiwan, the CPC reversed its 
position by disavowing Taiwanese ethnic separateness and rejecting 
the independence of the political movements on the island. In 
fact, the aforementioned positions were formalised in official 
statements by the CPC leaders. In the past forty years, both the 
CPC and the KMT tried deliberately to keep embarrassing documents 
secret, and revised the historical documentation to back up their 
claim to sovereign rights in Taiwan. Whatever may have been
altered, the fact of the matter is that the two main parties had
a long history of supporting "Taiwan independence".(3)
A specific policy towards Taiwan was first adopted in formal 
resolutions of the Sixth National Congress of the CPC held in 
Moscow in July 1928. It stated: "...The 6th CPC National Congress
considers that the problems of minority nationalities within the
Chinese territory (Mongols and Mohammedans in the North, Koreans 
in Manchuria, Taiwanese in Fujian, the aborigines of Miao and Li 
in the South and the nationalities in Sinjiang and in Tibet) have 
important significance ”(4) These specifically confirmed that
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the Taiwanese who lived in Fujian were regarded as a minority 
nationality, similar to the Mongols living in the North, and 
Koreans in Manchuria. Moreover,it implied that the Taiwanese were 
ethnically separate from the Chinese. In November 1931, the CPC 
adopted the "Draft Constitution of the China Soviet Republic" 
which extended constitutional rights to minority nationalities. 
According to that document, it read "Taiwanese, Koreans and Anna- 
mese residing in China are to be equal under the law of Soviet 
China."(5)The Taiwanese were again regarded, not as Han, but as a 
different nationality and race and were to be treated as equals 
like the Koreans and Annamese. This was deliberate, as can be 
seen from the fact that the CPC never referred to the Taiwanese 
as brethren or as the offspring of the Yellow Emperor or even as 
compatriots who would, de facto, belong to the Han race after 
they returned to China.(6)
Mao Zedong's own earliest comments on the Taiwanese came in
his "Report of the Chinese Soviet Republic Central Executive
Committee and the People's Committee to the Second All-China
Soviet Congress." in January 1934. In this report, Mao reaffirmed
the CPC's position that the Taiwanese residing outside Taiwan and
in China were a minority nationality. He also implied that his
party supported the independent Taiwan national liberation
movement. Concerning Item 15 of the Draft Constitution of Soviet
China, Mao put forward this comment:
" To every nationality in China, persecuted because 
of revolutionary acts, the Chinese Soviet Govern­
ment grants the right of protection in Soviet 
areas, and will assist them in renewing their 
struggle until a total victory of the revolutionary 
movement for their nationality and nation has been 
achieved. Many revolutionary comrades from Korea,
Taiwan, and Annam are residing in the Soviet areas.
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In the First All-China Soviet Congress, there are 
representatives from Korea, Taiwan, and Annam. This 
proves that this Declaration of the Soviet is a 
correct one."(7)
A year later, Mao dissociated Taiwan's political movement from 
that of China by incorporating it within the anti-imperialist 
revolution led by the Japanese Communist Party. The independent 
character afforded to the Taiwanese national liberation struggle 
by the CPC is clearly stated in material available from 1937 to
41. More than ten Party documents of this period endorsed the 
political right of the Taiwanese to gain independence.^^
As to explicit CPC support for an independent state on Taiwan,
the most notable documentary evidence is Mao's personal interview
with Edgar Snow, on July 16 1936. In the interview, Mao staunchly
supported the right of Taiwan and Korea to gain independence. In
response to Snow's question, "Is it the immediate task of the
Chinese people to regain all the territories lost to Japanese
imperialism, or only to drive Japan from North China and all
Chinese territory above the Great Wall ?" Mao answered:
"It is the immediate task of China to regain all 
our lost territories, not merely to defend our 
sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that 
Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, 
include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when 
we have re-established the independence of the lost
territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to
break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism,
we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their 
struggle for independence. And the same thing 
applies for Formosa, rEmphasis added.](9)
Zhou Enlai repeated Mao's position towards Taiwan, in June 1941.
In his paper on "National Supremacy and State Supremacy," Zhou
used the term "independence-liberation" to describe the Taiwanese
anti-Japanese movement.(10)
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The CPC's attitude towards Taiwan independence may also be 
traced back to its relations with the Taiwan Communist Party(TCP). 
The TCP was established in April 1928, in Shanghai, by order of 
the Comintern, not as a subordinate to the CPC, but as a Nation­
ality Branch of the Japanese Communist Party. Among 23 Taiwanese 
who attended the convention, 5 were members of the CPC; their 
unanimous support for independence was evident in such slogans as 
"Overthrow Japanese Imperialism," "Establish Taiwan Republic" and 
"Long Live the Independence of the Taiwan Nationality(11) In 
the "Resolution on an Outline of Organisation," the TCP cited the 
founding of the Republic of Taiwan in June 1895 as the historical 
justification for independence, while it also defined its role in 
the island's current independence movement.(12)
A close reading of these documents suggests that the claims 
for Taiwan independence were limited in the context of an anti­
colonial movement to a strategic ploy against Japan. They did not 
call for separation from China once the Japanese had been 
expelled. However this was not the case for the CPC. In "A letter 
to the Taiwan Communist Members" the TCP was told "since your 
country is also a colonial country, you should not place yourself
outside the high tide of the general revolutionary struggle.....
Only through this revolution can Taiwan gain complete indepen­
dence politically and economically(13) From the CPC's point of 
view, the Taiwan anti-imperialist movement was not only to be a 
truly internationalist movement, but should also pursue ultimate 
national independence. The Chinese Communist leaders acknowledged 
the independent political identity of the Taiwanese by consis­
tently grouping the Taiwanese and their "national liberation 
movement" with the Koreans and Annamese, whom the CPC clearly
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recognised as politically separate peoples. For this reason Mao 
and his colleagues never referred to pro-Japan Taiwanese as 
"traitors" nor to pro-China Taiwanese as "compatriots". The CPC's 
policy was actually a response both to the circumstances of its 
struggle to survive in China and its position at the apex of 
international nationalist movements.
In the Cairo Declaration of 1st December 1943, the Allied 
leaders envisaged that a future liberated Taiwan would be a part 
of China. Up to that point, it had been generally overlooked that 
the CPC and the KMT had long supported Taiwan independence. It is 
true that the KMT changed its stated policy of supporting self- 
rule in Taiwan after the Cairo summit. Many commentators have 
assumed that the CPC also changed its policy and opposed the 
Taiwanese separatist movement from 1943. f 14,/However, the documents 
of the CPC's 7th National Party Congress, in April 1945, state 
that "the principle of self-determination for all peoples is the 
most reasonable and advantageous method of dealing with the 
relatively small and powerless nations of the East", Taiwan was 
still regarded as an East-Asian nation.(15) An article published 
on May 1st, 1945, in the central Party organ, Jiefang Ribao, 
clearly indicated that Taiwan was named as a country -"Guo".(16) 
Eighteen months after the Cairo Declaration was announced, the 
CPC still took the line that "for the past 24 years, the CPC has 
been struggling unceasingly to achieve the liberation of the 
Chinese people. Meanwhile, it has assisted and stimulated the 
peoples of the East, the Taiwanese, Koreans, Annamese, Malays and 
Filipinos, in their liberation movements, fighting for national 
independence, democracy and freedom."(17) At this stage, the CPC
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still adhered to its policy of self-determination for Taiwan.
The incident of February 1947 in Taiwan, inspired in the CPC 
a positive affirmation of Taiwanese aspirations to their own 
"liberation". The party leaders not only accepted the 32 condi­
tions put forward by "the Ad hoc Settlement Committee" during the 
uprising, (the conditions clearly indicated that the Taiwanese 
preferred to opt out of the KMT's political aegis), but also 
proposed a "six point struggle programme" for the "rebels" to 
secure the successful outcome of their armed struggle.(18) The 
KMT, on the contrary, regarded the secessionist 32 conditions as 
a treacherous plot and executed most of "the Ad hoc Settlement 
Committee" members. Since 1948, the CPC has annually celebrated 
the February Incident, but it has changed the emphasis several 
times so as to meet the needs of its changing party line.(19)
The CPC did not suggest that sovereignty over Taiwan belonged 
to China, or that it should revert to China, until the late date 
of March 16, 1949, when a new China News Agency report said; "The 
Chinese People Are Determined To Liberate Taiwan".(20) Obviously 
this change was in response to the KMT's retreat to Taiwan and 
the extension of the Civil War across the Straits of Taiwan. The 
CPC policy on Taiwan, set since 1928, henceforward, changed to 
advocacy of a military solution to the Taiwan issue in the frame­
work of China's unification under the name of PRC or "One Country 
(the Communist China) and One System (Socialism)".
Of course, the above analysis does not imply that the CPC is 
legally bound by the pronouncements made when out of power over 
forty years ago. Nor does it discredit the PRC's claim to Taiwan. 
But, if it was ideologically possible for the CPC's top leaders
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to accept the distinctiveness of a Taiwanese nationality for over 
twenty years, then the issue of the island's political status is 
not the open-and-shut case described in the PRC's policy line 
after 1949. That also weakens the argument that the movement for 
an independent Taiwan is solely a creation of American and 
Japanese imperialism directed against China. Rather, the policy 
statements of the CPC before 1949 afford substantial legitimacy 
to the idea of a Taiwan national liberation movement within the 
scope of the CPC's own ideological traditions.
From 1979 onwards, the PRC proposed granting the people of 
Taiwan considerable autonomy in maintaining the political and 
economic organisation of the island. This shift demonstrated that 
the Chinese Communists have not taken a consistently irredentist 
position on the island's status. The history of the CPC's policy 
towards Taiwan is one of ambivalence in which the Party has 
changed its position according to changing internal and external 
circumstances. Certainly, the CPC will not, of its own accord, 
renew its support for the full independence of Taiwan. If the 
people of Taiwan can demonstrate, however, that there is 
indigenous support for the attainment to their political rights, 
then perhaps the legacy of the 1928 - 49 period may have more 
influence in shaping the political framework of "One Country Two 
Systems". It remains to be seen, nonetheless, the new generations 
of the PRC leaders will continue to regard the unification of 
Taiwan as "the sacred mission" which the founders of the PRC had 
failed to fulfil.
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B .  THE C P C ’ S TAI WAN P O L I C Y  PHASE TWO,  1 9 4 9  - 7 8 .
As discussed in chapter two, the international involvement 
has had a greater impact on the development of the Taiwan issue 
than Chinese factors. Since 1949, Taiwan has been regarded in 
Beijing as a barometer reflecting U.S. policy towards China, and 
indeed of U.S. foreign policy in general. The PRC disenchantment 
with US proposals for a Taiwan solution was an understandable 
reaction in power politics.But the long-standing Two-Way Struggle 
within the Party did shed light on the CPC leaders differing 
approaches to the question of how to respond to the US initia­
tives on the future settlement of the Taiwan issue: The Taiwan
policy of seeking what might be called a "One Country (the PRC),
and One System (Socialism)" which the CPC followed from 1949 to 
1978, underwent many changes and variations during that period.
Statistical surveys show that, throughout the period during 
which the CPC pursued the goals of "One Country, One System", the
slogans used in the PRC's mass media were extremely consistent,
as well as rigid.(21) Editorials in Renmin Ribao, for example, 
clearly indicate that shifts in internal policy provoked changes 
in the CPC's stance towards Taiwan.(22) The following 2 Tables 
reveal many crucial points in the pattern of the repercussion of 
external pressures on the CPC's internal differences. These 
differences, on the one hand, reflected sharp turns in the party 
line, on the other hand, implied that main-taining a consensus on 
the concept of "One Country One System" very much relied upon the 
stability of the PRC's power structure.
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* TABLE 1: CONTENT OF RENMIN RIBAO EDITORIALS
ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE
/ \
| _ITEMS_ |_________________ CONTENTS_______________________ |
| A | We must liberate Taiwan.(liberation by force).j
| B | On the counter-attack of the KMT. j
| C | The US imperialists colluded with the KMT. j
| D ] The American imperialists occupied our mother-j
| | land, and turned Taiwan into US military base |
E ] The liberation of Taiwan is our internal
j affair.
F | Against the "Two Chinas" policy.
G [ Against Taiwan independence.
H ] The Taiwan issue and the US military threat.
j I | Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. |
| J | The reunification with Taiwan is a sacred |
] | mission for all Chinese. |
| K | The people of Taiwan are our own flesh and j
] j blood. |
| L | US withdraws from Taiwan and security of East ]
| | Asia. j
\ /
* The contents from A to L are the slogans used in the Renmin Ribao 
editorials. The first group of A, B, C, and D denotes the CPC’s 
combatant slogans used often by hard liners. In the second set - E, F, 
G, and H, represent, by and large, the PRC’s stance of anti-separatism 
and anti-external intervention. The last group of four slogans which 
are more benign, appeared only after the inception of Beijing- 
Washington reconciliation in the early 1970s. In these stereotyped 
articles no mention was made of the CPC’s pre-1949 Taiwan policy. At 
the same time, no peaceful solution slogan was ever included. The term 
of "Taiwanese" was redefined to refer only to the aborigines, and not, 
as is commonly understood, to the inhabitants of the island who are 
ethnically linked to Fujian and Guangdong.
TABLE 2: RENMIN RIBAO EDITORIALS ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE
f ---------
Items A B C D E F G H I J K L Total
1949
50
51
52
53
54
55
3
4 
4
3
4 
3
1
2
2
2
2
1
4
3
2
3
3
2
2
4
3
1
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
14
17
13
12
13
10
56
57
58
2
2
1
1 1 1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
7
5
6
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59 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 13 |
60 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 12 j
61 1 4 2 2 3 12 j
62 1 2 2 1 2 9 I
63 1 3 1 1 1 7 !
64 1 2 3 !
65 1 1 j
66 1 1 2 I
67 4 1 1 6 !
68 3 1 1 5 !
69 3 1 1 1 1 7 i
70 3 3 2 2 3 2 1 16 |
71 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 15 |
72 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 12 |
73 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 15 |
74 2 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 14 |
75 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 2 15 j
76 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 1 15 |
77 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 14 j
78
V-------
1 2 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 16 | 
---- /
* Sources: Renmin Ribao, Editorials January 1st, February 28th, 
June 25th, August 1st, October 1st, (N.B. May 1st and July 1st 
normally the editorials did not mentioned about the Taiwan 
issue.)
The two tables show that at different times there have been 
drastic changes of emphasis, and of terminology in the CPC's 
policy on Taiwan.(23) The tables also reveal the different party 
lines, moderate and extreme, among the leaders of the CPC, which 
reflect the power struggle in the four arenas of the Taiwan 
dispute. At the same time, an analysis of the two tables makes it 
possible to divide the PRC's Taiwan policy into six sections: (1) 
1950-55, (2) 1955-58, (3) 1958-61, (4) 1961-65, (5) 1966-69, (6)
1970-78. The frequency with which the Taiwan question is 
mentioned in the editorials also reflects the see-sawing 
confrontations between l).the mainland and Taiwan; 2). the 
radicals and the moderates in the PRC; and 3). the US and the 
PRC. A profile of the tables also indicates the many adjust-ments 
that the CPC has made in order to comply with its policy of
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national reunification. One could, accordingly, illuminate the 
interactions of the Taiwan issue and the CPC's internal-external 
problems in the following points.
In March 1950, after the CPC captured Hainan island, only a 
few offshore islands and Taiwan were left as targets yet to be 
conquered. Due to the outbreak of the Korean War, the liberation 
of Taiwan had to be given a lower priority. The number of men­
tions of the Taiwan issue in Renmin Ribao editorials, however, 
reached its peak in the period of 1950 - 54 with denunciations of 
"the American occupation of Taiwan". The condemnation of American 
aid to the KMT forces and the possibility of an invasion of China 
from Taiwan were also repeatedly mentioned. Calls for the libera­
tion of Taiwan, however, were regarded as reactions for self- 
defence against the imperialists who had interfered in the 
Chinese Civil War and national liberation.
In 1954-55 the Taiwan issue continued to be frequently cited, 
but, by 1956 with decreasing frequency. The content of editorials 
centred mainly on "liberation", slogans such as "the liberation 
of Taiwan is an historical mission" were coined.(24) Apparently, 
the CPC was seeking favourable arguments to back up its policy 
for solving the Taiwan issue and to find a modus vivendi with the 
US. After the Bandung Conference of 1955, Zhou Enlai expressed 
the CPC'S desire for direct negotiations with the Nationalists,on 
condition that the US should reduce its interference in Chinese 
internal affairs. When the Soviet repre-sentative Kliment 
Voroshilov visited China, he was told, by the leaders of the PRC, 
that "we are now planning a third United Front with the 
Nationalists".(25) But after the KMT announced that US ground-to-
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ground missiles with a capacity for carrying nuclear war-heads 
were to be sited on the island in 1957, China took a tougher 
stance in its policy on Taiwan.
In 1959 and 60, the editorials raised the subject of Taiwan 
almost incessantly. In the main these articles denounced American 
military aid to Taiwan, speaking of "US-KMT military collusion" 
and of the "US making Taiwan into its own military base". The 
opposition to the "Two Chinas" theory, which appeared in 1961, 
and is characteristic of this period, can be seen as a response 
to Kennedy's "One China One Taiwan" thesis, and also to the fear 
of collusion between the Soviet Union and the United States 
against China. In 1962 - 63 the idea of "Taiwan counter-attacking 
the mainland" reappeared several times in Renmin Ribao.
In the period of 196 2-65, the CPC was, on the one hand, busy 
rebuilding its economy after the damage caused by the Great Leap 
Forward and a succession of natural disasters: the policy of
"three freedoms and one contract" (Sanzi Yibao), proposed by the 
new Chairman, Liu Shaoqi, was adopted, and the Commune system was 
substantially modified: the general trend was towards a less
collectivist economic policy. On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet 
split intensified, and, with the US pressing the reviled policy - 
"One China One Taiwan", the PRC moderate leaders were pushed to 
opt for a "revisionist" approach internationally.Apart from being 
manoeuvred into an unwelcome skirmish with India in Nov. 1962, 
the mainstream policy of the CPC was, by and large, to seek for 
friendly relations with other neighbouring nations. China glossed 
over the Sino-Indian border conflict in order to stay on good 
terms and a cease-fire agreement with India was concluded a few
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weeks after the clash occurred.(26) In 1963 border treaties were 
signed with Pakistan in March and with Afghanistan in November. 
In addition, 17 non-communist countries established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC, 150% more than the period of 1949-60.
The moderation of the policies of that period was high­
lighted when, in Oct. 1965, the former KMT President, Li Zongren, 
returned to the mainland from his self-imposed exile. Zhou Enlai 
resurrected the 1955-57 suggestion of talks with the Nationalists 
to accelerate the peaceful unification of Taiwan with China.(27) 
Foreign Minister Chen Yi said at a press conference, "we would 
willingly co-operate with Chiang Kaishek and Chiang Chingkuo in 
the same way as we have with Mr Li. The possibility of our working 
together has increased".(28) During this period the Renmin Ribao 
substantially decreased the number of references to the liberation 
of Taiwan, and in 1964-65 Taiwan was hardly mentioned at all.
The content of editorials on the Taiwan issue in the 1970s 
changed drastically in comparison with those of the 1960s. There 
is a clear division between the subjects covered in 1965-69, and 
those dealt with since 1970. At first Renmin Ribao mechanically 
repeated the old phrases calling for "liberation of Taiwan", but 
there was no attempt to propose concrete measures for its achie­
vement. With the Sino-US rapprochement, beginning in the early 
1970s, comments on the Taiwan issue became more frequent, and it 
was made a focal point in the dialogue between the two sides. The 
content of the editorials addressed some of the wider aspects of 
the Taiwan question, rather than just mechanically repeating old 
slogans. From 1970 onwards, the most common formulations such as 
"US-KMT military collusion", "Taiwan's insistence on counter-
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attacking the mainland" disappeared entirely. These phrases con­
sistently repeated, since the Korean Warfare now never mentioned. 
Slogans such as "compatriots from Taiwan are our flesh and 
blood", and relatively moderate comments on the withdrawal of the 
US force from Taiwan and the security of East Asia, which had 
never appeared in Renmin Ribao before, gradually became familiar 
in the PRC's propaganda.(29)
In the period of 1972-78, the internal-external politics of 
the PRC went through a volcanic change. The demise of the first 
generation leaders, the dramatic shifts in Sino-US relations, the 
rise and fall of the so-called "Gang of Four", and a time of 
intense internal struggle for Party survival, all indicated that 
the CPC experienced an extraordinary decade.In foreign policy the 
CPC repeated its opposition to both American and Soviet hegemony. 
Instead of basing strategy on the commonly accepted framework of 
the East-West bipolar system, the theory of an "Intermediate 
Zone" which formalised the antagonism of China to both the super­
powers, was put forward.(30) After being seated in the UN, the 
CPC also portrayed itself as a representative of the Third World, 
defending it from political dominance and economic exploitation. 
The Taiwan question, in that period, was somewhat alienated from 
the PRC's global strategy.
With two notable exceptions, namely during the first Taiwan 
Straits crisis in 1954 and when the KMT declared its intention of 
attacking the mainland in 1962, "the February 28th Commemoration 
Day" editorials on the Taiwan question in Renmin Ribao over these 
30 years present a clear indication of the power politics inside 
the CPC. A thorough analysis of the Renmin Ribao editorials
112
concerning Taiwan reveals clear differences between the years 
when moderate internal policy dominated in the PRC and periods of 
radicalism. An investigation of the various periods delimited 
above shows that in times when an offensive stance was adopted 
towards Taiwan, editorials had a marked similarity both in the 
frequency of the mention of Taiwan and in their content. Because 
of political upheaval and the severity of the internal power 
struggle during the Cultural Revolution, the Taiwan issue was 
scarcely mentioned.This omission was exceptional during a radical 
period.
As regards the above two tables, the last, and perhaps the 
most significant point was the consistency of the CPC's policy of 
committing itself to liberating Taiwan by military means.No other 
slogan was ever mentioned so often, nor so clearly implied the 
CPC's determination to fulfil the dream of taking over the island. 
Judging the dispute over the Taiwan issue from the essential four 
arenas, the CPC leaders obviously believed that as long as inter­
national intervention still exist, the military option would be 
indispensable. After 1978, although the slogan of "liberation" 
has been replaced by other terms, the CPC still declined to 
renounce its right to use force to settle the Taiwan problem.
C .  S I N O - U S  R E C O N C I L I A T I O N  1 9 7 2  - 7 8
One of the most crucial factors in making China's policy 
toward Taiwan become more flexible was the Sino-US reconciliation 
which began in the late 1960s. By that time Sino-Soviet relations
had reached their nadir, and the US was considering moves
towards an eventual military disengagement in Vietnam.(31) 
Beijing first perceived and then concluded that throughout the
1960s the Soviet Union had gradually replaced the United States 
as the prime military threat to China and had become its
principal enemy. Therefore, despite the fact that their dispute 
over Taiwan was still unresolved, for the first time since 1949, 
both the PRC and the US saw compelling reasons to try to 
establish a new Sino-US relationship. (32) In other words, their 
global strategic interests reached the point when they 
outweighted their regional differences over Taiwan. Kissinger's 
secret trip to China, and the drama of Mao Zedong's handshake 
with Nixon in Zhongnanhai had maximised the impact of the 
Beijing-Washington reconciliation.
The realisation by the leaders of the PRC that China stood to 
gain substantial strategic interests from Sino-US detente, made 
it possible to soften its policy on the Taiwan issue. However, as 
Doak Barnett put it:
" A number of conflicts of interest will continue 
to make U.S.-China relations extremely complex. The 
two countries' interests in Taiwan will continue to
diverge, and no final resolution of the Taiwan
problem is likely for many years. More broadly, 
even though the two countries now share certain
important common security interests which are the
fundamental basis for their present relationship, 
American and Chinese outlooks continue to differ in 
basic respects even in security terms."(33)
Despite the limited scope of Sino-US detente, it became clear, 
when the two powers were seeking common ground, that the Taiwan 
issue had to be put aside. China's foreign policy could then be 
based on a careful assessment of where Chinese and U.S. interests
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converged and where they conflicted. Similarly, the US policy of 
China seemed to show, in good faith, that further progress in 
Sino-American detente was possible, but was to be approached in a 
rather cautious and gradual manner, since their misunderstanding 
and distrust were deeply rooted for over 20 years. That was the 
main reason why the normalisation took almost seven years to 
complete.
SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE
The Shanghai Communique, one of the most significant results 
of Nixon's visit to China in 1972, produced a new framework for 
the relationship between the two powers. It demonstrated that 
they wished to end the old pattern of Sino-US confrontation. Due 
to the unresolved Taiwan issue, they could not immediately create 
a common basis for establishing full diplomatic relations. But a 
process of strategic adjustment was already under way.(34)
With respect to the Taiwan issue, the Communique concluded in 
different versions. The PRC stated its unwavering claim to be the 
sole legal government of China and its conviction that Taiwan is 
a province of China.It asserted that the liberation of Taiwan was 
Chinese internal affair, in which no one has a right to interfere 
and all US forces and military installations should be withdrawn 
from the island. It also reiterated its objection to any ploy of 
creating "One China One Taiwan","One China Two Governments", "Two 
Chinas", or an "Independent Taiwan", or claim that "the status of 
Taiwan remains to be determined".(35) The PRC strategy was clear: 
not only would it like to demonstrate its determination to gain 
control over Taiwan, but also intended to paint a higher profile 
role of Taiwan in the Sino-US relations.
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The U.S., on the other hand, suggested that no country could 
claim infallibility, and each should review its own attitudes for 
the common good,(36) Nixon and his associates tried to avoid a 
direct clash with their counterparts on the Taiwan problem. They 
stated that "the US acknowledges that all Chinese, on either side 
of the Taiwan Straits, maintain there is but one China and that 
Taiwan is a part of China. The US government does not challenge 
that position" (37) But Nixon tactfully reaffirmed that the U.S. 
still had great concern for the security of the people of Taiwan 
and an interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. 
To demonstrate a new U.S. stance on East Asia, and a new policy 
towards China, Nixon clarified that the U.S. would look into "the 
ultimate objective of withdrawing American troops from Taiwan.... 
as the tension in the area gradually diminished".(38)
Obviously, the Communique brought the PRC-US relationship to 
a new stage. Both sides tacitly agreed that the disagreement on 
the Taiwan problem could not be solved easily, but that, for the 
time being, it would be best left aside, so long as the PRC did 
not attempt to take Taiwan by force, and the U.S. did not overtly 
pursue its Two Chinas policy. Having pledged to work toward a 
normalisation of relations with the US, the PRC proceeded to 
expand its relations by an agreement to set up liaison offices, 
which doubled as temporary diplomatic missions. Although fully- 
fledged diplomatic relations were not achieved until January 1979 
Sino-US trade and cultural exchanges grew rapidly. In 1974 trade 
reached a peak of $ 1 billion. Delegations from both sides were 
exchanged under quasi-official arrangements.(39) Kissinger, then, 
made nine visits to China, in his capacity as a National Security
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Advisor and later as Secretary of State.
Gerald Ford, who succeeded Nixon after the Watergate scandal, 
paid a second presidential visit to Beijing in December 1975. In 
spite of no concrete measures were taken regarding the Sino-US 
normalisation of relations, President Ford reassured his hosts 
that the US government would uphold the principles of the Shanghai 
Communique. Soon after Jimmy Carter took office,he signalled that 
he favoured the normalisation of relations with Beijing, if the
security of the people of Taiwan could be assured. In fact, the
Carter Administration's China policy was clearly stipulated by 
his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in July 1977, as follows:
"Our policy toward China will continue to be guided
by the spirit of the Shanghai Communique, and on 
that basis we shall seek to move toward full 
normalisation of relations. We acknowledge the view 
expressed in the Shanghai Communique that there is 
but one China. We also place importance on the 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves "(40)
President Carter further expressed his expectation that the 
US government would work out a Sino-US agreement, not only to 
achieve full diplomatic relations with China, but also to ensure 
that the peaceful life of the Taiwanese would be maintained.(41) 
With this formula in mind, Vance visited Beijing in Aug. 1977. In 
the meeting with Deng Xiaoping, Vance suggested a formula to swap 
between US missions in Peking and Taipei i.e. setting up a liaison 
office in Taipei and an embassy in Peking. But the PRC promptly 
rejected the idea and condemned Vance "for retreating from the 
position put forward in the proposals of Ford and Kissinger."(42)
Although the Shanghai Communique had not solved the dispute on 
the Taiwan issue, it had indicated the desire of the two big
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powers to make progress of bilateral relations. In the communique 
both sides specified, rather differently, what the prerequisites 
for full normalisation should be and what kind of future 
compromise on the Taiwan issue would make it possible. But the 
speedy establishment of full diplomatic relations between Beijing 
and Tokyo had clarified the approach of the PRC, and showed how 
far it was willing to go. Notwithstanding differences entailed in 
the normalisation with Japan and with the U.S., the frequently- 
mentioned Japanese model for dealing with the issue was obviously 
relevant to American relations with Taiwan. This model, in fact, 
provided the decision makers in Beijing and Washington with addi­
tional latitude in their consideration of a peaceful solution of 
the Taiwan issue.
THE US-TAIWAN READJUSTMENT
While the two big powers (the PRC and the U.S.) were paving 
the way for the final deal on "Normalisation",the little one (the 
ROC on Taiwan) sulked over being treated unfairly. Although both 
Republican and Democratic politicians in the US, as well, indeed, 
as public opinion supported the idea of the normalisation of 
relations with the PRC, none of them believed that the US should 
sell out Taiwan as a precondition for reaching normalisation.(43) 
But there were signs that without cutting the "Gordian Knot" i.e. 
overcoming the obstacles to normalisation, China would be unlikely 
to accept any proposal for ultimate agreement over the issue of 
Taiwan. Hence, it became very important to urge Taiwan to play a 
positive role in seeking a solution.
In the confident belief that the PRC would not take military
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action against Taiwan, the US was prepared to honour its words in 
the Shanghai Communique and withdraw its military forces from the 
island. US military personnel in Taiwan were reduced from 8,500 
in 1972 to 1,100 by the Summer of 1977.(44)On the other hand, the 
US continued to assist the Nationalists in strengthening Taiwan's 
defences. The contract with the Northrop Corporation for the co­
production of F-5E fighters indicated US readiness to help the 
KMT protect the island with advanced defence technology.(45)
Washington believed the weapons supplied to Taiwan were still 
indispensable for the island's security, and that her continuing 
economic growth would sustain the stability of the KMT regime. In 
the period of 1972-78, the US Export-Import Bank had given Taiwan 
$1.2 Billion in loans and guarantees, the Bank's largest venture 
in any country except Brazil. American companies flocked into the 
island, since they were under the protection of "the US Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation". In 1978, eight American banks 
were operating in Taiwan, and seven others applied for permission 
to open branches. More than 9,000 American civilians resided on 
Taiwan. A huge US trade centre was established in Taibei in 1973, 
and two-way trade figures increased from $1.8 billion in 1972 to 
$6.67 billion in 1978. At the same time the PRC's trade with the 
US remained at around $400-$500 million per year,(46)
As substantial relations between the US and Taiwan increased 
significantly, the tensions in Sino-US relations continued to 
relax. However,in many respects, Taiwan was still a dilemma in US 
foreign policy. But the disappearance of the old autocrats in 
China and Taiwan in the 1970s provided another turning point for 
the dead-locked dispute over Taiwan.
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D .  D E A T H  OF THE OLD GUARD AND T H E  P O L I T I C A L  
C H A N G ES  I N  C H I N A  AND T A I W A N .
ZHOU AND MAO'S DEMISE AND POWER TRANSFORMATION
In the mid 1970s, the long-standing PRC leaders, Mao and Zhou, 
eventually passed away. They were replaced by Hua Guofeng, who 
could not, however, match their power and authority. A period of 
political uncertainty seemed inevitable, for the old leaders had 
dominated Chinese politics for nearly half a century. The popular 
revolutionary posters which had for a long time been a means of 
educating the Chinese, proclaimed "a turbulent time produced 
national heroes, and the heroes created a glorious time." Mao 
especially was regarded as the emancipator of the nation, and the 
great helmsman of the party. For decades, the people of China had 
revered their party leader, Chairman Mao, as a living god.
When Zhou and Mao died in Jan. and Sept. 1976 respectively, 
the People's Republic, in many ways, was like an ancient China, 
on the eve of a change of dynasty (Gaichao Huandai). Zhou's death 
immediately triggered a power struggle between the so-called 
pragmatists or moderates and radicals or ideologues. After the 
bloody Tiananmen incident of April 5, 1976, Deng Xiaoping, the 
leading pragmatist, was once again denigrated and removed from 
all his positions in the party and government. (4 7) At the time of 
Mao's death, the party was seriously weakened by a series of 
confrontations that involved factions of the top party leaders. 
China's economy showed increasing signs of strain and breakdown,
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and the industrial sector was inefficient and wasteful. All these 
adverse factors plagued the adjustment of China's domestic policy 
as well as its foreign relations.
In October 1976, one month after Mao's death, Hua Guofeng, 
the new leader, handpicked by the late Chairman Mao, arrested the 
"Gang of Four", which included Mao's wife Jiang Qing. To relieve 
the social tension and in order to affect a political compromise, 
Hua was forced to rehabilitate Deng Xiaoping, so as to pave the 
way for reform and reorganise the paralysed party. A new policy 
to achieve the Four Modernisations was put forward.(48) However, 
at that time, a new political schism appeared. Hua, as Mao's 
chosen heir advocated following whatever Mao said or did, he and 
his group became known as the "Whatever" faction. On the other 
hand, soon after rehabilitation, Deng and his supporters were 
actively planning their take-over of Hua's leadership. The trump 
card that Deng held was his "squad" (Bang Zi) which was much 
stronger than Hua's.(49) As Secretary General of the CPC before 
the Cultural Revolution, like Stalin under Lenin, Deng had been 
able to "cultivate" his own power base. Deng carefully avoided 
acting prematurely in challenging Hua. His tactics were: first,
to be reinstated in his personal position in the party and 
government, then to reinforce legitimacy by satisfying the public 
mood for normalcy. Deng gratified the public by restoring the 
national college entrance examination that had been suspended for 
over ten years under Mao's leftist line policy; this was soon 
followed by the reactivation of the united front organisation of 
the Chinese National People's Consultative Council and the 
convening of the 5th NPC in February 1978. The constitution was
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also revised, and the "Four Modernisations" were written into it 
as the new agenda for national reconstruction.
In November 1978, Deng appealed to the public, as the party 
prepared for the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, one of 
most crucial meetings in modern Chinese politics. The media had 
also initiated a movement based on Deng's political thinking; the 
so-called theories of "Black and White Cats", "Seeking Truth from 
the Facts"and "Practice as the sole criterion of truth". All 
these measures were designed to diminish the sacred status of Mao 
Zedong Thought and to downgrade the political influence of the 
party Chairman, Hua Guofeng.(50)
Since the internal changes, underpinned by the consolidation 
of power in the hands of the pragmatists headed by Deng,have been 
put into practice,the PRC's Taiwan policy has entered another new 
phase. In the years 1976-78, the focus of the power struggle was 
mainly on domestic affairs; the confrontations between Maoists 
and pragmatists on external affairs were kept in low profile, but 
they were by no means negligible. For instance, although Hua 
Guofeng made a few friendship trips abroad, nothing of importance 
was achieved in external relations in the post-Mao period. In 
other words, Hua made no significant break-through to upgrade the 
relations of China with other parts of world during his trips. 
Deng, on the contrary,was actively involved in the PRC's external 
affairs. By Autumn 1978, more divisive differences between Hua 
and Deng appeared on foreign affairs.
In September 1978, Deng made a trip to North Korea. During 
his talks with Kim Il-Song, he deliberately neglected to use the 
phrase "liberation of Taiwan". Interesting enough, the phrase was
122
employed by his Korean hosts. When he returned to Beijing, Wang 
Dongxing,one of Hua's staunch supporters,accused Deng of "leading 
China down the road to capitalism and disgracing a loyal friend 
on the crucial issue". (51) Deng was not deterred by this radical 
viewpoint. Instead, he took a further step in proposing a conci­
liatory line on the Taiwan issue. One month later, in October, 
Deng, while in Japan,stated that the question of Taiwan and other 
similar problems could be solved in more flexible ways:
" Apart from two Koreas, there are two Germanies, 
two Chinas, and also the question of a country 
having one hundredth of Japan i.e., the Diaoyu Tai, 
or Senkaku islands . All these questions must be 
settled eventually. If they cannot be settled in 
ten years, or in a century, they will certainly be 
settled in a thousand years. Our national 
aspirations and currents are irresistible ,.,."(52)
This was, in fact, the first time that a Chinese leader had 
openly recognised that there were two Chinas. It was, by far, the 
most courageous speech that a Chinese leader has made on the issue 
of Taiwan, since the PRC reversed its policy on the independence 
of Taiwan after 1949. This gesture of compromise offered an 
opportunity for the US negotiators, on the one hand, to re-start 
their talks on diplomatic normalisation with China, and for the 
Chinese, on the other,to shake off the straight jacket of leftist 
ideas of anti-revisionism.(53)
When, in December 1978, the Sino-US talks reached agreement,
Chairman Hua, unable to influence the results of the negotiations
conducted by Deng, could only indicate his approval of China-US
normalisation. At a news conference, Hua announced:
" We hope that our Taiwan compatriots will join all 
other Chinese people, including our compatriots in 
Hongkong and Macao and Overseas Chinese in making 
further contributions to the reunification of the
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country....Taiwan's residents no longer have reason 
to fear an armed invasion from China.(54)
This declaration revealed that Hua and his "Whatever" group 
of supporters (even including Marshal Ye Jianying) seemed to have 
no chance to manifest their tough line on the Taiwan issue but had 
to agree with Deng's new strategic policy.(55) On the issue of 
Taiwan,the people were assured that their political status would, 
at least, not differ from that of ethnic Chinese living outside 
the PRC. Moreover, the wording is also variance with the Maoist 
attitude that the Taiwanese and outside world, in particular the 
US,should never be deluded into thinking that the PRC might forgo 
taking military means to solve the Taiwan problem.
It is crystal clear that, after Mao's death, the impact of 
the power struggle between the Maoists and the reformists in the 
PRC had not only redirected its internal political line,but also, 
tacitly, readjusted its strategic foreign policy, especially in 
relations with the US. Once the Sino-American negotiations on 
diplomatic normalisation reached an agreement, the question of 
how to deal with the Taiwan issue would certainly re-emerge to a 
new point in the East Asian politics. Nevertheless, the Sino-US 
detente was an indispensable precondition for the reformists to 
concede that the shift of the PRC's theoretical Taiwan policy of 
"One Country, One System" to a flexible policy of "One Country, 
Two Systems" became more attainable.
CHIANG KAISHEK'S DEATH AND TAIWANIZATION
Since Chiang Kaishek arrived in Taiwan in 1949 as head of 
the party and army, no one had had any chance to challenge his 
authority, despite the damage to his prestige resulting from the
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loss of the mainland to the Communists, and Taiwanese dissatisfa­
ction under Nationalist rule. Having resumed himself as President 
of the ROC in March 1950, until his death in April 1975, Chiang
placed himself in an impregnable position in Taiwan for 25 years.
Because of the painful experience in Nanjing, where many of his 
top associates forsook him, Chiang came to trust no one but his 
son, Chiang Chingkuo. Unlike Mao Zedong, for many years, Chiang 
carefully groomed Chingkuo to be a powerful successor.
In the late 60s and the early 1970s, in order to reduce the 
burden on his ailing father, Chiang Chingkuo had already taken
charge of the day-to-day affairs of Taiwan. When Chiang Kaishek
died, the power transfer was smoothly accomplished. The younger 
Chiang had been widely recognised as the only one could success 
his father and made himself party chairman and, later, president. 
The internal-external situation in Taiwan, in the mid 197 0s, was, 
however, very much different from what his father had had to deal 
with before. Because the ROC has never relinquished its claim to 
be the only legitimate regime of China, its political structures 
have remained essentially unchanged for nearly three decades. The 
old guard, who followed Chiang in the retreat to the island, had 
gradually withered & fallen. The outcry against the octogenarians 
and calls for a rejuvenation of the ruling machine had been made 
by the local Taiwanese for many years. When younger Chiang took 
power, he faced immense pressure for political change. Partly 
because the old guard distrusted him, and rallied to advocate 
the leadership of his step-mother Madam Chiang; partly because he 
perceived that the Taiwanese were not well-represented in the ROC 
government and that their support was needed for a new government 
programme to succeed, Chingkuo eventually chose to co-operate
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with the Taiwanese to ensure the ultimate survival of the KMT and 
the ROC government itself.(56)
Long before the death of Chiang Kaishek, there had been a 
continual tug-of-war between those who placed prime emphasis on 
the goal of recovering the China mainland and those who favoured 
concentrating on the development of Taiwan. As in China, the two 
different groups were dubbed ideologues and pragmatists. When the 
Generalissimo was still alive, it was recognised that he himself 
headed the ideologues, and nobody dared to challenge his authori­
ty; therefore the distinction between the two factions was not 
clear-cut. Although Chiang had made a secret commitment in 1958, 
that without U.S. endorsement, he would not use military means to 
attack the PRC forces.(57) he continued to perpetuate the concept 
of mainland recovery, rejecting both compromise with his arch 
enemies - Mao's "bandits" and a separate status for Taiwan. Under 
Chiang's absolute authoritarian control, most of the resources of 
Taiwan were diverted to military and security purposes. Not until 
1972, when Chiang Chingkuo took over the Premiership, did the 
situation begin to change. He laid more stress on the economic 
development of Taiwan. The theme of "a return to the mainland" 
gradually became mere official rhetoric, as the Taiwanese put it: 
"it had begun as a fierce resolve; at first an aspiration; then a 
myth; and finally a liturgy".(58)
Chiang Chingkuo's personal style differed greatly from that of 
his father. To most Taiwanese, Chiang Kaishek was an aloof auto­
crat, a living god. Unlike his father, Chingkuo effectively made 
himself a leader concerned about the life of ordinary people.(59) 
he brought many Taiwanese elite into his government to replace
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the old guard, who had disliked any change in the KMT structures. 
The reforms Chiang Chingkuo initiated, in no way indicated that 
he had departed from his father's adamant opposition to Communism 
and continued to issue ringing declarations of the ROC's determi­
nation to recover the mainland. However, they had sophisticatedly 
transformed the political tension caused by Taiwanese resentment 
at the mainlanders' domination of the Nationalist government into 
expectations of economic development and modernisation.
The interaction of the CPC new policy towards Taiwan and the 
shift of the KMT's attitude towards the recovery of the mainland, 
as well as the start of Taiwanization provided a better then ever 
chance to review the feasibility of a peaceful solution of the 
Taiwan problem. The tension between mainlanders and Taiwanese had 
decreased, to a certain extent, as a result of the change in US 
policy towards China in 1970s.(60) The KMT also started to learn 
how to tolerate differing political opinions among the local 
people. For instance, in 1975 the monthly Taiwan Political Review 
was launched, to publish articles critical of the ROC government, 
and to comment on highly sensitive issues such as martial law and 
the role of the military in Taiwan. It is inconceivable that this 
could have happened under Chiang Kaishek's rule.
After the death of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kaishek, both Deng 
Xiaoping and Chiang Chingkuo tried to handle the Taiwan issue in 
a more flexible way. As the old guard on the mainland and Taiwan 
disappeared, the potential danger of direct conflict or prolonged 
hostility gradually diminished.
E .  S I  N O - A M E R I  CAN N O R M A L I S A T I O N  AND  
THE ONE C H I N A  P O L I C Y .
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The most significant influence on China's attitude towards 
the Taiwan issue, allowing her to "talk" about peaceful solution, 
rather than the use of military threats was the completion of the 
normalisation of Sino-US relations in January 1979. According to 
the Joint Communique on the Establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries, America accepted the so-called "three 
conditions" which put forward by China; and, Beijing, in return, 
agreed to Carter's conditions on Taiwan.(61) The three conditions 
were: the severance of official relations with the ROC on Taiwan; 
the termination of the 1954 US-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty; and the 
withdrawal of US troops and military installations from Taiwan.
During his trip to the US in January 1979, Deng reaffirmed 
that: "In dealing with the Taiwan issue, China would patiently
pursue peaceful means The only two circumstances under which
the PRC would not renounce force were: if there were an extended 
period without negotiation between the PRC and Taiwan or; if the 
Soviet Union should enter Taiwan."(62) Concerning this assurance, 
several points, however, remained unclear. First, Deng failed to 
mention, as he had previously stated, that internal unrest, the 
development of nuclear weapons and Taiwan independence are also 
the reasons which would force China to use military means to 
solve the Taiwan problem. Second,since he had declared earlier in 
Tokyo, that "if the Taiwan issue cannot be settled in ten years 
or in a century, it will be settled in a thousand years", it was 
difficult to guess how long "an extended period without negotia­
tion between the PRC and Taiwan" would be tolerated by the PRC. 
Third, Deng firmly denied, after his return from Washington, that
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he ever made any promise to settle the question of Taiwan by non­
military means. Although these confusions remained, Beijing did 
try hard to prove that the PRC had softened its rhetoric against 
Taiwan and initiated a series of proposals for peaceful reunifi­
cation. (63)
At televised press conference on December 16, 1978, Hua Guo- 
feng was asked if there were any points on which the PRC had made 
concessions to the US on the solution of the Taiwan problem, i.e. 
arms sales, Hua was evidently in a predicament, and responded
stutteringly".....  I do, don't want to make any prompt answer to
that question here, since I did not participate in the China-US 
negotiations personally."(64) this was regarded as evidence that 
there was some discontent among the PRC leaders over their US 
policy and the way to settle the Taiwan issue.
In respect of Taiwan's legal status, the Joint Communique of 
the Sino-US Normalisation stipulated that: "the US acknowledges 
the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is 
part of China.... and the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully 
by the Chinese themselves."(65) On December 27, 1978, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Roger Sullivan explicitly clarified, that "the United States did 
not recognise the PRC's sovereign claim to Taiwan in the Joint 
Communique".(66) But Beijing still deliberately emphasised that 
the word "acknowledges" means "Chengren" in the Chinese version, 
which if retranslated into English means "recognises".At the time 
of the negotiations, the US deliberately did not challenge the 
Chinese version of "Chengren", in order to preserve its position 
of ambiguity with regard to the legal status of Taiwan.
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President Carter's sudden recognition of the PRC, and his 
acceptance of the demands put forward by China, caused a serious 
political row in Washington.(67) The Republican Senitors and 
congressmen led by Barry Goldwater, severely criticised Carter's 
acceptance of the "three conditions", regarded as a betrayal of 
its old friends, the Nationalists. Jimmy Carter then argued that 
the process of normalisation was guided by the principles of the 
Shanghai Communique, initiated by Republican President Nixon. 
Nonetheless, Carter did emphasise the importance of the future US 
relations with Taiwan. He stressed:
"I wish to convey a special message to the people 
of Taiwan, with whom the American people have had 
and will have extensive, close, and friendly rela­
tions. As the United states asserted in the 
Shanghai Communique of 1972, we will continue to 
have an interest in a peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan issue. I have paid special attention to 
ensuring that normalisation of relations between 
our country and the People's Republic of China will 
not jeopardise the well-being of the people of 
Taiwan. The people of our country will maintain 
commercial, cultural, trade, and other relations 
with Taiwan through nongovernmental means."
Similarly Deng Xiaoping expressed his confidence that the 
question of Taiwan had been resolved in principle and reconfirmed 
his interest in the peaceful resolution of the issue, but again 
refused to rule out the use of force as a means of bringing the 
island back to the control of the PRC. It is obvious that the arms 
sales issue remained the major issue between the PRC and the US. 
China was particularly emphatic in denying that it had agreed the 
US could continue selling arms to Taiwan. However, shortly after 
Deng's return from his trip to Washington, he ordered the PLA to 
make an incursion into Vietnam to teach Hanoi a "lesson" for its
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occupation of Cambodia. In fact, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam 
reminded the world that Communist China was not averse to using 
military means to achieve political objectives. And the lesson of 
the use of military force by China was not lost on Congress when 
it reviewed the draft of a bill submitted by President Carter, on 
the future relations of the US and Taiwan.
Many members of Congress reckoned that Carter's draft of the 
Taiwan Omnibus Bill for the future security of the people on the 
island was inadequate.(69) Congress then rewrote the bill and 
passed it in both houses by an overwhelming majority in March 
1979. President Carter had no alternative but to sign the revised 
bill, known as the Taiwan Relations Act on April 10,1979. (70) The 
Act stated "the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is 
necessary to maintain peace,security and stability in the Western 
Pacific" therefore it should link the future of Taiwan with US 
security interests in Asia. The Act specifically defined American 
policy toward Taiwan as: 1). to preserve and promote extensive, 
close and friendly commercial, cultural and other relations 
between the people of Taiwan, as well as the people of the China 
mainland, and all other peoples of the Western pacific area; 2). 
to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the 
political, security and economic interests of the United States 
and are matters of international concern; 3)* to make clear that 
the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with 
the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will 
be determined by peaceful means; 4). to consider any effort to 
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, 
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
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security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the 
US; 5). to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; 6). 
to maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force 
or other forms of coercion that would jeopardise the security, or 
the social/economic system, of the people of Taiwan.
To give specific guidance on the implementation of the above 
policy, Section 3 of the Act reads "In furtherance of the policy 
set forth in Section 2 of the Act, the US will make available to 
Taiwan such defence articles and defence services in such quantity 
as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 
self-defence capability ".(71) Meanwhile the President and the 
Congress shall decide the nature and quantity of defence articles 
and services in accordance with the situation of Taiwan. The Act 
indeed, implied that the US was not, as the PRC leaders expected, 
prepared to desert Taiwan in order to achieve a strategic balance 
between the US the USSR and the PRC.
The initial reaction of the PRC to the TRA was comparatively 
moderate. Apart from a Xinhua News Agency editorial comment and a 
note from Huang Hua the Foreign Minister of the PRC to the US 
Ambassador Woodcock, no further move was taken. Huang Hua pointed 
out that "on a number of points the bill is consistent with, in 
essence, an attempt to maintain 'the US-Chiang' Joint Defence 
Treaty, to continue to intervene in China's internal affairs and 
to give official status to future US-Taiwan relations, this is, 
of course, unacceptable to the Chinese government".(72) Despite 
the disagreement with the TRA, Beijing carefully avoided spoiling 
the newly established friendship with the US. Meanwhile President 
Carter imposed a one year moratorium on arms sales to Taiwan, as
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a "compensation” in favour of China.
With the issue of the Taiwan Relations Act temporarily settled 
on an "agreement to disagree" basis, Sino-US relations remained 
generally stable. The PRC saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
as part of the USSR's southern strategy to isolate and contain 
the PRC's influence in Asia. Moreover, as the US has continually 
promised that it would not pursue a "Two Chinas" or "Taiwan 
independence" Policy, Beijing then responded that it would follow 
peaceful means to resolve the issue. All in all the PRC campaign 
for peaceful reunification with Taiwan was brought about by the 
internal and external political atmosphere.
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C H A P T E R  4 :  T H E  F O R M A T I O N  AND D E V E L O P M E N T  OF ONE
C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S  1 9 7 9  - 8 4
"The idea of One Country Two Systems was first put 
forward with a view to settling the Taiwan and Hong 
Kong issues. There are two ways to settle the 
issues: peaceful and non-peaceful. The non^-peaceful 
way, or the way to settle the issues by force, was 
deemed inappropriate. How could these issues be 
settled peacefully ? It requires taking into full 
consideration the history and present conditions of 
Hong Kong and Taiwan.... After the reunification is 
realised,Taiwan can still practise capitalism while 
the mainland maintains socialism. Both of them are 
part of a united China. This is what we mean by One 
Country Two Systems. (1)
.........  Deng Xiaoping, 1984
A .  O R I G I N S  OF ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S
Deng Xiaoping claimed that the original idea of One Country 
and Two Systems derived from the party resolution of the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, in 1978.(2) 
But a careful reading of the documents issued by the PRC during 
the period of 1978-82, shows no sign of this formulation.In fact, 
Deng used the concept of One Country Two Systems for the first 
time in 1982 at a reception in honour of Britain's Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, where the two exchanged views on how to settle 
the Hong Kong problem.(3) The resolution made at the Third Plenum 
of December 1978, indeed, marked the beginning of a series of 
peaceful initiatives by the PRC, aimed at bringing Taiwan to the 
negotiating table.
The new proposal was inspired by two interrelated motives:(4)
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on the one hand, to try to convince the Taiwan authorities that 
Beijing was sincerely looking for peaceful reunification under 
mutually acceptable conditions, and on the other hand, to create 
the impression that the PRC would faithfully honour its words 
according to the Sino-US Normalisation Agreement. The New Year's 
Day Message to the people of Taiwan in January 1979, formally 
laid the foundation for China's renewal of China-Taiwan relation­
ships. The message claimed that Beijing was uneasy about the pro­
longed national division and professed its responsibility for the 
reunification of the motherland. It also suggested that Taiwan and 
the mainland arrange for mutual visits and tours, establish postal 
and transportation services, set up various academic and cultural 
exchanges, and open up trade. All this was later summed up in the 
term "Santong Silui" (Direct contacts by ways of mutual exchanges 
and communications).(5)
Following the publication of the message, a massive campaign 
for reunification with Taiwan was launched in Beijing. The PRC's 
National Defence Ministry promptly announced that the PLA was 
ceasing the alternate day shelling of Jinmen and Mazu which had 
been occurring regularly since 1958.(6) Hua Guofeng also repeated 
the proposal for peaceful talks in his government report at the 
Fifth National People's Congress, and recommended that a peaceful 
solution to the Taiwan issue should be ratified by the law-making 
body. (7) Deng Xiaoping was pleased to point out that the New Year 
Day of 1979 was the most notable one since the establishment of 
the PRC. Among the three important tasks that he singled out for 
the Chinese people for the next decade was the solution of the 
Taiwan issue. He hinted that he would be delighted to meet Chiang 
Chingkuo in any place to discuss the matter of national reunifi­
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cation. (8) When he made his trip to the US in January 1979, Deng 
sought US's supports to bring about peaceful negotiations between 
Beijing and Taibei. Many public figures, other than the leaders 
of the CPC, made sentimental pleas for contacts with their old 
friends in Taiwan. Overseas Chinese were also mobilised to express 
their wishes for China's reunification and to put pressure on the 
Taibei authorities.
The new initiatives gained some international applause, but 
Taibei and Washington did not respond as positively as the PRC 
leaders had hoped. In September 1981, in his capacity as Chairman 
of the SCNPC, Marshal Ye Jianying, offered a more specific "Nine 
Point Proposal" to Taiwan. The contents of the proposal can be 
summarised as follow:(9)
1. To initiate reciprocal negotiations between the Communist 
Party and the Kuomintang;
2. To realise the urgent desire of people on both sides of 
the Taiwan Straits to communicate with each other,to reunite with 
their relatives, to develop trade and to increase mutual under­
standing;
3. Taiwan to retain a high degree of autonomy as a special 
administrative region and to be allowed to obtain armed forces. 
The Central Government to refrain from interfering in local 
affairs on Taiwan;
4. Taiwan's current socio-economic system to be unchanged, 
as would also be the way of life, and its economic and cultural 
relations with foreign countries;
5. The people of Taiwan to take part in the state government 
(in Beijing) and be appointed to leading posts;
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6. The Central Government to subsidise Taiwan in case of 
financial difficulty;
7. The people of Taiwan to be guaranteed the right to come 
and settle on the mainland and to have freedom of entry and exit;
8. Industrialists and businessmen to be welcomed to invest 
and engage in economic undertakings on the mainland; legal rights 
interests and profits to be guaranteed;
9. The PRC welcomed all proposals and suggestions concerning 
national reunification. It would also respect the current role 
and status of the people of Taiwan in the process of national re­
union .
The above statement was by far the most comprehensive offer 
the Chinese Communists had yet presented. The PRC lost no time in 
demonstrating that it was a turning point in her policy towards 
Taiwan, and claimed the proposal to be a fair and reasonable 
formula for the return of Taiwan to the motherland in the light 
of the actual situation. The proposals were rejected outright by 
the KMT in Taiwan. Apart from reiterating its No Contact, No 
Negotiation, and No Compromise - "Three Noes policy", the Taibei 
authorities made counter offers for China's reunification.(10)
More generally, however, there were some ambiguities which 
the PRC failed to clarify at the time the overtures were made:
1. The Nine-point proposal was based on the fundamental 
hypothesis that the people of Taiwan were longing to be clasped 
in the embrace of the motherland, without indicating how that 
might be established.
2. By proposing that the problem be solved by negotiations 
between the CPC and the KMT, Beijing was in effect prejudging the
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claim of the KMT to represent the people of Taiwan, (without this 
being tested democratically), and denying the KMT's claim to be a 
national party.
3. Since the free exchange of mail, trade, visits, and 
services either do not exist or are heavily circumscribed on the 
mainland, how could the people of Taiwan exercise these freedoms 
with people on the mainland without fear of being put at a disad­
vantaged ?
4. As it is unlikely that Taiwan should receive financial 
subsidies from the PRC Central government, since the GNP per 
Capita in Taiwan has reached US$ 8,500.oo while it is only US$ 
450.oo on the mainland, could there be an ulterior motive for the 
proposal ?
5. Finally, compared with the people on the mainland, the 
people of Taiwan have more political economic freedom. It is hard 
to conceive that the Taiwanese would willingly accept the CPC's 
suggestions and put their own future in doubt by giving the 
Communist party final control. In short, for the people of Taiwan 
the risks involved in reunification on the PRC's terms by far 
outweigh the hypothetical benefits.
Of course, one should not be confused by Taibei's strong 
words in rebutting the proposal. In fact, the KMT authorities and 
those who followed the defeated government in its retreat to 
Taiwan in 1949, still maintain that there is only "One China, and 
Taiwan is part of China". To that extent, the Nine-point proposal 
is quite encouraging, because, at least implicitly, it assures 
them of their privileged status and the retention of power in 
Taiwan. But various objections were raised by the Taibei authori-
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ties and the mass media they control,mainly because of their lack 
of confidence that the PRC would honour its words.
Efforts by the PRC to get Taiwan to the negotiating table did 
not end with the Nine Point proposal. The PRC's latest revision of 
the PRC Constitution include the provision of Article 31:
"The state may establish special administrative re­
gions when necessary. The rules and regulations in 
force in special administrative regions shall be 
instituted by the NPC in legal form in accordance 
with their specific conditions."(11)
The Article was specifically designed for Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Macao, so that these areas could be allowed to retain as 
Special Administrative Regions. The PRC took the opportunity at 
the meeting of the National People's Congress to demonstrate that 
"The Beijing regime is highly unequivocal on the principle of 
safeguarding its sovereignty,unity and territorial integrity, but 
would be extremely flexible with regard to specific policies and 
measures in some areas in China".(12) Elaborating on the possible 
future of Taiwan, Deng told Winston Yang in July 1983 that: (13^
1. "After reunification, Beijing will not dispatch the PLA to 
Taiwan, nor will it send officials to take over, to take part in, 
or to interfere with Taiwan's internal affairs." Though Deng did 
not agree to the proposition of "Taiwan people governing Taiwan", 
because he thought it had implications of Taiwan independence, he 
stressed that "Taiwan can maintain its economic, social system, 
and its party, government, army and intelligence agency. We will 
never harm even a single blade of grass or tree on Taiwan. The 
mainland and Taiwan will co-exist peacefully". He also said that 
this arrangement would remain unchanged for at least one hundred 
years. If disputes should arise in the course of implementing the
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reunification terms, both sides could seek solutions through 
consultation. Meanwhile, neither side would act so as to cause 
harm in any way to the other in its own territory.
2. After reunification Taiwan would enjoy independent legis­
lative rights and could basically maintain its existing laws. 
Provided that the Constitution of the PRC were respected, the 
Taiwan legislature would have the right to enact its own laws 
which would form the foundation for Taiwan's administration.
3. After reunification Taiwan would have its own independent 
jurisdiction. The laws and decrees on the mainland would not be 
applied to Taiwan. The court of last instance for Taiwan should 
sit in Taiwan rather than in Beijing.
4. After reunification, Taiwan would maintain certain rights 
to handle foreign affairs. It could also handle its foreign 
economic relations independently. The Taiwan authorities could 
issue special passports to Taiwan people and could grant entrance 
visas to foreigners. It could even have the right to sign some 
treaties or agreements directly with other countries.
5. After reunification, Taiwan's Army will have the right to 
buy weapons from other countries in order to consolidate its 
self-defensive capability.(But Deng later denied that he had told 
W. L. Yang that he agreed to Taiwan purchasing weapons from other 
countries.)(14)
6. After reunification, Taiwan could still use its special 
flag and use the title of "China Taiwan".
Because the fifth point caused a degree of confusion, some 
Chinese sources refer to the document as the Deng's "Five-Point 
Proposal". Others, and in particular US official documents, refer
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to it as "Deng's Six Assurances". When, in Chicago in October, 
1983, he was asked to clarify China's policy about US arms sales 
to Taiwan, Wu Xueqian, the PRC Foreign Minister, did not answer 
directly. Instead, Wu told his American audience that "All our 
proposals for the reunification of Taiwan, are the main themes 
which our leaders have been considering for a long time. We do not 
ask for US assistance in achieving the reunification of Taiwan 
with the mainland, but we ask our American friends to refrain 
from obstructing our efforts."(15)
The 1982 - 84 negotiations between China and Britain over the 
issue of Hong Kong resulted in the construction of a substantial 
model of "One Country Two Systems". From the outset of the Sino- 
British talks, the PRC officials frequently referred to the plans 
being considered for Hongkong as also being applicable to Taiwan. 
After the Agreement on the future of Hong Kong was duly signed by 
the governments of China and the U.K., Deng Xiaoping then added a 
peculiar caveats
"We have been discussing the policy for two systems 
in one country for several years. It has now been 
approved by the National people's Congress. Some 
people worry whether this policy will change. I say 
it will not change. The core of the matter is 
whether this policy is correct or not. If it is 
correct it will not be changed. If it is incorrect, 
it may change."(16)
At any rate, the concept of One Country Two Systems originated 
from Deng's initiatives. To a large extent, it exemplified the 
flexibility of the PRC's external policy in the decade of 1980s.
B .  THE T H E O R Y  OF ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S
145
Following the completion of the Sino-British talks, Beijing 
hailed the One Country Two Systems policy as "a scientific method 
for the peaceful resolution of international disputes and a new 
departure in political science and theories of the state."(17) But 
what exactly is this new political theory - the theory of "One 
Country Two Systems" ?
The Chinese Communist record over the past decades shows that 
every innovative policy decision is always accompanied by theore­
tical justifications. However, "One Country Two systems" was an 
exception. When the British politicians acclaimed it as a "richly 
imaginative conception, to solve international disputes,"(18) no 
Communist theory was mentioned to back up this concept. When Deng 
Xiaoping defined the the policy of One Country Two Systems, he 
said that "the policy goes with the principle of seeking truth 
from facts". This, obviously, is insufficient as an explanation 
of the socialist criteria allegedly applied. Since the Sino- 
British Agreement was signed, it ceased being merely "a tentative 
plan formulated in response to a particular problem", rather it 
became "a national policy and a guideline to conducting external 
a f f a i r s (19) Therefore the theoretical issues of One Country Two 
Systems have been dealt with both by party ideologists and 
scholars in China.
Some eminent Chinese scholars and party theorists have made 
efforts to justify One Country Two Systems as compatible with the 
principle of revolutionary foreign policy. For instance Pei 
Monong, the Deputy Director of the Institute of the International
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Relations Studies in Beijing, believes that "in terms of the 
stages of development in human history, our era is one in which 
socialism and capitalism exist side by side. In fact, for the 
past thirty odd years we have been living in a situation of 'One 
World Two S y s t e m s (20) Qian Jiaju, a former Consultant at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science, also said "In such an histori­
cal epoch, the belief that socialism and capitalism are irrecon­
cilable opposites like fire and water, and that if we don't 
destroy them, they will destroy us, is an expression of the out­
moded vision of the 1950s, the Dulles philosophy."(21)
Indeed, a world where capitalist and socialist countries have 
existed side by side for many decades, is one in which peaceful 
coexistence between the two sides is possible. The extension of 
the concept of peaceful coexistence, inherent in the framework of 
"one world two systems", to the notion of one country two systems 
appears to be a reasonable foundation for proposing the policy of 
"One Country Two Systems". But if one looks more closely at the 
reasons for the peaceful coexistence of the two systems in one 
world, it becomes clear that the conditions for one world, two 
systems and one country, two systems are actually very different. 
Hence, the argument that world politics actually "formulated" the 
idea of one country two systems is a weak one. (22)
On many occasions, the Chinese leaders have hinted that the 
idea of one Country, Two Systems is a new development within 
Marxism. Qian Junrui, Professor of philosophy at Beijing Univer­
sity, also suggested two reasons why the policy should not be 
seen as a departure from Marxism. First One Country Two Systems 
is a product of the Marxist line of seeking the truth from facts,
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starting out from a knowledge of reality, and combining theory 
and practice. Second, the policy does not depart from the theory 
of Marxist dialectical materialism, rather, as Qian put its "the 
principle of the unity of opposites, the relationship of produc­
tivity and means of productions, the theory of surplus value and 
the law of the development of history are all scientifically 
adopted in the concept of One Country Two S y s t e m s (23) Yet, 
again, this explanation was hampered by lack of evidence that the 
concept of One Country Two Systems has any connection with these 
hackneyed and cliche-ridden expressions of the Communism.
Another thesis was put forward by Wang Bangzuo and Wang 
Huning, in an informative explanation of their article "On the 
Relationship of Sovereignty and One Country Two Systems".(24) 
The argument in the article held that: "....In the Concept of One 
Country Two Systems, the literal meaning of 'One Country' refers 
to the indivisibility of state sovereignty and the unitary nature 
of the Chinese nation."(25) Although the historical situation has 
necessitated "peaceful coexistence" between political systems of 
different natures, the two Wangs believed that in searching for a 
solution to the division of the nation, "if the question of 
sovereignty is avoided and the unification of sovereignty is not 
discussed, there can be no hope for the eventual reunification of 
the nation, and all methods of achieving this end will have lost 
their main premise and basis. This reasoning causes the Chinese 
leaders and theorists to reject ideas such as "Two Chinas" or 
"China and Taiwan can coexist": in Wangs' opinion, One Country is 
the principle aim of One Country Two Systems.(26)
While clarifying the principle of One Country Two Systems,
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the Wangs' article also stresses the unitary nature of China, as 
they explain "overall sovereignty can be vested in the Central 
Government, while regions with different political systems can be 
authorised by the Centre to exercise a high degree of self 
government. The linkage of Two systems in One Country implies a 
high level of organic integration of sovereignty and administra­
tive p o w e r (27) According to the Wangs' viewpoint, under unified 
sovereignty there can be many types of administrative system, but 
the relationship between the Two Systems is clearly an unequal 
one. This is because One Country is a process created for the 
transfer of sovereignty while the Two Systems are merely a number 
of regions whose organisation is based on the exercise of admini­
strative power.(28)
In spite of its hard-line nature, the article does succeed 
in clarifying a number of important points. People in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan spend a great deal of time in discussing the contents 
of Two Systems, yet Chinese leaders regard it as a pre-condition 
that One Country should come first, otherwise the Two Systems 
could not possibly exist. The emphasis on One Country, however, 
raises questions about the sincerity of their support and 
tolerance for Two Systems.
The most succinct and thought-provoking work on the theory of 
One Country Two Systems came in an article by Yan Jiaqi, former 
Head of the Institute of Political Studies, the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences. Yan defined the theoretical scope of the 
policy as follow:
"The meaning of 'One Country Two Systems' is that 
the constitution and laws of a particular state 
expressly allow a certain number of regions within
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that state to maintain a different type of 
political, economic and social order. The 
administrations of these regions, however, are 
local governments of that state, and are therefore 
not entitled to exercise sovereignty".(29)
The above definition brings out four key factors that include
1). the different systems are to be in operation in separate 
regions, not Two Systems in one region; 2). there will continue 
to be obvious differences between the Two Systems, and these will 
be allowed to coexist; 3). these regions will still be part of a 
unitary state and therefore will not have the right to conduct 
foreign affairs, declare war or make peace on their own behalf, 
nor to organise their own defence forces; 4). explicit guarantees 
for the long-term coexistence of the Two Systems on a stable 
basis are to be given in the constitution and in law.
Yan also argues that the policy of One Country Two Systems 
differs significantly from any parallel, either historical or 
international, which could be drawn, since none was protected by 
any type of constitutional provisions. Examples would be Emperor 
Taizong of the Liao dynasty's formulation "The State rules over 
the Khitans, whilst the Han rule over the Han people " (Yi Guozhi 
Zhi Qidan, Yi Hanzhi Zhi Hanren),(J0^ and the coexistence in 
North America before the Civil War of the slave-holding South and 
the slaveless North. China's Special Economic Zones enjoy 
autonomy in the economic sphere only, while the Ethnic Minority 
Autonomous Regions have the same type of political and economic 
system as the centre.(31)
No Chinese leader or scholar has attempted to show what dis­
tinguishes One Country Two Systems from federalism or a confeder­
ation. But Yan Jiaqi does mention that "generally, states are
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classified as either unitary or compound, compound systems being 
of the federal or confederative type, but One Country Two Systems 
innovates in enlarging the jurisdiction of local government to an 
extent never previously seen within a unitary country. "(32) In 
other words, in the past it has been considered impossible to 
retain a unitary state structure while also enjoying the advant­
ages of federalism or confederation, but now China has discovered 
a way of combining these two elements in One Country Two Systems.
In theory, the statements of the Chinese government and the 
annotations made by the above mentioned scholars, have indicated 
that the policy of One Country Two Systems represents a higher 
degree of autonomy than that of the different states under the 
federal systems of the US, Canada or Germany.In comparing federal 
systems and One Country Two Systems, there are two problems, 
however, which remain unclarified. 1). Federalism, in general, 
includes the possibility of there being one, two or even many 
systems of government, but One Country Two Systems "assumes" that 
there will be only two. 2). The scope of the jurisdiction of 
federal states is based on the initial independence of the states 
from the central government and allows them to contend for juris­
diction over specific areas with the national governing body, 
while under One Country two Systems the power of the SARs is 
"conferred" upon them by the central government, and they are 
subordinate to it.(33)
Arising out of the above-mentioned proposals made by Ye Jian 
-ying and Deng Xiaoping, together with the above analysis of the 
theoretical concept of One Country Two Systems, a concise, and 
explicit definition could be drawn up as follows:
151
" The meaning of One Country Two Systems is that 
the constitution and laws of a particular unitary 
state expressly allow one or many regions within 
that state to maintain a fundamentally different 
type of political, economic and social order. The 
administrations of these regions have the status of 
local governments but can only exercise powers, 
according to law, which have been conferred on them 
by the central government, and they are not entitled 
to exercise any right of national sovereignty(34)
Fundamentally, the theory of One Country Two Systems is 
established on two major hypothetical premises: 1). The people of 
Taiwan are longing for national reunification. The PRC leaders 
believe that the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants in 
Taiwan regard themselves as thoroughly Chinese and share the same 
deep-rooted national identity as the rest of the Chinese people.
2). A great many artificially imposed obstacles have existed, and 
most of the problems between Taiwan and the mainland are caused 
by misgivings, misunderstandings and misinterpretations that have 
deterred the people of Taiwan from trying to reunite with the 
mainland Chinese. Should the two premises accepted by the people 
of Taiwan, certainly the theoretical concept of "One Country Two 
Systems" would eventually be the guideline for reunification. The 
essence of the Taiwan question would therefore become not whether 
to reunite or not, but how to reunite and on what conditions.
But would the people of Taiwan accept these hypotheses ? This 
is a matter which should be discussed and it will be dealt with 
in Chapter seven.
C .  THE  C H A R A C T E R  OF ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S
152
Judging from the abundant documents, speeches and comments 
relating to the policy of One Country Two Systems, the character 
of the policy has many aspects. And these can be argued in three 
ways as follows:
1. The contradictory nature of the two systems.
"One Country Two Systems" is undoubtedly an example of "the 
unification of contradictions".(35) As Deng Xiaoping pointed outs 
"if there were no contradictions between the two systems of main­
land China and Taiwan which have coexisted for such a long time, 
there would be no need for a strategic policy of One Country Two 
Systems to settle the problem."(36) In terms of contradictions, 
there is a fundamental problems how to justify the rejection by 
one of the existing systems of tolerance of the other, and the 
employment of a new framework for the management of their rela­
tions ? In other words, what is the justification for the two 
parties proposing that it is necessary to take positive measures 
to re-shape their mutual relationship ?
Indeed, a simple answer to this question is by no means easy, 
as both long-term peaceful coexistence and positive methods for 
the elimination of contradictions are subject to the vagaries of 
practical situations which are in turn affected by the contradic­
tory nature of the two systems. However to argue the nature of 
the policy, it must be recognised that at times it is unnecessary 
to seek to solve contradictions through active measures, and, in 
fact, letting them alone might be more advantageous. From this 
perspective, "One Country Two Systems" advocates laying aside the 
problem of the contradictions between the two systems in the
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interest of reunification and makes clear that an attempt to force 
positive solutions will seriously endanger peaceful reunification. 
The best tactic for coping with contradictions is perhaps quietly 
to distance oneself from them on some occasions and to try to 
equip oneself with the time and the necessary material conditions 
on others. The essential prerequisites for peaceful coexistence 
are an attitude of mutual respect and a state of mind summed up 
by the Chinese classical phrase "the gentleman agrees to differ", 
(Junzi Heer Butong).(37) This principle, perhaps, applies equally 
to all relations between human beings and states.
If several regions were allowed to implement different social, 
political and economic ideas under a liberal society allowing for 
democratic freedom or a pluralistic economic and political order, 
and as a result of this contradictions emerged, it is likely that 
in the process of applying predetermined laws and decision-making 
procedures some method of reducing problems would be found, or at 
very least that some control could be exercised under an objective 
system which would prevent the scope of the difficulties from 
widening. If a few areas which have capitalist systems are to co­
exist successfully with a socialist, central government, a high 
degree of commitment and leadership ability will be essential. A 
cautious approach will be needed to preserve the stability and 
viability of the policy. At any rate,this contradictory character 
is an integral part of One Country Two Systems,and must therefore 
be taken into consideration, but it is difficult to predict 
whether the contradictions can be resolved or not.
2. The possibility of one side overwhelming the other
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Since the "Two Systems" are unequal, the relationship between 
them is not reciprocal and balanced, and therefore there is a 
possibility that the larger system will be tempted to overwhelm 
or absorb the smaller one. But, is a reciprocal, balanced and 
equal relationship between the Two systems completely outside the 
scope of the proposals China has put forward in "One Country Two 
Systems" ? The written record of the policy would force one to
reply to this question in the affirmative. Although both Taiwan 
and Hong Kong have enjoyed phenomenal economic success and pros­
perity, Deng Xiaoping has repeatedly declared: "Would it make 
sense to re-unify China by transferring the system of Taiwan 
under which only ten million plus people live, to the billion 
people of the mainland ? China's ultimate goal is indubitably 
Socialism".(38) Moreover, the policy of One Country Two System is 
not to be used for the ethnic minority autonomous regions or 
anywhere else on the mainland. The PRC has explicitly indicated 
that the existing rules of One Country Two Systems are prepared 
for the adjudication of disputes where Beijing will exercise the 
ultimate authority.
The basic idea of the Two Systems in One Country is that the 
Socialist mainland and its government rule, while Taiwan and Hong 
Kong are ruled(may be not totally) and have to accept the central 
government's direction.(39) The CPC would be unlikely to think 
that this formulation departs from its stated aims.In other words, 
if there were even the remotest possibility that Taiwan or Hong 
Kong would be able to overpower or absorb the mainland and become 
its rulers, would it still have the same trust in "One country 
Two systems" ?
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In the Autumn of 1920 the young Mao Zedong advocated "self 
government" and "complete autonomy" for Hunan.(40) But the 
Summer of 1983 saw Deng Xiaoping saying, "there cannot be 
unlimited autonomy, it cannot be 'complete'. 'Complete Autonomy' 
would, in effect, mean 'Two Chinas'".(41) The circumstances of 
these two pronouncements were very different and therefore the 
conclusions they come up with are also different. The purpose of 
One Country Two Systems is clearly to effect the reunification of 
China, while preserving the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. Indeed, the term of "One Country Two Systems" is much 
more attractive than the previous advocacy of "liberation" by 
force. However, those who concerned with effecting reunification 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan are extremely sensitive about this 
tendency inherent in One Country Two Systems for the larger to 
overwhelm smaller unit, and they hope that the policy might be 
improved through proposals similar to those in the "Puerto Rican 
Model",(42) or even the "Singaporian Model". This apprehension is 
understandable and ought to be taken into consideration.
3. The transitional character
Xu Jiatun, when Chief of the Hong Kong Branch of the Xinhua 
News Agency, commented that "the transfer of the sovereignty of 
Hongkong is not only expedient, but is also in the best interests 
of both sides and is an expression of an awareness of the actual 
situation. The policy of One Country Two Systems is the result of 
the party centre and the State Council undertaking research and 
discussion over a long period of time. It takes account of Hong 
Kong's history and its present situation; the task of reunifying 
China; the needs of socialist modernisation and the wishes of the
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majority in Hongkong, and for these reasons it has been supported 
both domestically and internationally." (43) What the leaders of 
the PRC have said may be true, and the prudence and realism of 
the Beijing authorities has gained international credit. However, 
this does not alter the transitional character of One Country Two 
Systems.
The policy is transitional in that it is explicitly limited 
in terms of time, and the ultimate aim is also clearly stated. 
But would it be possible to make "One Country Two Systems" a
permanent arrangement ? Is there any chance that the predominant
socialist system could either make some concessions, or even 
undergo some change which would makes it no longer predominant ?
Deng Xiaoping, who confidently asserts that his Party fears 
no criticism, recognised that people in Taiwan and Hongkong would 
have found the idea of socialism unacceptable during the Sino- 
* British talks, and proposed the new formulation; "We will not 
swallow you up, and you will not absorb us. After fifty years of 
the practice of One Country Two Systems, it will be even less 
likely that Hong Kong would be compelled to transfer into the 
Communist system, simply because by that time the PRC will have 
become a strong and prosperous socialist nation."(44) This 
assertion contradicts many of the previous speeches made by CPC 
leaders (including Deng himself) in which they had vowed Hong 
Kong's eventual transfer into the main-stream system. Moreover, 
Deng's claim subjectively implied that a strong and prosperous
socialist China would be equally attractive to people who had
been used to living under the Capitalist system. Even if that 
were so, how could people in Hong Kong and Taiwan be sure that
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the PRC would become a strong and prosperous nation in fifty 
years time ? In fact, judging from the political upheavals which 
have repeatedly occurred on the mainland, the residents of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan have been more concerned about their possible 
political suppression than their chances of economic prosperity 
should the Communists come to rule them. Deng's comment, however, 
deliberately avoided these points and that has made the people of 
Taiwan and Hong Kong gravely worried about the transformation 
period of 50 years which is to be a time of re-education for 
learning the glories of Socialism. If the One Country Two Systems 
policy really means peaceful coexistence, with neither side 
prevailing over the other, then there should be no need for time 
limits or a final outcome which favours one side. But, in fact, 
the Sino-British statement clearly sets out the deadline after 
which Hong Kong will adopt the system of the rest of China, 
leaving Beijing little flexibility in case it should choose to 
alter its original intention.
D .  T H E  L E G A L  B A S I S  OF ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S
As has been mentioned above, the 31st article of China's 
1982 Constitution allows for Special Administrative Regions to be 
set up if necessary, the system of SAR's to be determined by 
actual conditions, to be legislated for by the National People's 
Congress. This, the PRC has contested, is the legal basis for One 
Country Two Systems. From the exact wording of the article, the 
establishment of many SARs with different types of government
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could be envisaged. However, the speeches of the CPC leaders 
reveal that the proposed SARs are Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao 
only, and that there will be no others. Concrete issues, such as 
differences in the application of the policy in each of the 
three, arising from their particular requirements and the time at 
which they are re-united with the mainland, will be legislated 
for by the NPC as they emerge, in accordance with the specific 
situation of the time.
Some problems, which could create conflicts and threaten the 
foundations of the stability of One Country Two Systems, become 
apparent on reading the plans for putting the policy into effect 
as laid down in the constitution. The most important reason for 
this is that the status of article 31 is rather unclear.
The preamble of the constitution says: "All the peoples of 
China will uphold the People's Democratic Dictatorship and keep 
to the socialist road under the leadership of the CPC and the 
guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought."(45) Article 
1 of the constitution's General Principle states: "The PRC is a 
socialist country led by the proletariat and based on an alliance 
between the workers and peasants and exercises government through 
the People's Democratic Dictatorship. Socialism is the fundamental 
principle of the PRC's governmental system "(46) Article 5 claims 
"No law, administrative regulation or local rule can conflict 
with the provisions of the constitution. All state bodies, the 
armed forces, political parties and associations, businesses, 
enterprises and organisations must uphold and respect the consti­
tution and the law. Any violations of the law or constitution must 
be thoroughly investigated."(47)
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The constitutional justification for the future SARs existing 
under a different type of government lies only in the above- 
mentioned Article 31, and is obviously in opposition to all these 
strict regulations. According to the explanation given by 
Beijing, article 31 is a "Proviso of principle", and the NPC can 
therefore decide to implement "One Country Two Systems". This 
provokes two urgent questions. First, can the NPC override what 
is laid down in the constitution and confer power on any region, 
organisation, or individual in accordance with this proviso ? 
Second, are the governments upon which the NPC has conferred 
power and the individuals living in the SARs subject to the
provisions of the constitution,or can they act unconstitutionally 
without being prosecuted ?
A careful analysis of article 31 reveals that it is only the 
word "special" which seems to exempt it from the other provisions 
of the constitution. However, what is the scope of this "special" 
status ? IS it actually part of the constitution ? If it can
exempt these "special" areas from articles of the constitution 
such as No. 6, which lays down the system of ownership of the 
means of production and No. 10, the system of ownership of land; 
No.24, which concerns communist education and No.25, the birth 
limitation programme; And No.33, which says that the citizens of 
the PRC are all equal before the law, then why can it not exempt 
them entirely from the provisions of the constitution ? Any 
attempt to interpret Article 31 by bringing it into line with the
preface to the constitution and article No.l, could provoke
interminable disputes, and if article 5 is to apply to the SARs, 
their basic law could be declared to be unconstitutional.
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There seem to be two possible ways of resolving once and for 
all these controversies over the jurisdiction of various parts of 
the constitution. The first would be to amend article 31 with 
reference to article 64, adding the words: "these provisions are 
not subject to limitation by any other article of the constitu- 
tion."(48) The second method would be for the NPC to proclaim 
publicly, with reference to the first clause of article 67 of the 
constitution, that "the SARs can have systems which are not 
socialist (or are even in opposition to socialism), and are not 
subject to articles of the constitution which would disallow 
this". The first solution has greater legal authority, but the 
second is clearer and more thorough.(49)
Some scholars, however, argue that the constitution in China 
has always been subject to changes in party policy, so that, when 
the CPC encounters a situation in which "revolutionary necessity" 
requires it, the constitution is laid aside or even radically 
altered, as the party leaders do not consider the constitution to 
be the ultimate authority.(50) According to this reasoning, it 
is therefore important to ensure the correctness and stability of 
One Country Two Systems on the level of policy and in its subse­
quent implementation, rather than providing for minutiae in the 
constitution. The people of Hong Kong responding to the revision 
of the PRC Constitution in 1982, have firmly demanded that the 
Chinese government must abide by its own laws. In Particular, an 
interpretation of "One Country Two Systems" must not violate the 
constitution and should be established on a firm constitutional 
basis.(51)
However, further ambiguities are caused by the PRC's attitude
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towards the controversy over the provisions of the PRC constitu­
tion for the planned Basic Law of Hong Kong (Mini-Constitution). 
In Sept. 1984, an article in Renmin Ribao entitled "Clarifying the 
possible legal problems of One Country Two systems and Chinese 
law", (52) claimed that the policy China put forward will be 
implemented as laid out in the Sino-British Agreement, and is not 
in contradiction to the articles of China's constitution, being 
rather completely in accord with them. The article makes three 
vital pointsi(53)
1. It explains that the Four Basic Principles laid down in the 
constitution "are binding over the entire country".(54) The first 
article of the constitution, which decrees that "the socialist 
system is the basic system of our country" is actually speaking 
of the overall character of the nation, and the implementation of 
the special policies in the SARs will not affect this character, 
as they are only particular social policies carried out by the 
nation. The article quoted a comment made by the NPC Standing 
Committee: "the 1954 constitution listed four types of ownership 
of the means of production, namely ownership by the whole people, 
the collective, the individual, and capitalist ownership, but, in 
fact, in the regions inhabited by ethnic minority peoples, slave- 
holding and feudal ownership still existed."(55)
2. It contests that Article 5 of the constitution states "no 
law, administrative regulation or local statute can be in contra­
diction with the provisions of the constitution". Despite this, 
it is a fact that some of the provisions of Hong Kong's projected 
Basic Law are bound to contradict certain articles of the consti­
tution (e.g., the system of ownership, right to strike, and the
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right to decide on the number of children to have with no 
intervention from the state etc.). The article claims that since 
the Basic Law is provided for in article 31 and its wording is an 
integral part of the whole constitution, any regulation which is 
in accordance with article 31 is also in accordance with the con­
stitution. (56) As for the specific legal provisions to be enacted 
for Hong Kong, "as long as they are in accordance with the Basic 
Law, they will be consistent with the constitution, and it would 
therefore be illegitimate to cite article 5 to support a conten­
tion that these are in contradiction with the constitution." (57)
3. The article asserts that the fact that the Hong Kong SAR 
will have different laws from the rest of the country, does not 
go against article 33 of the constitution which says that "all 
citizens of China are equal before the law". It justifies this 
view by saying that article 33 refers to the fact that all citi­
zens are to be treated equally in the implementation of the law, 
not in terms of legislation. (58) The SARs can have their own 
legislation, different from that of the rest of the PRC, because 
of their special circumstances. The law of the whole nation will 
be applied equally to all its citizens, while the registration of 
the SAR will be applied equally to all the citizens of the SARs; 
this is the true meaning of equality before the law*(59)
In the first point of the above explanation, the PRC govern­
ment has resorted to sophistry, the second uses a lame argument 
and the third can only be regarded as fallacious. It is difficult 
to see how the view put forward by the author of the article can 
really be squared with the idea of the constitution as China's 
"primary great law". Even in a federal system, all the states in
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the federation must abide by the provisions of the federation's 
constitution, although each state has its own particular legisla­
tion. The article seems to suggest that if something is in accor­
dance with one article of the constitution then it is compatible 
with the whole constitution; if the citizens of one region are 
equal before that region's law, then this constitutes equality 
before the law. This is a strange type of logic.
E .  O T H E R  M O DE LS  AND ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S
"One Country Two Systems" is not the only proposal that has 
been put forward to solve the Taiwan issue. Many formulae have 
been proposed for the normalisation of relations between China 
and Taiwan, . (60) Of more than ten models for the resolution of 
the issue, the most frequently mentioned includes
1). The former German Model: In the last four decades, East 
Germany and West Germany have resolved their problems peacefully. 
Although both German governments were strongly constrained by 
international influence on the issue of reunification, they had 
gradually reduced their mutual hostility. The situation in the 
two Germanies, had led to the exchange of representatives between 
Berlin and Bonn; dual recognition of the two states by many other 
countries; dual representation of both Germanies in the diploma­
tic corps of the world community; membership for both East and 
West Germany in the United Nations; and direct trade and tourism 
between the two systems. Hungdah Chiu and some other supporters
164
of this formulation believe that the Taiwan issue should be 
solved in a manner similar to the German solution.(61)
2). The Singaporian Model; Hungmao Tian first advocated the 
"Singapore pattern" in 1972, and it has received a fair amount of 
attention in the international arena.(62) Tian holds that "One 
China" means an identity attached only to the Han nationality and 
culture, and that all Chinese do not necessarily live under one 
political roof. He argues that although today's Taiwanese, in 
terms of nationality and culture are Chinese, they are actually 
of a different political identity and should be regarded as such, 
just as are the Chinese who now reside in Singapore. Many in 
Taiwan take Tian's point, proposing to change the KMT's current 
power structure by turning it into another Singapore.
3). The Federal state or Confederation Model: It has been 
suggested by scholars and politicians such as Yan Jiaqi and Hu Di 
that Taiwan and the mainland form a "Federal Republic" or "China- 
Taiwan Republic" (Zhongtai Gonghe Guo). These propositions entail 
creating a loosely organised Federal Parliament, Confederate 
Council or other symbolic organisations, over which there will be 
no central government to dominate the other part and each of the 
governments will have its own independent diplomatic powers.(63)
4). Self-Determination (independence) Model; If there were 
an opportunity for all the people in Taiwan to take part in a 
plebiscite, it is possible that they would choose the option of 
Taiwan Independence. (64) The governments on both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits deliberately prevent the testing of the opinions 
of the common people on the issue of unification. Repeatedly the
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PRC's warning is heard that a declaration of Taiwan independence 
would be seen as a direct challenge to Beijing,thereby increasing 
the danger that the mainland would abandon all other alternatives 
and resort to military force to gain possession of Taiwan. 
Recently, some have, however, argued that the new generation of 
leaders within the PRC may be more tolerant towards the long term 
separation of China and Taiwan. But it seems likely that a 
premature declaration of independence would come to nothing.
5). Far Eastern Economic Community: The General Secretary of 
the Democratic Progressive Party, Zhang Junhung and many other 
scholars who support so-called Functionalism, have proposed this 
model.(65) The establishment of a Far Eastern Economic community 
in the Asian-Pacific region, which would included both Taiwan and 
the PRC as members of the organisation, would ease the tension 
between Taiwan and the mainland. They believe the trend toward 
regional, global markets in the international environment produces 
an economically, technologically and culturally interpenetrated 
system, such as that of the European Community, that challenges 
the traditional insulation of national borders. No doubt, this 
development illustrates what the functionalist argues, that 
peaceful relations are "more likely to grow through doing things 
together in the workshop and market-place than by signing pacts 
in chancelleries."(66)
6) . One Sovereignty Two Administrations: The formulation was 
proposed by Shen Junshan in 1984. Shen argues that sovereignty 
and administration can be completely separate.(67) Under his 
proposals for the unification of China, the governments of the 
regions presently outside the jurisdiction of Beijing would
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control their own defence and foreign relations, thus retaining 
complete power over their respective territories under the over­
all sovereignty of Chinese Culture, with peaceful competition of 
the two systems in one China. This proposal gives conceptual form 
to and points the way forward for the stable development of some­
thing which is already happening on both sides of the Taiwan 
Straits. This is identical in substance with his idea of "One 
House with Two Rooms, in which each has its own key", and differs 
from the CPC's "One Country Two Systems" in seeing the two sides 
as equals, with neither having jurisdiction over the other, and 
each having its own administration. (##,)
7). Multi-System State: This was first advocated by Yung Wei 
in 1981. Wei believes that "this model can clarify the fact that 
the reality in the divided country is not the separation of one 
nation into two or more nations, but the emergence of more than 
one political system within a nation, either as the result of 
international arrangement or as the product of internal wars. More 
significantly, the term multi-system state reflects faithfully 
the true nature and cause of the division i.e., the confrontation 
and competition between non-Communist systems and Communist 
systems in various countries."(69) This model looks squarely at 
the actual situation in countries which are divided and suggests 
a way in which the separate parts of those countries can each 
protect their own interests and jurisdiction over their own 
territory, and participate together in international events and 
bodies, before a final solution of the sovereignty issue has been 
reached through the mediation of international organisations. The 
separate parts would all have the status of "a state" at inter­
national level, but an idea of their still being parts of one
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country would be maintained. The relationship between them might 
still fluctuate from peaceful competition to hostility until they 
eventually resolve their differences and are reunified. Scholars 
on both Taiwan and the mainland have deemed that there are 
fundamental differences between this model and "One Country Two 
Systems", but they do not enumerate these differences.
8). Two Systems One Country: The proposal, obviously, is only 
the projected policy of One Country Two Systems reversed. However, 
it could mean something very different from the original idea. Dr. 
Chen King first made the revision from the PRC's proposal.(70) It 
could mean "One China, but Not now"; it could also mean that "Two 
Systems" are more essential than the "One Country", and that 
transferring the two systems into a united country will need more 
time than the PRC leaders have proposed. Many comments published 
in Hong Kong strongly argued that people residing there would 
prefer this revised model to the PRC's proposals.(71)
9). One Country Two Government Model: The model was drafted 
by the ROC government on Taiwan with the endorsement of the KMT 
headed by President Li Denghui. After Chiang Ching-kuo died in 
1988, the liberal leaders of the KMT tried to change the rigid and 
long-held policy of claiming to be the sole legal government 
representing the whole of China. The PRC, however, depicted "One 
Country Two Governments" as a model of "Taiwan Independence Mark 
II", and denounced Li Denghui for pursuing a policy of "Du Tai"
(an independent Taiwan)(72) .
10). Olympic Model: This model has been the one of most well 
known formulations, other than the One Country Two Systems. It is
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no longer a hypothetical proposal, rather it is a counter offer 
made by the Taiwan authorities and recognised by international 
institutes. On many occasions this model has been regarded as the 
way out of the Taiwan-China dispute.(73) The first systematic 
explanation and analysis of the pattern was made by Professor 
Wong Songran of Hong Kong Chinese University at the Xiangshan 
symposium on "the Future of Taiwan" in Beijing in 1983.(74) Wong 
argues that "the model calls for self-governing, non-interference 
and peaceful competition between the two sides as the main points 
of internal policy, and in international affairs a 'One Country 
Two Teams' or 'One Country Two Seats' approach, in which one team 
has the status of an independent state while the other has the 
status of a local government or a non-state legal entity."(75J 
This is clearly different again in some respects from the PRC's 
One Country Two Systems. It is not explicitly guaranteed by the 
constitution and laws of one country, but would be the result of 
agreements produced and then maintained by separate negotiations 
between the two sides & the relevant international organisations. 
It would not, strictly speaking, start from the assumption that 
the two sides would operate under distinctly different political, 
economic and social systems. Besides, each would have the right 
to control its own foreign policy and defence and to declare war 
and make peace. But unlike the proposed models mentioned above it 
does not appear to contradict or conflict directly with One 
Country Two Systems. This is because although an international 
agreement is not the constitution and laws of one country, it is 
a type of guarantee; the two sides can have completely different 
systems, but this is not a fixed provision; and in allowing a 
local government or non-state legal entity to participate in
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international affairs,the exercise of sovereignty would obviously 
be circumscribed to some extent.
The specific contents of the Olympic model are yet to be 
confirmed by both Chinese governments. The most controversial 
problem, over the past years, has been finding a proper title for 
the ROC government. Although it may be a practical as well as an 
already internationally familiar one, neither the PRC nor the ROC 
authorities would choose the name of "Taiwan" to replace "the ROC 
on Taiwan".(76) Beijing would prefer Taiwan to be called "China 
Taiwan" since it could be explained in Chinese as "China's Taiwan 
or Taiwan belonging to China".Taibei authorities reject this name 
absolutely, instead it recommends "China, Taiwan" (with a comma), 
because this would specifically imply "the Chinese Mainland and 
Taiwan", two geographical areas. Moreover, this is a copy of the 
"Two Germans model".(77) Beijing was not happy about the revision 
and Taibei then deleted the comma and put forward a new version 
"Taiwan China", Beijing still did not accept the new revision, 
because again this would imply the geographical concept of Taiwan 
and mainland China. Beijing then suggested retaining the comma, 
as Taibei had previously proposed. In that case "Taiwan, China" 
could refer, as aforementioned, to "China's Taiwan" and would not 
imply "Mainland, China" because in Chinese "Mainland, China" 
would be either a meaningless term or two separated terms. Of 
course, Taibei again rejected this revision.(78)
Taibei later suggested "Taipei, China" or "Chinese Taipei", 
instead of "Taiwan, China", but Beijing considered these were to 
announce "Taipei" as the Capital of a certain country, and it was 
no different from "Bonn, West Germany" or "Japanese Tokyo", and
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retorted that the Taibei authorities were still putting forward 
their perennial "Two Chinas" policy.Taibei Olympic Committee then 
firmly declared "our government is sincerely trying to find a new 
concept to respond to the proposal of the mainland authorities
for peaceful unification, and the ROC government is prepared to
accept any one of the following concessions: 'Taipei, China', or 
'China, Taipei'(with commas); 'Chinese Taipei' or 'Taipei China' 
(without comma,)".(79) Beijing tacitly implied that "Taipei, 
China" and "Chinese Taipei" would be acceptable. Consequently, 
the two names were openly seen at the Los Angeles Olympic Games
in 1984 and in the annual conference of the Asian Development
Bank later. The PRC claims that "Taipei, China" and "China Taipei" 
are no different from "China Hong Kong" or "Hong Kong, China" and 
interprets it as a preliminary realisation of "One Country Two 
Systems". However, the ROC government still insists that the use 
of the above alterative names in international activities should 
be regarded as an expedient measure, and should be allowed only 
on unofficial occasions.(80)
It seems likely that it is because the Olympic Model is 
fairly close to "One Country Two Systems", but does not require 
either side to make any large concessions, that it has already 
had some positive effects. The first application of this model, 
the Olympic games of 1984, in which both Taiwan and China (and, 
indeed, Hong Kong) participated, could be said to have been 
basically successful, although Taibei may have been unhappy with 
some aspects of that experience.(81)
Not surprisingly, the PRC shows no interest in any solution 
other than the proposal of One Country Two systems, because it
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suspects "all of the suggestions, put forward by the KMT and its 
associates, would eventually lead either to the aim of Two Chinas 
or Taiwan independence".(82) Beijing appears to be confident that 
the concept of the One Country Two Systems will be acceptable to 
the people of Taiwan. Moreover, it will be generally useful to 
solve disputes in other international matters. And, indeed, the 
issues of Hong Kong and Macao have provided timely proof of its 
practicability and feasibilities.
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" A sensible solution of the Hong Kong issue will 
provide a good example to the Taiwan compatriots
for the return to the embrace of motherland ......
the policy of one country two systems is not merely 
a theoretical proposal but also a reasonable and 
feasible policy."(1)
Deng Xiaoping, 1984
" The successful negotiations over the sovereignty 
of Macao between the governments of China and 
Portugal proved again that the method of peaceful 
reunification by way of One Country Two Systems is 
a will-thought out approach to solve an historical 
problem about which the international community is 
deeply concerned."(2)
Deng Xiaoping, 1987
A .  T H E  HONG KONG I S S U E  AND S I N O -  
B R I T I S H  N E G O T I A T I O N S
The resolution of the problems over the British colony of 
Hong Kong in 1984 and the Portuguese colony of Macao in 1987 have 
been cited by Beijing as models for a future solution of the 
Taiwan issue. Ever since their victory on the mainland, the exis­
tence of the capitalist colonies on their borders has been an 
affront to the Chinese Communist's principles. However, they did 
not seek to repossess by force these imperialist governed 
territories. Indeed, not until London raised the question of the
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sovereignty of Hong Kong in the light of the impending ending of 
its lease in 1997, were the issues of Hongkong & Taiwan mentioned 
simultaneously.(3) In Sept. 1984, the PRC and Britain concluded 
an agreement on the future of Hong Kong, and it was known as the 
Hong Kong Model of One Country Two Systems.
The Hong Kong issue emerged first in the mid-19th century, 
when, after a humiliating defeat in the Opium War, the Qing Court 
in China was forced in 1842, to sign the Treaty of Nanjing under 
which Hong Kong Island was ceded in perpetuity to the UK. At that 
time the British government was reluctant to take this literally 
unwanted island.(4) Eighteen years later, the Manchu armies were 
again defeated during the Arrow War. The British forced the Qing 
Court to sign the "Convention of Peking", under which the southern 
part of the Kowloon peninsula was ceded to the UK. However, there 
is no fresh water in Hong Kong island or in Kowloon harbour, and 
when the numbers of residents increased, drinking water had to be 
supplied from the mainland nearby. Therefore, Britons had further 
negotiations with the Manchus: on 1 July 1898 the New Territories 
(comprising 92% of the total land area of "Hong Kong" today) were 
leased to the UK for 99 years.
The CPC and KMT governments of China have consistently taken 
the view that the whole area of Hong Kong and the New Territories 
are Chinese territory. They made it clear that in principle they 
did not recognise the validity of what they regarded as the 
unequal treaties by which Britain acquired and administered these
territories. In 1941, London acknowledged the assertion of the
Chinese government that "after the War, all unequal treaties
signed by the previous government - the Qing Court would be
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abolished."(5) In March 1972, the PRC made its view on the status 
of Hongkong clear in a letter to the United Nations Special 
Committee. It stated that the settlement of the Hongkong issue 
was a matter of China's sovereign right and that Hongkong should 
not be included in the list of colonial territories covered by 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples.(6)
Since Hong Kong has always been the PRC's main channel to the 
rest of the world, the PRC government has hinted for many years 
that it would prefer to settle the issue by peaceful means, and 
hoped that when the PRC recovered the colony the status quo would 
be maintained. For instance, when Foreign minister Huang Hua met 
the Hongkong Governor Murray MacLehose in November 1979,he stated 
explicitly that the colony's status would not necessarily have to 
change when the lease expired in 1991.(7) But it was the British 
government which stated that "the confidence of the people of 
Hongkong and foreign investors would begin to erode in the 1980s, 
if nothing was done to alleviate the uncertainty caused by the 
1997 deadline".(8)
In order to remove this uncertainty, negotiations between the 
PRC and Britain began in January 1982. When the Lord Privy Seal, 
Humphrey Atkins, visited Beijing, he confirmed the view of the UK 
government that discussions should be opened with China as soon 
as possible.(9) To speed up the preparation of the negotiations, 
the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, visited Beijing in Sept. 1982, 
and formally included the Hong Kong issue as one of the items in 
her discussions with Chinese leaders. At the end of her meeting 
with Deng Xiaoping the following joint statement was issued:
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"Today the leaders of both countries held far- 
reaching talks in a friendly atmosphere on the 
future of Hong Kong. Both leaders made clear their 
respective positions on this subject. They agreed 
to enter into talks through diplomatic channels 
following the visit, with the common aim of main­
taining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong." 
(10)
After the Prime Minister returned to London via Hong Kong, 
the first phase of talks followed.(11) Apart from an exchange of 
opinions on "the basis on which the talks should be conducted",no 
further breakthrough was achieved, that was because,at that time, 
both sides lacked confidence and understanding of the real inten­
tions of their counterparts. Nevertheless, both sides agreed that 
the second phase of negotiations should be resumed in July 1983.
Before the negotiations started, the PRC was well aware that 
the UK government had few bargaining counters in the deal. As 
officials in Beijing often put it privately "the recovery of Hong 
Kong is merely a matter of a telephone call."(12) However, 
leaders in Beijing made a great display of their "good faith" in 
conducting the negotiations over Hong Kong in order to "take back 
the bird-cage without disturbing the birds".(13) The British 
government also did not intend to close the last chapter of its 
colonial history shabbily.Once the issue had been raised formally 
by Britain, the PRC government could no longer accept the right 
of a colonial administration after 1997; the British government, 
therefore proposed the following compromise:
"Both sides (should) discuss on a conditional basis 
what effective measures, other than continued Brit­
ish administration,might be devised to maintain the 
stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and explore 
further the Chinese ideas about the future, which
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had at that stage been explained to them, in order 
to see whether, on this basis, arrangements which 
would ensure lasting stability and prosperity for 
Hong Kong could be constructed......." (14)
The British delegates in Beijing then informed the PRC that if 
the above process was acceptable it would consider recommending 
to Parliament in London a bilateral agreement enshrining the arr­
angements. In response to this suggestion, the Chinese government 
put forward its ideas for maintaining Hong Kong as a Special 
Administrative Region after 1997.
The negotiations went more productively and smoothly in the 
second phase. By April 1984, the two sides had completed general 
discussions on the questions initiated. Not unexpectedly, a number 
of outstanding points remained for further talks, but it was clear 
by then that a possible agreement might be achieved. The Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, Geoffrey Howe, went to Beijing to review the 
course of the talks with the Chinese leaders and more decisive 
measures were agreed. On 20 April 1984, Sir Geoffrey, stopping 
over in Hong Kong, stated that!
" ..... It would not be realistic to think of an
agreement that provided for continued British 
administration in Hong Kong after 1997: for that
reason Her Majesty's Government has been examining 
with the Chinese Government how it might be 
possible to arrive at arrangements that would 
secure for Hong Kong after 1997 a high degree of 
autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, and that would 
preserve the way of life in Hong Kong, together 
with the essentials of the present systems."(15)
In Beijing a working group was established and intensive talks 
continued after Howe's announcement in Hong Kong. In August, both 
sides agreed on the general content of the documents which would 
set out arrangements for Hong Kong's future in a legally binding
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form. By September 18, negotiators on both sides had approved the 
English and Chinese texts of the documents. And the texts were 
finalised on September 26.
Although the agreement was concerned with their future, the 
people of Hong Kong had not been formally consulted at any stage 
of the negotiations. The negotiations were conducted in a strictly 
confidential manner. The British government reiterated that the 
Executive Council and the Unofficial Members of the Executive and 
Legislative Council were fully informed during the talks, but the 
people of Hong Kong were gravely concerned and anxious to have 
knowledge of the talks which directly affected their future.(16) 
Their lack of confidence was reflected in the collapse of the 
stock market in 1983-84.
Political leaders and the people of Taiwan also kept a close 
watch on the Sino-British negotiations and on developments in the 
territory. The process of the talks would be important for the 
KMT government on Taiwan, should it have to face its arch-rivals 
in Beijing at some point in the future. The people in Taiwan were 
also anxious to know what the Communists would really offer to 
the residents of Hong Kong. Under the new concept of One Country 
Two Systems, it was vital for the KMT and the people of Taiwan to 
look into: 1). the strategies and tactics which the British
negotiators employed during the talks; 2). what they succeeded (or 
indeed failed) to achieve for the future maintenance in Hong Kong 
of the existing system. The next section dealing with the Sino- 
British Agreement and its provisions for a peaceful settlement, 
will explore these points.
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B .  THE S I N O - B R I T I S H  A G R E E M E N T  AND  
ONE C O UNTR Y TWO S Y S T E M S
The Joint Declaration was ratified on November 29 1984. China 
acknowledged that it agreed to exclude Hong Kong from the Chinese 
socialist structure. The future socio-political system of Hong 
Kong was clearly described in the agreement: the PRC will resume 
the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, but, in effect, the 
territory will retain a high degree of autonomy for at least 50 
years after the transfer is completed.(17)
The PRC's policy of One Country Two Systems with regard to 
Hong Kong was not specifically mentioned by name in the documents 
of the Declaration, nevertheless, it is clearly implied in the 
contents and in the procedure for the future management of the 
territory. In the Agreement the British negotiators rejected any 
mention of the term "One Country Two Systems", but they were 
encouraged by the fact that the PRC negotiators accepted, from 
the start, that Hong Kong should remain Capitalist.
The PRC negotiators, however, guided by Deng Xiaoping, firmly 
adhered to the principles that: 1) The concept of One Country Two 
Systems is a strategy for the settlement of the Hong Kong issue 
(perhaps later the Taiwan question as well). After reunification 
the one billion people on the mainland will follow the socialist 
system while the people in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan will 
continue their capitalist way of life. However, the capitalist 
ideology should not interfere with the socialist national constru-
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ction; 2) The strategic policy of One Country Two Systems should 
not be regarded as a measure of expediency or a fraudulent 
scheme; 3) The concept should be demonstrated as a model for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes.(18)
Many differing attitudes on both sides, revealed in many 
newspaper articles during the negotiations, were reconciled when 
the U.K. consented to renounce its sovereignty over Hong Kong 
after 1997, and when the tactical proposal of One Country Two 
systems was presented by the Beijing authorities.(19) It is 
essential to discuss details of the Agreement here, in order to 
understand the concepts of One Country Two Systems which underlie 
the contents of the Declaration. As the theoretical meanings have 
been examined in the previous chapter, only the ideas and 
concepts included in the Agreement will be discussed. 
Furthermore, one can treat the Agreement as the further 
development of the PRC's essential plan for peaceful unification, 
from Ye Jianying's Nine-Point peaceful initiatives towards Taiwan 
in 1981, to Deng's Six-Point Assurance regarding a Taiwan 
settlement in 1983.(20)
In the light of the Agreement, the PRC will establish, on the 
basis of the provisions of Article 31 of its Constitution, a Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. As already discussed, this 
clause of the PRC Constitution indicated that China could set up 
special administrative regions when necessary. The future SAR of 
Hong Kong will be finally authorised under the regulation of a 
Basic Law which will be enacted and promulgated by the National 
People's Congress. Apart from foreign and defence affairs, which 
will be the responsibility of the Central Government in Beijing,
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the Hong Kong SAR shall be vested with executive, legislative and 
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. 
But the SAR would be permitted to conduct some external affairs 
with other countries, as mentioned in Section II of the Annexe of 
the Declaration.(21)
The government and legislature of the Hong Kong SAR will be 
composed of local inhabitants, its chief executive to be selected 
by election or through consultations and appointed by the Central 
Government of Beijing. The members of the legislature will then 
be elected, but the method of election will depend upon the Basic 
Law.
As regards the current social and economic systems and also 
the lifestyle in Hong Kong, the PRC agreed to maintain the status 
quo. In other words, in its social-economic systems Hongkong will 
remain a capitalist society at least until 2047. To this end, the 
basic human rights and freedoms were carefully listed. Private 
property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheri­
tance and foreign investment will also be protected by law. (22)
Furthermore the SAR will be allowed to retain the status of 
a free port, a separate customs territory and an international 
financial centre.The Hongkong markets for foreign exchange, gold, 
securities and futures will be maintained, and there will be free 
flow of capital. The Hongkong dollar will also continue to circu­
late and remain freely convertible.(23) In this way, the SAR will 
retain independent social, economic and financial power. The PRC 
will not only offer Hongkong exemption from taxes but will also 
permit it to keep mutually beneficial socio-economic relations 
with the UK and other countries.
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Apart from displaying the national flag and the national 
emblem of the PRC, Hongkong will be allowed to use a regional 
flag and emblem of its own. The Joint Declaration stipulated that 
the SAR will use the official name of "Hong Kong, China".
Unlike the proposal for Taiwan, the PRC will send military 
forces to stay in Hong Kong to enforce its sovereignty. But the 
maintenance of public order in the SAR will be the responsibility 
of the Hong Kong SAR government. The People's Liberation Army 
should not interfere in the internal affairs, and the cost of the 
military forces will be borne by Beijing.
To avoid the potential problem of an exodus of mainlanders, 
and to protect the rights and freedoms of the inhabitants, the 
Hong Kong SAR government will retain its independent authority to 
handle immigration issues. But the government of Britain did not, 
at that time, clarify the status of those 3.5 million Hong Kong 
residents who hold British Passports. It was unclear whether they 
will be considered as having full UK citizenship. However, in 
December 1989, the British Government proposed that 50.000 of the 
elite (i.e., key position holders in public as well as in private 
sectors) with family be granted visas to reside in the UK after 
the deadline of 1997.^24^
The Joint Declaration not only outlines the post-1997 status 
of Hong Kong in terms of its political, social and economic stru­
ctures, but also stipulates the relationship between the Hongkong 
SAR and the PRC in general. The Agreement reveals the particular 
character of the Hong Kong government under British rule during 
the 13 years transfer period. It also confirms that a strong UK
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influence will be maintained in Hong Kong after 1997,(25)
When the public in Hong Kong were informed of the settlement, 
reactions were mixed. Some found the agreement much more detailed 
and more reassuring than they had expected, and the Declaration 
favourably fulfils the expectations of those Chinese leaders, who 
would like to maintain the stability and prosperity of Hongkong. 
The optimistic scenario presented to the Hong Kong residents 
together with propaganda from the Chinese media, have been woven 
into the day-to-day life of the people of Hong Kong and are 
reflected, to some extent, in the index of the Hong Kong Stock 
Market, and the resilience in the price of real estate. (26)
The successful negotiation of the Sino-British agreement on 
the issue of Hong Kong provided a great opportunity for the PRC 
to demonstrate that a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue could 
be attainable. Beijing repeatedly portrayed the proposal of One 
Country Two Systems as the most important political idea ever 
created for the resolution of national reunification.(27) While, 
on the other hand, for the purpose of soothing the Hong Kong 
residents' psychological jitters, the policy of One Country Two 
Systems was also presented in another euphemistic Chinese phrase: 
"Hong Kong ruled by Hong Kong people" (Gang Ren Zhi Gang), a term 
too sensitive to be applied to Taiwan.(28)
Instant response from the KMT on Taiwan reads that "Although 
it (the Joint Declaration) may appear alluring and convincing, it 
displays,on the whole, much of the character of the policy of the 
so-called One Country Two Systems, as a slogan, and, therefore, 
there must be reservations as to whether it will be beneficial 
for the people of Hongkong".(29) The speaker of the ROC govern­
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ment also reminded the world that "if Communist China is the 
angler, and the One Country Two Systems policy is the bait, then 
Hong Kong is the small shrimp and Taiwan the desperately-desired 
big fish." (30) Since the signing of the Agreement, the KMT and 
the people of Taiwan, by and large, have been sceptical about 
Beijing's assurances to the people of Hong Kong and about the 
likelihood of the promised prosperity in the UK colony.
Scholars who have studied the One Country Two Systems policy 
raise some delicate but important problems. They warn that the 
political idea of One Country Two Systems might not be as simple 
and neat as it sounds. For example, since 1984 scholars have 
continually pointed out that even if Hong Kong could be sustained 
as a SAR for 50 years after 1997, the problems would re-emerge in 
2047, and question why "our generation" should create an obvious 
problem for the future 1(31) Furthermore, Hong Kong SAR will have 
its own chief executive, selected either by election or through 
local consultations, but Beijing will have the final say over the 
appointment; in other words, the Beijing government can veto any 
possible election result which it dislikes.(32) This will be in 
contradiction to the principle of "Hong Kong ruled by Hong Kong 
people".
In addition, Hong Kong SAR will remain a capitalist society, 
which by its nature is fundamentally incompatible with Communism. 
It is questionable whether One Country Two Systems could be the 
solution for accommodating two sets of extremely different social 
political and economic systems in one country. Qian Mu,an eminent 
scholar in Hong Kong, suggested: "Can Buddhists worship Buddha in 
a Mosque ?" The slogan of 'One Country Two Systems' is virtually
unrealistic and will never work." (3.3Peter Harris also pointed 
out, immediately after the Declaration was published, "The term 
(One Country Two Systems) did not appear in the agreement, and is 
not discussed, not defined and not described." Harris added "I 
have spent two years reading and writing about it, and still do 
not understand the definite content of the policy."(34)
Harris has been teaching in Hong Kong for 20 years, and has 
studied over 40 countries, including Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Northern
Ireland and Belgium etc., which have more than "one system"
operating within a single sovereign state. "In no case is it 
satisfactory", he stressed "and in every case there are serious 
difficulties." (35) The Hong Kong case will not be an exception. 
"Suppose the PRC goes to war with Vietnam or with other countries 
would it permit Hong Kong to trade with them 1" (36) In Harris's 
opinion, the whole idea of One Country Two Systems is simply 
impractical.
However, there are some intellectuals in Hong Kong who prefer 
to adopt a wait-and-see attitude toward the feasibility of the 
policy. For example,Lao Siguang of the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, commented that "to date (September 1984) the theory is only 
hypothetical, good for the imagination; whether it would work in 
real politics depends on the political orientation of the Chinese 
Communist movement as a whole. It might also depend on what 
Communist China really wants from promoting the theory; since the 
ultimate goal of advocating such a theory is not clear in itself, 
it is difficult even to talk about the 'success' or 'failure' of 
the theory."(37)
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Indeed, the settlement over a historical issue, such as the 
case of Hong Kong, by peaceful means, is better then by that of 
the Falkland formula.The responses of the international community 
to the Sino-British Agreement reflected their interests. The U.S. 
and Japan are the two countries most closely related to Hong Kong 
in terms of trades and travel. During the period of the Sino- 
British negotiations both countries adopted a hands-off policy 
and pro-claimed their confidence that the future of Hong Kong 
would be brighter than people feared. But the Nakasone government 
warned Japanese companies in Hong Kong "to look into the Hongkong 
question beyond the 1997 deadline".(JtfjThe US, however, applauded 
the peaceful settlement of the Hong Kong issue and was willing to 
"provide any assistance to maintain Hongkong's appropriate parti­
cipation in international bodies".(39) And President Reagan did 
remind the PRC that it would be improper to take the case of the 
Hong Kong resolution as the formulated model for the settlement 
of the Taiwan issue.(see chapter 6.)
C .  T H E  MACAO S O L U T I O N  AND ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S
By comparison with Hong Kong, the issue of Macao is of lesser 
significance and less worrying for the PRC. Macao consists of a 
peninsula and two tiny islands, totalling 16.2 square kilometres. 
A 2.5-Kilometre-long bridge across the sea and a 2.2 kilometre 
highway connect these three land formations. The population of 
Macao is just short of half a million, with 97% of Chinese origin 
and 10.000 more of Portuguese descent.(40)
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Before the mid 19th century, the number of Portuguese settled 
in Macao was rather small, mainly missionaries and merchants. 
Chinese officials were sent to govern the islands from Guangdong 
and to collect taxes. After the first Opium War, the Portuguese 
took advantage of the defeat of the Qing Court to remove the 
Chinese officials and put the whole area of Macao* under their 
colonial rule. In December 1887, the Portuguese forced the Qing 
government to sign the Sino-Portuguese Beijing Treaty, specifying 
that the Portuguese "would administer Macao in perpetuity".(41) 
At the same time the treaty stipulated that when the two count­
ries sent officials to negotiate and settle an agreement on the 
border, another treaty would be signed.(42) Because of the local 
people's violent efforts to protect the status quo, the 
demarcation of Macao has never been fixed, and no new treaty was 
produced.
During the World War II, Macao was occupied by the Japanese, 
and after the War, the Portuguese resumed their rule. In 1962, 
Lisbon announced a Portuguese decolonisation policy: all overseas 
colonial territories of Portugal would be granted either indepen­
dence or a negotiated settlement with the countries concerned, 
should be concluded before 1970. Due to the political upheaval 
in China in the 1960s the PRC government declined to discuss the 
Macao issue.(43) The Portuguese government then declared Macao to 
be, like Hong Kong, a free port and pursued an open-door policy 
with the outside world. Foreign exchange is not controlled, the 
tax rate is low and interest is not taxed. People from Hongkong 
and European Community countries can enter and leave Macao freely 
without visas.
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When the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984, 
the Portuguese government advised the PRC that the Macao question 
should be settled as soon as possible.(44) Deng Xiaoping, the 
architect of the policy of One Country Two Systems, said, however 
that China's negotiations with the Portuguese should not be 
hurried. Deng's idea was to "let the Macao settlement be started 
in 3-4 years time, then the people of Hong kong and Taiwan will 
be convinced that One Country Two Systems could be implemented 
not only in Hong Kong, but also elsewhere. In the meantime, the 
pace could be set for the solution of the Taiwan issue, i.e., in 
3-4 years, after the settlement of the Macao issue".(45) Although 
practical relations between Taiwan and Macao are limited, the 
significance of the Macao solution for the Taiwan issue is, 
however, extremely important. China took the opportunity of once 
again demonstrating that One Country Two Systems will work for 
national reunification and the easing of their internal disputes.
Under Deng's guideline on when the problem of Macao should 
be solved, the Sino-Portuguese negotiations on Macao did not 
start until November 1986. As the model for the future structure 
had been established in the earlier Hong Kong Agreement, the 
negotiations went more smoothly than had been expected and, in 
March 1987, a Joint Declaration - another example of the solution 
of an international and historical dispute through One Country, 
Two Systems - was signed by China and Portugal. The conclusion 
of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration confirmed that the PRC 
would resume the exercise of sovereignty over Macao with effect 
from December 20, 1999.(46)
Unlike the Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong in which
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the British Foreign Office explicitly declined to include the 
term "One Country Two Systems" in the legal documents, the Portu­
guese negotiators accepted the statement "the Government of the 
PRC declares that in line with the principle of 'One Country Two 
Systems', the PRC will pursue the following basic policies 
regarding M a c a o (47) Obviously, the wording of the agreement 
was recognised by the PRC leaders as a great achievement, demon­
strating that "the problems of national reunification have once 
again been solved by way of the imaginative political theory of 
One Country Two S y s t e m s (48)
As with the Hong Kong Agreement, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 31 of the PRC Constitution, the Chinese 
government will establish a Macao Special Administrative Region 
after the territories are returned to China. The Macao SAR will 
be directly under the authority of the PRC, but will enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy. Apart from foreign and defence affairs the PRC 
central government will allow the Macao SAR to have executive, 
legislative and independent judicial power, including that of 
final adjudication.(49) Above all, the principle of maintaining 
Macao as a SAR is identical with the Sino-British Agreement on 
Hong Kong.
There is an important difference in content between the 
Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong and the Sino-Portuguese Joint 
Declaration on Macao. According to the memorandum on Macao, the 
Lisbon government will allow all the Macao inhabitants who hold 
colonial passports to retain their Portuguese citizenship and 
right to travel to Portugal (and, indeed, to travel all other EC 
countries), after 1999, whereas the U.K. policy towards Hong Kong
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immigrants, was, as mentioned, rather cautious and sellective.
D .  P R O B L E M S  OF THE HONG KONG I S S U E  AND C H I N A  - I s  
" O n e  C o u n t r y  T wo  S y s t e m s "  P r a c t i c a b l e  ?
For well over a century, except during the years of Japanese 
occupation, the British colonial powers in Hong Kong have main­
tained a rather stable institutional framework for the conduct of 
government, business and the operation of the rule of law. Some 
Chinese in Hong Kong have shown resentment at the stigma of 
colonial status. However, they will find that it is far easier to 
exercise civil liberties and personal freedoms in the political 
stability of Hong Kong under British government, than it will be 
when they are governed by the "Uncle from Beijing" (Biaoshu).(50) 
The political awakening of the inhabitants of Hong Kong, who 
usually reserve their deepest passion for business, not politics, 
has drastically changed the political prospects since the Sino- 
British Agreement was made in 1984. Hong Kong people are becoming 
concerned and they understand that it is time for them, not only 
to talk about the meaning of "Gang Ren Zhi Gang" (Hong Kong ruled 
by Hong Kong people.) but also to work out the possibilities for 
"Gang Ren Jiu Gang" (Hong Kong people rescues Hong Kong.). (51)
From Beijing's point of view, it would seem inevitable that 
a bold, yet immensely complex policy like One Country Two Systems 
will have problems and meet with obstructions. Although the 
actual implementation will not begin until 1997,developments that 
have occurred in Hong Kong since the publication of the Sino- 
British Statement have already revealed some of the policy's draw
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backs. Because of the contradictory nature of the two systems, 
and the possibility for the larger (China) to overwhelm the 
smaller (HongKong) and in view of the transitional character of 
One Country Two Systems, innumerable potential problems are 
explosed. (52) Here one could examine the most obvious issues; the 
transfer of sovereignty; the political democratisation; the 
implementation of legal systems; and the inequality of the two 
sides.It is important to examine these problems in order to judge 
whether the One Country Two Systems policy will be functionable.
When the Beijing government confirmed that the PRC will resume 
sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1st July 1997, its officers working 
in Hong Kong had to confront other more substantial and practical 
problems. Xu Jiatun, the then Director of the Xinhua News Agency 
in Hong Kong, indicated in September 1984 that "from now until 
1997, our main task is to ensure the smooth transaction of Hong
Kong affairs to do that we should maintain the confidence of
Hong Kong people towards their future and eliminate the anxieties
of the so-called uncertainty..... "(53) The fears and uncertainty
in Hong Kong are caused mainly by the following factors: 1) Anta­
gonism and conflict between the socialist and capitalist systems 
will be inevitable, since they are diametrically incompatible
I
systems. 2) Since socialism is the dominant form in the mainland 
and the capitalist system exists in a small area,it is possible 
that under certain circumstances, the areas that are currently 
practising capitalism will be forced to follow socialism. 3)Since 
Beijing's Constitution is of a socialist nature, it probably will 
not be able to provide an adequate legal basis for the existence 
of capitalism. 4) Since Hong Kong has been clearly stipulated as
196
part of China, Beijing may let a large number of people into the 
territory,thus creating a heavy social burden on its 
population.(54)
The above problems have gravely concerned the Hongkong people 
and the colonial government. Although the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration over Hongkong is an international agreement and has 
been recorded in the UN, it is still possible that the conditions 
of One Country Two Systems will be retracted by Communist China. 
The Hong Kong inhabitants can only hope that the "Basic Law For 
the SAR" will protect their promised rights. (55) The Basic Law, 
also known as the "Miniconstitution", will become the basic 
guideline for Hong Kong's relations with China in the post-1997 
period. In the past six years, the Basic Law Draft Committee has 
been working hard to produce the first and second drafts of the 
Miniconstitution.(56) Beijing insists that it should exercise the 
legislative and interpretative powers of this law, and that under 
it, Hong Kong would not become an independent political entity. 
More importantly, the Chinese officers have pointed out that Hong 
Kong would never be allowed to become a base to accommodate anti­
revolutionary activists attempting to sabotage China's socialist 
construction. (57) With so many preconditions set by Beijing, the 
Draft of the Basic Law was satisfactory neither to the Hong Kong 
people in general, nor to the British colonial incumbents.
From the local people's points of view, the quintessence of 
the problem of the transfer of the Sovereignty of Hong Kong to 
China, lies, not in the formalities of Sino-British diplomatic 
procedure, but rather in the uncertainty as to whether the PRC 
will honour its words. Despite the PRC has a good record for not
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breaking its international agreements, the Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong SAR will, after all, be an intranational commitment towards 
a small section of the people of a sovereign state. The PRC has a 
particularly poor reputation in terms of keeping its word domes­
tically. Some have therefore predicted that China will be unable 
to implement the promises, even if it were to try. (58)
With regard to the future political system of Hong Kong SAR, 
Chinese officials responsible for Hong Kong affairs have explained 
that China would prefer to see only minimal changes to the 
existing system. This position is quite different from what they 
promised during the Sino-British negotiations, when autonomy and 
self-administration were emphasised. For the last six years, the 
indications from Beijing have been that a strong executive would 
be favoured. The demand for a democratic political structure was 
regarded as subverting the Chinese central government. In other 
words, the appointment of the chief executive by the Central 
Government in Beijing, as stipulated in the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration, will be the reality, and the selection of the chief 
executive by election or through consultations will be only a 
symbolic formality.(59)
It is clear that Beijing is pursuing an "executive dominant 
system" in which the chief executive will have similar powers to 
those of the present British governor, and the functions of the 
elected legislature will be limited. For instance, the first 
Draft of the Basic Law deliberately avoided mentioning the issue 
of the election of the legislature and the chief executive. 
Furthermore, the then Deputy Secretary General of the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee, Lu Ping, indicated that "the Chinese govern­
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ment may form a committee under the Standing Committee of the NPC, 
consisting mainly of Chinese officials and Hong Kong community 
leaders, who would help establish the first Hong Kong SAR 
government. The Committee, like the Basic Law Drafting Committee, 
would be headed by a State Councillor from Beijing and would most 
likely be set up by about 1996. The committee would then arrange 
for the selection of the first chief executive."(60) Lu Ping also 
pointed out that "the existing Legislative Council in Hong Kong 
would not automatically become the provincial legislature of the 
Hong Kong SAR on July 1st 1997."(61) The central government, will 
thus be able to retain ultimate control over Hong Kong.
Since the Sino-British Joint Declaration was completed, the 
PRC stepped up its activities in Hong Kong, seeking to establish 
dominant political influence. It began publicly building its 
community networks and expanding its political control, following 
the setting up of the Headquarters of the New China News Agency 
and three district branches in Kowloon, Victoria Harbour and the 
New Territories. It has also been supporting the pro-Beijing 
political groups which campaigned to block the introduction of 
direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1988. But the PRC 
has not succeeded in gaining the cooperation of small business­
men, professionals, fledgeling politicians and community leaders. 
These people, who mainly belong to the middle class and the 
intelligentsia, are apprehensive about the expanding Chinese 
communist influence in Hong Kong.(62) They consider that what 
Beijing is doing is shifting from its promise of "Gang Ren Zhi 
Gang" to "Dang Ren Zhi Gang" - changing the policy from Self- 
administration to that of Party rule. (63,}
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The PRC leaders' sincerity in wishing to maintain Hongkong's 
stability and prosperity is beyond doubt. However,a smooth trans­
fer of sovereignty and political democratisation are vital for 
ensuring the fulfilment of the "One Country Two Systems" policy. 
Peaceful transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong to China effected 
by Beijing and London will be a pre-requisite for the elaboration 
of the policy of One Country Two Systems. Without political 
democratisation in Hongkong the ideas of One Country Two Systems 
will become empty words,because the retention of the two systems, 
of the socialist and capitalist socio-economic structures, is the 
essence of the policy. Nevertheless, Beijing's interpretations of 
the agreement in the past few years, have been proving very 
different from what Hong Kong and Britain expected. Promises to 
maintain horse-racing, the casinos, lotteries and night-clubs can 
not be all that One Country two Systems means.(64)
The third problem which Beijing needs to tackle is how to
operate the two legal systems, as the present system is to be
allowed to continue in Hong Kong. The British legal system has 
been a factor of vital importance in maintaining the stability 
and prosperity of Hong Kong for a long period. Those who are 
familiar with Hong Kong affairs would agree that a sound legal 
system is the basis for the high level of freedom which people 
there enjoy. The Sino-British Joint Statement declared that the 
Hongkong SAR will have the right to an independent legislature 
and judicature. Its existing legal system will remain unaltered.
The Annex of the Statement further elucidates s "After the SAR is
established, Hong Kong's present legal code, including the Common 
Law, Equity, Statute Law and Customary Law will be retained in 
its entirety with the exception of laws which conflict with the
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'Basic Law' and those laws which have been rescinded by Hong Kong 
SAR's legislature".(65) So China will have two legal systems 
operating within its borders after 1997. The legal organisations 
of the mainland have created a body of statute law based on the 
principles of the constitution, and all its laws have to be 
drafted and promulgated by legislative or paralegislative organs 
in accordance with statutory procedure. Hong Kong's code of 
written and unwritten laws have, on the contrary, been modelled 
on British Common Law systems and this body of laws will be 
contained in the Basic Law framework that will have to coexist 
with the mainland's legal system after 1997.
With the different laws of mainland China and Hong Kong 
operating side by side, not only will their dissimilarlities be 
revealed, but also the good and bad points of each system will be 
brought into high relief by their proximity. Furthermore,the laws 
of the PRC are not sufficiently independent of interference from 
the administration or even the party. (66) For the People in Hong 
Kong,however,accustomed to solving disputes through law, it would 
be intolerable that justice should eventually come from party 
decisions by the CPC or that it should be based upon the criteria 
of patriotism. The problem is, that the relationship between the 
mainland's central government and that of the Hong Kong SAR is to 
be one between ruler and ruled. The difficulties inherent in this 
are bound to have serious repercussions. Undoubtedly, there are 
great divergences in the type of legal language they use, the 
methods, the legal philosophy and the remuneration and social 
status of their lawyers. It would be no problem if the relation­
ship between them were to be analogous to foreign relations, but
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it will not be easy for them to operate together in the same 
sphere from such different back-grounds.(67)
The fourth difficulty of implementing One Country Two Systems 
is the inequality between socialist and capitalist societies. 
Amongst the 5.5 million population in Hong Kong, about 42% are 
refugees who fled from the mainland to Hongkong. (68) Most of the 
Hong Kong residents are aware of the harshness of life under the 
CPC rule. They have repeatedly stressed their fear that Chinese 
leaders in Beijing might demand that the Hongkong SAR give up its 
special rights - the "Two systems", and as in previous cases, 
such as Shanghai in the early 1950s or Tibet in the 1960s, submit 
to becoming a part of the Socialist family. (69) Demands for Hong 
Kong to give up its special rights would be understandable. But 
for people who have lived in a Western free society and who are 
familiar with democratic freedom, these so-called special rights 
are mainly seen as human rights. Human rights are not so easy to 
give up.
The last, but not least, problem - the most extraordinary 
change in the Hongkong/China relations - resulted from the events 
of June 1989. Hong Kong residents were baffled by the motives of 
the Chinese leaders who ordered soldiers to massacre indiscrimin­
ately hundreds, perhaps thousands, of unarmed civilian protesters 
in Beijing. It was undoubtedly one of the worst atrocities within 
living memory. In response to this incident, the people of Hong 
Kong displayed grief, anger and anxiety. Up to a million people 
in Hong Kong went on to the streets to protest against the 
military brutality and to demand specific guarantees of their 
promised political rights and future safety. The government in
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London responded promptly to demand that the final draft of the 
Basic Law to be reviewed, particularly with regard to the condi­
tions under which the PLA was to be stationed in Hong Kong. (70) 
Beijing's position vis a vis Hong Kong, after the demonstrators 
were slain, was unquestionably delicate. The new party General 
Secretary, Jiang Zemin, who replaced Zhao Ziyang,tried to placate 
the local people repeatedly declaring that the planned policy of 
One Country Two Systems would be upheld, whatever happened on the 
mainland. Jiang tried to convince people living in hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan by stressing that "as old Chinese proverb says, 
the water in the river would never mix with that in the well; Our 
Socialist system on the mainland will never encompass our 
compatriots living in the capitalist society".(71) On the other 
hand, Beijing's hard-line leaders warned that China would not 
tolerate Hong Kong and Macao becoming bases for anti-Communism or 
refuges for anti-government ruffians. The expectations of Hong 
Kong people regarding the fulfilment of One Country Two Systems, 
have, therefore, been further blighted.
E .  T H E  HONG KONG - MACAO MODEL AND T H E  T A I W A N  I S S U E
Over the past ten years or so, the picture of One Country 
Two Systems in the Chinese Constitution, has been continuously 
supplemented by more concrete plans for the policy in the official 
press, in party statements and documents, and in the words of 
government spokesmen.(72) A rough sketch of the future Beijing 
envisages for the projected Taiwan SAR can be assembled from the
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1979 New Year Message, Ye Jianying's Nine-Point Proposal in 1981 
and Deng Xiaoping's Six-Point Assurance in June 1983. The PRC has 
made clear that it would prefer two party negotiations between 
the KMT and CPC over the reunification with Taiwan. But practical 
internal-external political situations proved to be an impassable 
barrier for the KMT in attempting peaceful negotiations with the 
CPC without the consent of the local Taiwanese majority*(73) In 
terms of the contents of the policy of One Country Two Systems, 
as mentioned in the previous chapters and the above sections of 
this chapter, it seems that the PRC has been trying to be 
generous and broad-minded. However it is still difficult for the 
Hong Kong settlement to be a model for Taiwan to follow.
Although the promises made for the SARs are unexpectedly 
liberal, as has been seen, people in Hong Kong are still worried 
that there are insufficient practical guarantees. The official 
reaction of the KMT authorities towards the policy of One Country 
Two Systems is always negative.In response to the PRC's overture, 
the KMT proposed the "Three Noes Policy", and denigrated the 
policy of One Country Two Systems as "empty words without basis 
in fact", "bait disguised to lure us on to the hook", and "deadly 
poison disguised with sugar coating".(74) Evidently One Country 
Two Systems still has to overcome major difficulties before it 
can be acceptable to all concerned. (Substantial repercussions of 
the policy of One Country Two Systems in Taiwan will be discussed 
in detail in chapter 7.)
The reasons why the Hong Kong Model can hardly be applied or 
copied in Taiwan can be briefly summarised as follows: Taiwan is 
significantly different from Hong Kong and Macao in a variety of
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respects. It is substantially larger than Hong Kong and Macao, 
and possesses all the necessary conditions for independent 
nationhood. Although its economy relies heavily on foreign trade, 
it does not, as Hong Kong does, depend on China for its water and 
food supplies. Colonial rule in Taiwan ended more than four 
decades ago, and it has actually become an independent political 
entity since 1949. The KMT regime which has been ruling Taiwan, 
was, in fact, established even before the CPC was founded, and 
for years, the CPC was subordinate to it. The subsequent struggle 
for predominance between the CPC and the KMT has been going on 
for over half a century, and the KMT leaders still see the CPC as 
their arch-enemy. The Taiwan/China political and historical back­
ground is vastly different from the relationship of Hong Kong and 
China.
Geographically, Taiwan is separated from the mainland by the 
broad expanse of the 110 mile Taiwan Straits. Most Taiwanese have 
still never set foot on the mainland and most do not claim a 
"place of origin" there, while all Taiwanese citizens have been 
subjected to anti-Communist propaganda. Unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan 
has its own conflicts between local Taiwanese and mainlanders, 
and between members of the KMT and those outside it.This conflict 
has extended to the United States, Japan and Europe where a long­
term campaign for the independence for Taiwan is still being 
sustained by many Taiwanese students and their sympathisers.
At present, Taiwan only has formal diplomatic relations with 
29 countries, but has substantial economic and cultural contacts 
with further 140 countries or areas.(75) There are over 450,000 
crack troops in Taiwan, armed directly from US supplies.The long­
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standing protective stance of the US towards Taiwan has remained 
more or less unchanged.
Although the CPC leaders do not accord sufficient recognition 
to the great differences between Taiwan and Hong Kong, they are 
clearly aware of the main points of dissimilarity. For this 
reason, the PRC's proposal for steps to peaceful reunification 
with Taiwan such as "San Tong Si Liu" (Contacts and Exchanges) 
and "Dui Den Tan Pan" (reciprocal discussions.) were added to the 
appeal of "Gong Shang Guo Shi" ( Having a say in the governing of 
the nation). Decision-makers in the CPC, nevertheless, believe 
that the Hong Kong-Macao Model will provide the basic pattern for 
re-unifying Taiwan and the mainland.
In the past several years, a number of incidents have high­
lighted some of the problems which would emerge if the Hong Kong 
Model were applied unchanged to Taiwan. For instance, in March 
19 85, Li Xiannian, the then Chairman of the People's Republic of 
China, publicly declared that after reunification Taiwan could 
retain its party, government, and army as well as secret police 
personnel.(76) But subsequently the revelations of links between 
the head of the secret police in Taipei and the criminal under­
world, emerged during the investigations into the murder of Henry 
Liu, a critic of the KMT government and President Chiang Ching- 
kuo. Li's reaffirmation of the mainland's willingness to allow 
the KMT to retain its secret police forces came in the middle of 
the furore over the case, and was particularly repugnant to the 
local Taiwanese.
The other incident was caused by the bi-monthly magazine 
"Voice of Taiwan", a periodical published by Beijing's Taiwanese
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Association. In July 1986, an article entitled " One Country Two 
Systems or Let the Taiwanese rule Taiwan ?" was printed,but later 
recalled by the Beijing authorities. The article censured the KMT 
refugees defeated by the Chinese people, who have subjected the 
Taiwanese to four decades of martial law. It argued that in 
practice, under the One Country Two Systems policy, the Taiwanese 
would inevitably rule Taiwan. Hence, the status of the Taiwanese 
should not be lower than that of the residents of Hong Kong, who 
had been promised "Gang Ren Zhi Gang" (Hong Kong people rule Hong 
Kong) . (77)
Taken at face value, the above incidents seem to show that 
the CPC's strategy towards Taiwan is rather undetermined as yet, 
and that approaches so far have met with resistance from all 
sides. If, on the one hand, they allow Taipei to keep its secret 
police, thus reassuring the KMT,they risk incurring the animosity 
of the Taiwanese, who had once lived in fear of Chiang Kai-shek's 
military rule. While, on the other hand, letting the Taiwanese 
rule Taiwan would certainly alienate the KMT. The CPC seems to be 
caught in a dilemma. When this question was put to Chairman Yang 
Shangkun in an exclusive interview, in August, 1988, he carefully 
replied "China has no intention of squeezing out any ethnic sub­
group from future talks with regard to reunification".(78) How­
ever, in reality, the PRC has initiated some substantial secret 
contacts with the second generation elite of the "mainlanders" in 
order to enhance and assure their influence on Taiwan affairs. On 
the issue of unification, the Chinese leaders clearly comprehend 
that the Taiwanese are less enthusiastic than the so-called 
"mainlanders".(79)
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It is also important to point out that the Hongkong issue and 
the Taiwan problem are handled by different organisations in the 
PRC, which suggests that it has evaluated them very differently, 
although it is Deng Xiaoping who continues to make the final 
decisions in their regard.(80)The structure of the administrative 
system and the utilisation of personnel resources employed on the 
above-mentioned areas are critically disproportionate. Hong Kong 
is directly under the administrative supervision of the Hong 
Kong-Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, the Taiwan issue, 
however, is dealt with by the "Taiwan Unit" which is composed of 
members of the Politburo, the Central Military Committee and the 
State Council, co-ordinated by Yang Shangkun, who is directly 
responsible to Deng Xiaoping. In the past ten years, Departments 
of the Central government, Provincial, district, and County 
governments, have established more than six thousand branches of 
the Taiwan Affair Offices, the Taiwanese Associations, the Taiwan 
Compatriots Welfare Liaisons Groups and the "Reunification with 
Taiwan Promoting Associations". More than 100.000 full-time 
personnel (excluding military and public security sections, the 
actual figures of which are kept in secret.) are now working for 
"the beloved Compatriots of Taiwan", compared with less than 1000 
workers in Beijing, Guangdong and Hong Kong concerned with the 
people of Hong Kong.(82) Obviously, the PRC has been accelerating 
the pace for Taiwan reunification.
Although the PRC leaders repeatedly claimed that the policy 
of One Country Two Systems is a long-term strategy for China's 
reunification, by and large, people both in Taiwan and in Hong 
Kong, however, believe that it is no more than a stratagem, which 
may change their way of life drastically or may, on the other
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hand, preserve the present systems for at least 50 years as they 
have been promised. As a stratagem it obviously has its strong 
and weak points, and these should be clearly recognised and dealt 
with skilfully and in good time.
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C H A P T E R  6 : THE U N I T E D  S T A T E S  AND ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO
S Y S T E M S  I N  T HE 1 9 8 0 S
".......There is one obstacle in Sino-US relations,
that is the Taiwan question, or the question of 
China's reunification of the two sides of the 
Taiwan Straits. There has been talk in the United 
States to the effect that the United States has 
taken an attitude of "non-involvement" on the 
question of China's reunification. But this is not 
true. The fact is that the United States has all 
along been involved. In the 1950s, MacArthur and 
Dulles regarded Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft 
carrier of the United States in Asia and the
Pacific  The Taiwan question has been the
most important issue in the negotiations on the 
establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations, and 
it is still the greatest obstacle to improving 
relations between our two countries today."(1)
............  Deng Xiaoping, 1986
".....  The principles of one China and a peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan question remain at the 
core of our China policy. While our policy has been 
constant, the situation itself has not and can not 
remain static. We support a continuing evolutionary 
process toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue. The peace, however, will be determined by 
the Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait,
and free of outside pressure......  For our part,
we have welcomed developments, including indirect 
trade and increasing human interchange, which have 
contributed to a relaxation of tensions in the 
Taiwan Strait. Our steadfast policy seeks to foster 
an environment within which such developments can 
continue to take place "(2)
.........  George Shultz, 1987
As we have seen, the 1970s was substantially a period of re­
conciliation in Sino-US relations. Starting from the early 1980s, 
however, the relations between the two powers have experienced a 
series of high hope and great disappointment. Having contemplated 
China's reunification, following the normalisation with the US, 
Beijing anticipated that Washington would finally step aside from
blocking the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland: in parti­
cular, the US government has openly praised the One Country Two 
Systems proposal. But, the PRC was frustrated by such issues as 
Reagan's campaign speeches, the arms sales to Taiwan, the TRA, 
the change in the US view of China's role,from a global strategic 
key player to that of an East Asian regional power,and above all, 
US unwearying commitment to the security of the people of Taiwan. 
On the other hand, Washington was first pleased to see the PRC 
economic reform and its improvement of relations with the Western 
Bloc, which started in the late 1970s. From the American point of 
view, Beijing's open door policy, and its softened attitude 
towards Taiwan by means of the One Country Two Systems proposal, 
could eventually enhance the regional stability of East Asia. 
However, the political upheaval inside the PRC, which resulted in 
blood-shed at Tiananmen, have not only disappointed the US, but 
their relations tumbled to the lowest point since Nixon's visit 
to China. How far have US-China relations in the 1980s affected 
Beijing's policy of national reunification ? And what is the 
significance of the One Country Two Systems policy in the two 
powers' bilateral relations ? These problems will be dealt with 
in this chapter.
A .  T HE  T A I W A N  I S S U E  AND T HE  U . S .  S T R A T E G I C  
A S S O C I A T I O N  W I T H  THE PRC 1 9 8 0  - 8 2
After the Sino-US "Normalisation" was effected on January 1, 
1979, the two sides entered into a short-lived amicable relation­
ship. Since the US government had accepted the three conditions, 
which the PRC had put forward for diplomatic normalisation,
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Beijing was moderately pleased, though somewhat sceptical, that 
Washington had finally accepted the principle that the Taiwan 
issue should be settled by the Chinese themselves. It seemed that 
the PRC had managed to convince the US that the difficult issue 
of China's reunification would eventually be solved by peaceful 
means. (3) In particular, the US authorities had. publicly welcomed 
the new proposal for peaceful reunification, while Beijing issued 
the "1979 New Year message to compatriots in Taiwan".
However, when Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act and 
President Carter signed it in April 1979, the PRC expressed its 
dismay over the to US policy "to maintain the capacity of the 
United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of 
coercion that would jeopardise the security, or the social or 
economic system, of the people on Taiwan".(4) Bilateral relations 
between Beijing and Washington were worsened by Reagan's 1980 
campaign speeches calling for the restoration of "official" US 
relations with Taiwan. On several occasions in his presidential 
election campaign, Reagan promised that if he won the election he 
would redress the injustice done by Jimmy Carter to 'the Republic 
of China on Taiwan'.(5)
Beijing's response to Reagan's supportive attitude towards 
Taiwan was understandably harsh. Renmin Ribao, for example, made 
a strongly worded commentary directly challenging the Republican 
candidate in June 1980:
"....  If the United States re-establishes official
relations with Taiwan according to the policy 
announced by Reagan, it would imply that the very 
principle which constitutes the foundation of Sino- 
US relations is completely destroyed and that Sino- 
US relations will retrogress against the will of
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the two peoples. As for the absurd calls for a 
return of the US military presence on Taiwan and a 
revival of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defence Treaty, 
they constitute brazen interference in China's 
internal a f f a i r s (6)
Reagan's hard-line stance on the Taiwan issue angered the PRC 
leaders. On August 25, 1980, after having consulted his advisers, 
Reagan issued a five point "principles of China policy" as the 
blue print for his future presidency, to clarify, or indeed to 
modify, the confusions caused by his earlier speeches. Firstly, 
he proclaimed the importance of US-Sino relations and his wish to 
extend the hand of friendship to all Chinese. Secondly, he 
pledged to work for peace, stability and economic growth in co­
operation with the PRC and with Taiwan. Thirdly, he declared that 
he would re-act firmly against any country in the West Pacific 
area which sought hegemony or threatened peace and stability. 
Fourthly, and this is perhaps the core point of the statement, 
Reagan repeated that he intended to develop US-Taiwan relations 
in accordance with the law of the TRA"f7^, which he described as 
a law designed by the Congress to remedy the defects of Jimmy 
Carter's administration. And fifthly, he stated that he would not 
accept the interference of any foreign power in the process of 
the protection of American interests and the carrying out of US 
law.(8) At the end of his policy speech, Reagan asked the 
audience in a rhetorical manner "you might ask me what I would do 
differently (from the present government). I would not pretend, 
as Carter does, that the relationship we now have with Taiwan, 
enacted by our Congress, is not official."(9)
Reagan's modified wording in respect to future US-China rela­
tions comforted nobody. The KMT government in Taiwan had hoped 
that the presidential candidate would not go back on his promises
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made earlier, to re-establish of diplomatic relations or at least 
to up-grade Taibei-Washington official contacts. But the speech 
clearly revealed that Reagan would,most likely,follow the pattern 
set by his predecessors. For the PRC, the policy guidelines were 
unacceptable. An article in Renmin Ribao entitled "Reagan's 
erroneous stance on the Taiwan issue" made a detail criticism. It 
noted:
".......  Everybody knows that the so-called Taiwan
Relations Act is nothing but a domestic law of the 
United States. It can in no way serve as a legal 
basis for handling Sino-US relations. We should 
point out that many parts of the Act run in 
contradiction to the fundamental principles of the 
Communique on the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the PRC and the U.S.. The Chinese 
government has repeatedly clarified its solemn 
stance against the Act and suggests that the U.S. 
should respect the interests of Sino-US relations 
and truly respect China's sovereignty and terri­
torial integrity.....  Our government takes Sino-US
relations seriously and does not wish to see the
relations impaired...... Any action detrimental to
Sino-US relations will have serious adverse effects 
on the struggle against hegemonism and for the
safeguarding of world peace Reagan's erroneous
stand on the Taiwan question has a vital bearing on 
the strategic situation in the world. Whither goes 
Reagan? We shall wait and see."(10)
The above warning and protests, point out that Sino-American 
rapprochement virtually stemmed from a consensus on strategic 
cooperation. Beijing tried to explain that the normalisation of 
Sino-US relations was actuated, not by China's interests only, 
but, more importantly, by the overall consideration of safe­
guarding world peace and opposing hegemonism. Therefore, Beijing 
argued, Reagan should not alter U.S. China policy because of his 
personal dislike of the PRC and his out-dated anti-Communist 
ideology. Furthermore, Beijing warned that Reagan's speeches
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concerning Taiwan threatened China's national reunification - a 
principle on which the PRC would never concede. Any misca­
lculation by Americans on the issue of China's sovereignty would 
inevitably result in irrevocable damage to Sino-US relations. 
Many analysts later came to the view that Reagan's calls for 
official relations with Taibei, which had so exasperated Beijing, 
were a grossly inept handling of this sensitive issue.When Reagan 
assumed office in Jan. 1981, PRC leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, 
Chen Yun, Wang Zhen and Yang Shangkun were already angry at what 
they perceived to be a retrogression in Sino-US relations. The 
PRC openly confronted the new US administration on the issue of 
continuing arms sales to Taiwan. Meanwhile, the PRC's revaluation 
of its relations with the former Soviet Union also implied that 
China would not let the U.S. obtain the advantage of developing 
strategic interests with Beijing while still maintaining its 
dominance on the Taiwan issue. Reagan then, despite his pledged 
intention of upgrading relations with the ROC, was forced to make 
some concessions over the PRC's demands on Taiwan.(11)
Apart from Reagan's unilateral military build-up scheme, the 
paramount foreign policy and world defence strategy of his admi­
nistration was to counter the Soviet global expansion and to win 
the Cold War. (12) To achieve that aim, pursuing a strategic rela­
tionship with China was considered as an indispensable measure. 
While the US was seeking closer strategic cooperation with the 
PRC, Beijing came to the view that its security and strategic 
interests were best served by an independent foreign policy, 
detached from both superpowers. From the PRC's point of view, 
Reagan's suggestion of "official" relations with Taiwan could not 
be overlooked. Beijing indicated little interest in responding to
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the US new gesture, unless Washington made concessions over the 
problem of Taiwan. Washington then exercised a "practising what 
it had been preaching" measure to ease Chinese pressure over arms 
sales to Taiwan and signed the third Sino-US communique on August 
17, 1892.( for detail see the next section.)
But, Reagan' s determination to regain the upper hand over the 
the USSR and his strenuous efforts to check Soviet expansionism, 
marked a shift in the world balance of power. No longer could the 
Soviet hegemonist position be further strengthened. On the other
hand, the Soviet deepseated economic problems became more acute
on entering the 1980s. It was gradually becoming apparent that 
Washington would finally arrest the trend of Moscow's expanding 
influence on world affairs. In Autumn 1982, developments in the 
trilateral relations of Washington, Beijing, and Moscow clearly 
sapped American interest in developing closer strategic relations 
with the PRC.(13) Although Beijing would not like to be minimised 
in its trilateral relations with the US and the USSR, China's 
margin for manoeuvre was narrowed. It continued to improve rela­
tions with Moscow in order to enhance, its bargaining position to
gain more concessions from the US. But the steadfast stance of 
the US government, after signing the August 17 Communique with 
Beijing, did not just rule out the possibility of US compromising 
on matters of US-China bilateral relations, more importantly, 
Washington was also disinclined to help the PRC on the issue of 
. unification with Taiwan. Since the end of 1982, the issue of 
Taiwan has more frequently been juxtaposed with the bilateral
Taiwan issue has once again shifted from being a bargaining chip
relations of China and the United the
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at the table of the global powers to being a problem of the East 
Asian regional political arena.
B .  T H E  D I S P U T E S  OVER ARMS S A L E S  TO T A I W A N  AND US P O L I C Y  
" R E A D J U S T M E N T "  TOWARDS T HE  PRC 1 9 8 2 - 8 4
Since the Sino-American Normalisation, the US has been trying 
to maintain its 1970s China policy. On the one hand, it pursued 
an improvement of strategic relations with PRC, on the other, it 
attempted to retain its ties with Taiwan. To achieve this dual­
track policy effectively, the minimising of the PRC's military 
threat to the security of Taiwan became the core issue for the US 
government. When Congress re-wrote Carter's draft of the TRA bill 
and reconfirmed the US commitment to continuing weapons supply to 
Taiwan, the Taiwan issue turned out to be a symbol of abnormality 
in Sino-American relations in the post normalisation period.
To a certain extent, the changing of US policy towards China, 
depended on both the PRC's flexibility on the Taiwan issue and US 
low assessments of the PRC's threat to Taiwan.(15) The low threat 
assessments were particularly vital when the Carter administration 
took the initiative of negotiating with the PRC for normalisation 
in 1978. Notable evidence of this was given when, Harold Brown, 
the Secretary of Defence, assured Senators that:"the PRC military 
action against Taiwan is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable 
future."(16)Because of the Taiwan Relations Act and Reagan's pro- 
Taiwan speeches, Sino-US relations in the first two years of the
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Reagan administration were rather volatile. Beijing was concerned 
that the new US administration might undermine China's efforts to 
isolate Taiwan. For decades, Beijing had been taking all possible 
measures to cut off Taiwan's external relations, so as to degrade 
its political status. In doing so, it believed the Nationalists 
in Taiwan would become demoralised and eventually be compelled to 
the reunification negotiations table. However, for the first time 
since the Nixon visit to China, the US Presidential candidate, 
during his election campaign, had openly spoken of his intention 
to resume "official" relations with Taiwan. Beijing had no 
alternative but to directly confront the Reagan administration. 
The PRC, then, focused its challenge on the problem of US arms 
sales to Taiwan.
For the PRC the most noteworthy transaction regarding US arms 
sales to Taiwan was the FX jet fighters affair. In fact, the deal 
was initially supported by President Carter, as well as by the 
Congress in late 1970s. But it was delayed because of the norma­
lisation of Sino-US relations. When the 12 month moratorium on 
weapons sales to Taiwan ended in January 1980, Carter decided not 
to fulfil the commitment to sell the FX fighters to Taiwan. Mainly 
this was in response to the PRC's new initiative for a peaceful 
resolution on the Taiwan issue.(17)
When Reagan assumed office in January 1981, it was widely 
expected that he would speedily proceed with the FX sale, since, 
it could be argued, the deal was Jimmy Carter's unfinished work. 
But the incoming administration showed unusual hesitation over 
the deal, as the sales of arms to Taiwan had become an issue of 
US domestic politics. The new President's Security Adviser,
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Richard Allen and Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, supported 
the FX sale on the grounds that Beijing had never renounced the 
use of force against Taiwan, meanwhile Taiwan's air defence 
systems were relatively obsolescent. The Secretary of State, Gen. 
Haig, however, urged that the deal should not be approved. He 
argued that there was no serious PRC military threat to Taiwan,in 
particular, the Chinese government had been pursuing a policy of 
peaceful settlement over the Taiwan issue. The other important 
reason Haig put forward was that he believed that a US-PRC quasi­
alliance against the Soviet Union in the Far East region was 
desirable, possible and essential. Should the quasi-alliance 
materialise, the PRC would have no reason to attack Taiwan by 
force, as long as both the PRC and the US preferred to see the 
issue solved peacefully. If Washington continued to sell advanced 
weapons to Taiwan, Haig worried, the already tense relations, 
caused by Reagan's campaign speeches, would turn bad to worse, 
and US-PRC strategic cooperation would become impossible.(18) 
Eventually, Reagan was convinced that the deal should be stopped.
In June 1981, few months before Reagan made the final decision 
against the FX deal with Taiwan, General Haig went to Beijing, in 
an attempt to soothe the Chinese leaders' feelings over Reagan's 
"retrograde statements" on the Taiwan issue made during his 
campaign. Haig assured Deng Xiaoping that Reagan would pay 
attention to China as an important and valuable friend for global 
strategic cooperation. To demonstrate the new administration's 
desire to improve relations with Beijing, he told Deng that the 
US would be willing to sell arms to the PRC on a case-by-case 
basis. The day Haig left China, Washington disclosed that the US
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and the PRC were jointly operating a secret monitoring station in 
Xinjiang to keep track of Soviet missile tests.(19)
General Haig's olive branch to the PRC did not appease Deng 
and other leaders on the Taiwan issue, because of Reagan's long 
anti-Communist stance and because of his close ties with the KMT. 
Sceptical speculation arose in Beijing that the new government in 
Washington might have struck a deal with the Chinese to sell arms 
to the PRC in order to be able to continue its arms sales to 
Taiwan. On 10th June 1981, the PRC stated that China would rather 
receive no US arms than accept continuing American interference 
in its internal affairs by selling arms to Taiwan, which it could 
no longer tolerate.(20)
Trying to win back the PRC's confidence in the US government, 
Reagan then wrote three personal letters to Deng Xiaoping, Zhao 
Ziyang (the Premier) and Hu Yaobang (the General Secretary of the 
CPC), respectively, in April and May 1982. He repeatedly assured 
the Chinese leaders that the US was seriously considering a Sino- 
American strategic collaboration. Moreover, in these letters, 
Reagan, varying his previous positions, asserted that:
"The United States firmly adheres to the positions 
agreed upon in the Joint Communique on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
US and China. There is only one China. We will not 
permit the unofficial relations between the 
American people and the people of Taiwan to weaken 
our commitment to this principle"(21)
The PRC did not fail to seize the opportunities afforded by 
these friendly gestures extended by the US government. Apart from 
highlighting Reagan's one China assurance and unofficial policy 
towards Taiwan, it put even harder pressure on the President over
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the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. For example, Deng Xiaoping 
openly stated that the Sino-American strategic relationship was 
important and possible, but only on a condition of equal footing, 
and if the US properly respected Chinese sovereignty and terri­
torial integrity.(22) The Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua 
also warned that a "storms and reefs" relationship between the 
PRC and the US would be inevitable, if the Reagan administration 
mishandled the arms sales issue.(23)
For the purpose of staking out China's bargaining position 
on future arms sales to Taiwan, the PRC re-asserted that "If 
Washington wants to preserve and develop Sino-American relations, 
then the problem of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan must be solved on 
the basis of properly respecting China's sovereignty. And there 
is no way this problem can be solved while ignoring China's 
sovereignty."(24) Beijing then asked that a definite date should 
be set for the termination of arms sales to Taiwan. Huang Hua 
again hinted that a final settlement of the issue of arms sales 
to Taiwan was necessary. It was during this period that negotia­
tion between Washington and Beijing began in earnest over the
ititWveventual resolution of the problems^caused by the third Sino-US 
Joint Communique on August 17, 1982.
The PRC claimed that the Communique was extremely important 
with respect to the issue of China's reunification.Apart from its 
indication of US restraint on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, 
the Communique contained several statements which the PRC could 
claim as indicating support from the US for Beijing's peaceful 
reunification policy.(25) The US acceptance of the principles of 
the 1972 Shanghai Communique and the 1979 normalisation agreement
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were reconfirmed. Meanwhile the "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" 
issued on January 1, 1979 and the "Nine-point Proposal" presented 
by Marshal Ye Jianying on September 30, 1981 were cited as basic 
policy of the PRC towards Taiwan.
The US, however, argued that the Communique could not be 
interpreted as showing that Washington had any wishes to play an 
active role in bringing about a resolution over the Taiwan issue. 
Rather, it indicated that the US had no intention of infringing 
Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, nor of interfering 
in China's internal affairs by pursuing a policy of "Two Chinas" 
or "One China, One Taiwan". Likewise the US pledged that:
"........Having in mind the foregoing statements of
both sides, the United States government states 
that it does not seek to carry out a long-term
policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales
to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or 
in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied 
in recent years since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the United States and 
China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its 
sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of 
time to a final resolution...... ",(26)
Not surprisingly, disagreement arose immediately over the 
interpretation of the Communique. Senator Hayakawa pointed out: 
"The communique means either what you want it to mean or what you 
fear it means. There is enough ambiguity in the document,it seems
that no one need take offence. What we have in the communique is
a situation not uncommon in human affairs: total ambiguity."(27) 
Almost all US interpretations of the Communique have been more 
devious and less straightforward than the Chinese.(28) Beijing 
rejected outright any suggestion that its policy of peaceful 
reunification should be linked with, or be regarded as the pre-
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condition of any arms sales settlement. The PRC's intention in 
signing the Communique was clear; it attempted to use the new 
agreement to defy, or at least to weaken, the US Taiwan Relations 
Act.
Since the terms of the Communique were quite different from 
those of the TRA, if the US government strictly implemented the 
terms of the agreement, the Act would have to be revised. (29) In 
other words, though Reagan denied it, the Communique, like the FX 
deal, was in effect another concession to the PRC on the Taiwan 
issue. While the draft of "the August 17 Communique" was being 
secretly prepared, the architect of this controversial agreement, 
General Haig, resigned, and George Shultz took over the post of 
Secretary of State. The new Secretary of State brought a fresh 
perspective to bear on the PRC's role in the Washington-Moscow- 
Beijing trilateral relationship.(30) Although Shultz rhetorically 
still alleged China's importance as a strategic partner to offset 
the Soviet military threat,he quietly downplayed the "China Card" 
as a strategic counter-weight to influence Soviet behaviour.(31) 
He, therefore, initiated a reappraisal of the PRC's significance, 
designating it as a regional rather than a global power. And US 
strategy in the Far East seem to have quietly shifted from China 
to other East Asian countries.(32)
Under the new concept of the US strategy, it was Japan not 
China which was to be its true partner in forging a framework for 
economic and political security in the Asia-Pacific area. In 
Boston, in early 1983, Reagan said "the US-Japanese relationship 
remains the centre-piece of our Asian policy".(33) Paul Wolfowitz 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
made even clearer in his report to the House Committee on Foreign
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Affairs, that the US government wanted "to put US-China relations 
back on a stable, realistic footing".(34) Notwithstanding the 
ceaseless pressure from the PRC, the US government's lowered per­
ception of China's strategic significance resulted in it becoming 
less likely to compromise further over the Taiwan issue.
In March 1983, Shultz presented an interesting speech, showing 
a marked difference from his predecessor's stance. On American 
attitude towards US-China relations and the Taiwan issue, Shultz 
claimed:
"...China's new, more constructive, though guarded, 
role is welcome and a closer relationship with the 
PRC will benefit the people of both our countries. 
However, frustrations and problems in our relation­
ship are inevitable. They will arise not only out 
of differences concerning Taiwan but out of the
differences between our two countries Progress
in US-China relations need not come at the expense 
of relations with our other friends in the region, 
including our close unofficial relationship with 
the people of Taiwan. To the contrary, it can cont­
ribute to the peace and economic progress of the 
entire region. The key to managing our differences 
over Taiwan lies in observing the commitments made 
in our three joint communiques and allowing the 
parties themselves to resolve their differences 
peacefully with the passage of time. (35)
The above remarks clearly indicated the US intention of no 
longer pursuing a strategic relationship with the PRC at the 
expense of US-Taiwan relations. In the absence of a strategic 
motivation, Washington had more room to manoeuvre on the issue of 
China's reunification. Let by Shultz, US policy toward China and 
Taiwan after 1983, by and large, sought a stable framework that 
would allow Washington to remain its influence on the issue of 
Taiwan, while refraining from direct intervention in the gradual 
development of reconciliation between both sides of the Taiwan
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Straits. To achieve this aim, Shultz "re-normalised" US-China 
relations and US-Taiwan connections in accordance with the dual­
track policy. This "re-normalisation" included an uncompromising 
US stance in the face of Beijing's strong pressure on a series 
bilateral issues: for example, Reagan personally granted
political asylum to the tennis star Hu Na; the U.S. court decided 
that the PRC was liable for the Qing Dynasty's railway bonds; the 
Department of State's and the Congress' pro Taiwan stance on 
membership of the Asia Development Bank; the issue of US airlines 
being able to fly to China as well as to Taiwan; and most impor­
tantly, after 1983 the US maintained more or less the same level 
of arms sales to Taiwan as pre-August 17, Communique. On each one 
of the issues the PRC threatened that Sino-US relations would 
regrettably regress, unless their demands were satisfied; while 
each of the issues put forward by the PRC was quietly but firmly 
rebuffed by Washington, and never, indeed, did the PRC carry out 
its threats. (36) In short, in the two years of 1983-84, the US 
not only re-stabilised the Sino-American bilateral relations, 
mainly under U.S. initiatives, but also institutionalised close 
unofficial relations between Washington and Taibei in conforming 
with the guideline of the TRA, while not quite following the 
terms set out in the "August 17, Communique".
C .  D E V E L O P M E N T  OF S I N O - U S  R E L A T I O N S  AND I T S  I M P L I C A T I O N S  
FOR C H I N A ’ S R E U N I F I C A T I O N  1 9 8 4  - 8 7 .
Having learnt from the painful experiences of the Vietnam War, 
US foreign policy was less inclined to employ naked military
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intervention in the process of China's reunification. Instead, as 
noted, the US considered using more sophisticated measuresr such 
as diplomatic negotiations with Beijing over the continuing 
weapons supply to Taiwan, in order to secure its influence on the 
Taiwan issue. After the August 17, 1982 Communique, the US has 
kept a rather low profile, but a firm attitude in handling the 
issue of Taiwan. US policy towards the issue of China's unifica­
tion could be summed up as follows: l).the Chinese on both sides 
of the Taiwan Straits should resolve the issue of reunification 
themselves; 2). the US would neither persuade Taibei to go to the 
negotiation table nor become involved in Chinese peace-talks; but 
3). the sole American interest is in the peaceful settlement of
i
the issue.(37)
The first two points, which express the U.S. non-involvement 
policy, are,by and large, based on the assumption that the people 
of Taiwan would not accept the PRC's peaceful offensive measure 
of One Country Two Systems.The third point reveals US support for 
a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, which links directly 
to its national interests and security in East Asia. Since 1984, 
changes in US policy on the Taiwan issue have been fundamentally 
based on these three principles. In the section we will examine 
how these principles were applied to the following four main 
factors that have dominated the tripartite relationships of 
Beijing, Washington and Taibei viz, 1). the impact of the settle­
ment of the Hong Kong issue; 2). the decreasing tensions in the 
Washington-Beijing-Moscow triangular relations; 3). the beginning 
of limited contact between Taiwan and the mainland; 4). the 
institutionalising of Taibei-Washington relations in the light of
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the Taiwan Relations Act.
During the two years of Beijing-London negotiations over the 
future of Hong Kong(1982-84), there was little thought in the US 
about playing a role in China's reunification.(38) The announce­
ment of the Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong between 
China and the United Kingdom in September 1984, however, provided 
the U.S. with an opportunity for reviewing what role it could 
properly play in the resolution of the Taiwan problem, since, 
from the beginning, the PRC had made clear that application of 
the formula of One Country Two Systems to the Hong Kong solution 
was intended to be a model for Taiwan. How has the U.S. responded 
to the Hong Kong settlement ? in other words, how did the Reagan 
administration evaluated the One Country Two Systems formula.
Generally speaking, Washington's declared position towards 
the model of the Hong Kong settlement was rather positive. The US 
government showed its interest in a peaceful resolution of the 
issue. Not only would the settlement preserve the political and 
economic status quo in Hong Kong, distinct from that of other 
areas of the PRC, but also the US could maintain close political 
and economic ties with the colony, since Hong Kong is the tenth 
largest trading partner of the US. Furthermore,when the Hong Kong 
Agreement was completed, Washington reacted favourably; the State 
Department announced "the US Government welcomes the successful 
conclusion of the negotiations between the PRC and the UK. The US 
has a strong interest in the continued stability and prosperity 
of Hong Kong and believes the agreement will provide a solid
foundation for Hong Kong's enduring future progress........The US
will provide any assistance it can, in close cooperation with the
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UK and the PRC, to maintain Hong Kong's appropriate participation 
in international b o d i e s (39) Obviously, the US meant that the 
One Country Two Systems formula could be considered a credible
means for the resolution of international disputes.
Profiting by the supportive stance of Washington, Deng Xiao­
ping then asked the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher to take 
to Reagan the message that the US should "help" the PRC to achieve 
its national reunification i.e. solve the issue of Taiwan.(40)
With the PRC's appeal for something to be done about its national
reunification, the US gave serious consideration to what role it 
should play in the resolution of the Taiwan issue in response to 
the repercussions of the Hong kong settlement. Having carefully 
evaluated on Deng's request, the US backed away from the PRC's 
demand, and eventually made the decision to retain the existing 
policy of no direct intervention in China-Taiwan relations.
Indeed, though the US government hinted that the manner in 
which Hong Kong's future would be handled could greatly influence 
the future prospects for reunification with Taiwan, several 
problems disturbed the Washington policy-makers and they could 
see no advantage in, nor moral justification for nudging Taiwan 
into closer contact with the PRC. Firstly, the US was not sure if 
China's initiatives for peaceful reunification were only part of 
the reformists' policy package introduced at and after the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee. If the initial 
reform became unravelled, either through failure, or because it 
was denounced by anti-reformist factions, then the Hong Kong 
settlement might well turn out to be a nightmare, and the new 
Chinese leadership might rescind the policy of One Country Two
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Systems accordingly. Secondly, the impact on Taiwan's political, 
economic and social stability of US involvement in China's re­
unification was unpredictable. Thirdly, US politicians had shown 
their discontent over Reagan's handling of the Taiwan issue since 
he took office. The conservatives, because of their distrust of 
the PRC regime, and their undying moral commitment to the KMT 
regime, had made their position clear: the US government should 
not involve itself in the issue of China's unification. On the 
other hand, the liberals were inclined to see the Taiwan issue as 
something to be decided by Taiwanese themselves. Fourthly,none of 
the countries in East Asia had indicated any desire to see Taiwan 
controlled by the PRC under any conditions. On the contrary, most 
of the neighbouring nations were anxious about their security were 
Taiwan to be seized by China or the PRC to become too powerful. 
Finally, the US was doubtful that a solution of the Taiwan issue 
on the PRC's terms, would lead to a substantive improvement in 
Sino-US bilateral relations. Rather, it seemed certain that if 
Taiwan were taken over, the PRC would be in a better position 
than ever to challenge the US on other issues. All these concerns 
led the US to shy away from any change in its existing dual-track 
policy aimed at keeping Taiwan out of the PRC's hands.
Although the Taiwan issue was, to a certain extent, disass­
ociated from the Hong Kong frame of reference after the US made 
above decision, some US politicians still value the Hong Kong 
Agreement as being a good way for easing international disputes. 
They also believe that the Hong Kong formula of One Country Two 
Systems, is, and will continue to be,a blessing for the people of 
Taiwan, for it has removed, at least until 1997 and possibly for 
a decade more, any need to seriously consider negotiations with
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Beijing.(41) This is because they expect Taibei to adopt the 
PRC's conventional slogan, saying that they will wait for "deeds 
and not words" as proof of a positive attitude on national reuni­
fication. The US leaders are quite happy with Taibei's argument 
that it is reasonable for them to wait and see how the formula 
works out in practice for Hong Kong after it goes into effect in 
1997 .
The other thing that the leaders of the U.S. had to consider 
was the continuity of and changes to its strategic posture in 
East Asia in the light of China's attitude of peaceful reunifica­
tion. Indeed, the Taiwan issue has undoubtedly been one of the 
major contentious subjects in Washington-Beijing relations. How­
ever, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the issue was, as has been 
discussed, tacitly put aside, because both Washington and Beijing 
considered friendly Sino-US relations as a strategic counter­
weight to the growing former Soviet Union military threat to, and 
political influence on, East Asia. As was also examined earlier, 
after Shultz took charge of foreign affairs,the US downgraded the 
importance of the PRC in the management of strategic relations 
with the former USSR. A similar view of the diminishing global
significance of the PRC emerged from the conduct of Soviet
foreign policy under its new leader, Gorbachev, who came to power 
in 1985.(42^ Notwithstanding China's international significance 
was regionalised as well as marginalised by Washington, it was
the first time in four decades, that China was in position to
enjoy good, normal relations with the two superpowers at the same 
time. In the second half of the 1980s,the PRC was pursuing a more 
independent foreign policy.
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Mikhail Gorbachev's speech delivered at Vladivostok in July 
1986, indicated the Soviet intention of seeking better relations 
with the PRC, in order to maintain the stability of the Far East 
and the Pacific.(43) He proposed talks with Beijing to solve the 
"three obstacles"(44) repeatedly referred to by the Chinese. 
Furthermore, the limitation of nuclear weapons in the region; the 
reduction of US and Soviet naval fleets; a cut back in regional 
conventional forces; and most notably, a public concession on 
river border disputes were suggested in Gorbachev's speeches.(45) 
The former Soviet attitude towards East Asia was vital to both 
China and the US. It has always been apparent that China's 
security is tied intrinsically to Beijing's relations with 
Moscow. The PRC attempted to take advantage of the new atmosphere 
in Sino-Soviet relations to advance its own interests.
Deng Xiaoping exploited Gorbachev's proposals and enhanced 
China's independent foreign policy, saying that apart from the
Sino-Soviet three obstacles, there was one over-riding obstacle 
in Sino-US relations: the Taiwan issue. He repeatedly appealed 
to Reagan to bring about further progress in Sino-US relations, 
including some effort in respect of China's reunification.(46)
The US analysed both the Gorbachev's proposals and the PRC's 
responses in order to decide whether any adjustment in US policy 
in Asia was necessary. The US assessment of the prospects for 
improving Sino-Soviet relations was mixed. Some officials in the 
Reagan administration were apprehensive that the USSR might be
able to take advantage of the impact of the Taiwan issue on Sino-
American relations and of China's problem with the influx of
unwanted Western "decadence" to drive a wedge between Washington
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and Beijing. The majority of policy-makers in the White House, 
however, still believed that the achievement of a strategic 
realignment between the PRC and the USSR was rather unlikely. (4 7) 
Following an extensive review of Soviet and American capabilities 
in Asia, Washington concluded that the Soviet challenge to US 
interests in the area was not as serious as had been thought. 
Therefore, they could see no compelling strategic reason to 
change existing US policy towards China's reunification.(48)
Apart from the impact of international relations, i.e., the 
Hong Kong settlement and the Sino-Soviet reconciliation, the 
increasing unofficial contacts between Taiwan and mainland China 
became another important factor causing contention in the US 
government over its policy on China's unification. As mentioned, 
the US has firmly insisted that it will not be involved in any 
talks, should negotiations over the Taiwan issue take place. Its 
arms sales to Taiwan were designed to help the ROC on Taiwan meet 
an adequate defence need, so that Beijing's threat to use non­
peaceful means would not be viable. It is clear that unless the 
Taibei authorities change their relations with Beijing, the US 
has no reason to shift its existing policy. But, since 1985, the 
situation on both sides of the Taiwan Straits has gradually 
developed to a new stage. The KMT government, although still 
vehemently rejecting any contact with Beijing, has relaxed its 
restrictions on unofficial "people-to-people" communications with 
the mainland.( See chapter 7.) Facing up to the new atmosphere in 
Taiwan-China relations, and in order to avoid being accused of 
blocking China's reunification, statements have been made by the 
US in support of the "process" of peaceful reunification.
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When the flow of contacts between Taiwan and China became
more perceptible, the PRC launched stronger attacks on the US for 
not sincerely supporting Chinese reunification.(49) In response 
to pressure from Beijing that the US government should do some­
thing on the issue of China's reunification, the State Department 
official specialising in Taiwan Affairs, Mark Pratt, gave the 
* r  following comments:
"The US role in the area (East Asia) will continue 
to be questioned, particularly from the PRC side. 
However, as time goes on and the US policy and 
intentions are more clearly understood,there should 
be greater acceptance in Beijing of the fact, that 
this policy is not directed against the PRC, but is 
in the interest of all the Chinese people. The US 
is not attempting to separate Taiwan from China in 
order to have an unsinkable aircraft carrier.If the 
US maintains a principled position which is in 
accord not only with US policy but with the US 
character, then we may be able to reduce suspicions 
and reassure both Taipei and Beijing of the benevo­
lence and beneficence of our policy.(50)
The above clarification from the State Department of the US 
attitude on the Taiwan issue shows its concern and belief that 
the majority of people in Taiwan do not have desire to be taken 
over by the Communist regime. The speculation that the KMT and 
the CPC would not be able to work out their differences was 
another reason for the Americans to argue that the US was not at 
the centre of the differences between Taiwan and China, rather, 
the core of the problem lay with the Chinese themselves.
The speech made by George Shultz, in Shanghai in March 1987, 
quoted at the beginning of the chapter, was the first time the US 
explicitly expressed that "it would support a continuing evolu­
tionary process toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue". 
Did Shultz's statement imply that the U.S. would be positively 
interested in the realisation of the policy of One Country Two
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Systems ? Chinese officials on the mainland and, indeed, a few in 
Taiwan as well, tried to interpret this speech as indicating the 
US intention to change its non-involvement policy. The people of 
Taiwan also felt it could be a dangerous development for them, 
faced with the same fate as the people of Hong Kong in the course 
of the Sino-British talks over the future of the colony.(51)
Despite the expectations and worry to which Shultz's speech 
gave rise, the events have shown that the US government had no 
intention of changing its non-intervention policy towards China's 
reunification. The main reasons, at the time, were the volatile 
nature of political developments occurring in China since 1987, 
and the international situation which allowed the Washington- 
Moscow detente to develop further. This "favourable" atmosphere 
released the US policy-makers from the embarrassment of the PRC's 
pressure for China's reunification. The PRC government suffered a 
series of political difficulties, following the resignation of 
Deng's hand-picked successor, Hu Yaobang, as General Secretary of 
the CPC, after the students' anti-corruption demonstration in 
Jan. 1987. Under pressure from the resurgent advocates of central 
planning, who urged a slowdown of the political and economic 
reforms, the government, led by the reformers, was badly in need 
of the supports from the US and other Western countries. Although 
Beijing was still unhappy about the US dual-track policy toward
i
China and Taiwan, it could do little to change it.
The prime consideration for the US in adhering to its non­
involvement policy on the Taiwan issue is that the existing policy 
serves important interests: it enables Washington to pursue the 
aim of maintaining good relations with both China and Taiwan at
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same times it also reduces China's potential threat to US 
interests in East Asia. In the US election campaign of 1988, both 
Democratic and Republican party candidates shared very similar 
views on the future settlement of the Taiwan issue. While 
promising to honour the TRA, they both appreciated the PRC's 
initiatives for peaceful reunification under the formula of One 
Country Two Systems. When George Bush took office in Jan. 1989, 
China expected that he would be better able to solve the Sino- 
American disagreement on the Taiwan problem, because both Deng 
and Bush looked on each other as "good old friends". (52) But 
Bush's policy appears not much different from that of his prede­
cessor's. The policy towards China's reunification will remain in 
place unless compelling circumstances force the US to change.
D .  WASH I N G T O N - T A I  BE I R E L A T I O N S  AND R E U N I F I C A T I O N
When the normalisation of the Sino-US diplomatic relations was 
accomplished in January 1979, Taibei-Washington had had to find 
some guide-lines for their post-derecognition relations. It was, 
indeed, an unique opportunity for the American Congress to enact 
the Taiwan Relations Act to define, govern and oversee US 
relations with the deserted former ally.(53) And the TRA has, 
hence, functioned as an institutional regulation for Washington- 
Taibei relations.
The setback in Washington-Taibei relations caused by the US- 
China normalisation was somewhat softened by the TRA. This Act of
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the Congress treats Taiwan, in terms of international convention, 
as a distinct political entity, and reflects, more or less, the 
vision of the US "One China One Taiwan" policy of the early 60's. 
Contrary to the wording of the 1978 Normalisation Agreement and 
the Shanghai Communique of 1972, it does not formally regard 
Taiwan as a part of China. The only point in the TRA which the 
Taibei authorities dislike, would perhaps be that its formal 
designation of "the Republic of China" has been replaced by "the 
people of Taiwan", implying that there is no recognised government 
on the island. (54) The Act also makes clear the US concerning of 
Taiwan's security, which is directly linked to the stability of 
the Western Pacific region. In other words, it reflects a U.S. 
commitment to the welfare of the people and to the security of 
the region in which the current status of Taiwan is regarded as 
vital.
To enforce the TRA, and for the purpose of taking charge of 
day-to-day administrative affairs between "the people of Taiwan" 
and the US, a "private" body,the kmerican Institute in Taiwan was 
set up in Taibei in April 1979. The "unofficial AIT" was staffed 
by professional diplomats, financed by government funds, and 
governed by trustees appointed by the Secretary of State. For the 
last ten years, the AIT has substantially functioned as an 
Embassy in all but name. Corresponding to the AIT, "the People of 
Taiwan" established in Washington a counterpart "private" body, 
the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA). 
Through these "unofficial" bodies, the United States and "the 
People of Taiwan" have steadily developed their relations.(55)
The Articles of the TRA and the structures of the AIT and
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the CCNAA ensure a practical level of government-to-government 
relations, while subtly avoiding specific reference to any offi­
cial relations. The continuing links between Washington and Taibei 
had put Beijing a difficult position. On the one hand,the PRC had 
offered a new, friendly, as well as generous proposal ( at least 
from their point of view,) to the KMT regimes Taiwan would be 
allowed to maintain its independent external relations in an 
unofficial manner and could maintain military forces below a 
level capable of threatening the security of the PRC. On the 
other hand, the Beijing government regretted that its proposal 
for Taiwan's reunification with the mainland had been unsettled 
by the TRA. (56) According to the above guidelines set by the PRC, 
Washington could argue that the US had conducted its relations 
with Taiwan exactly as Beijing recommended. In this situation, if 
Beijing were to push its Taiwan policy too hard, it would show up 
the insincerity of its peaceful initiatives, but, should the PRC 
complain to Washington in too soft a tone it would give the rest 
of world the impression that China had offered tacit consent to 
the indefinite continuation of US intervention in the issue of 
Taiwan. In that event, the prospects for the reunification of 
Taiwan with the PRC would be severely damaged.
Throughout the 1980s, Beijing kept up its pressure on the US 
government regarding the TRA and US relations with "the people of 
Taiwan". Taibei was disappointed by Reagan's decision not to sell 
advanced FX fighters to Taiwan. It was further frustrated by the 
August 17, 1982 Communique in which the US was prepared to accept 
that the PRC's proposals concerning the future settlement of the 
Taiwan issue should be linked to the US arms sales policy. How­
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ever, Washington did,in return,provide some compensatory measures 
to comfort the Taibei authorities. For example, Taibei diplomats 
in the US were accorded diplomatic immunity. (57) Furthermore, the 
setting up of thirteen branches of the CCNAA in the main cities 
of the US was ratified by the State Department, while there are 
only four Consulates of the PRC in the US. The Reagan administra­
tion also took some steps to limit the damage to arms sales to 
Taiwan which the August 17, Communique generated.(58) The total 
amount of arms sales to Taiwan was kept at the level of 1982 by 
interpreting the Communique as lacking any consideration of "the 
inflationary index".(59) An important development was the Reagan 
government's decision, after 1983, to transfer to Taiwan more 
advanced defence systems technology, rather than by selling large 
quantities of weapons. In so doing, the government-approved items 
of arms sales decreased, while US commercial sales of defence- 
related equipment to Taiwan increased.
The most testing case for the US in response to the PRC's 
peaceful proposal over the Taiwan issue and its relations with 
Taiwan came in February 1983, when Beijing openly expressed its 
desire to join the Asian Development Bank(ADB), at the same time, 
demanding that the ROC be expelled from that body. The US State 
Department later indicated that the PRC was welcome to join the 
organisation, but opposed the ousting of any member as a pre­
condition for any country to attend the ADB. Aware of the US 
dominating influence in the ADB, Beijing then sought to downgrade 
the ROC's status from full membership to that of observer.(60) 
The US Congress then passed an amendment to the IMF appropriation 
bill, which stipulates: "....It is the sense of the Congress that 
Taiwan should remain a full member of the ADB and that its status
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within that body should remain unaltered, no matter how the issue 
of the PRC's application for membership is disposed of".(61) The 
Congress also urged "the President and Secretary of State should 
express support of Taiwan, making it clear that the US will not 
countenance attempts to expel Taiwan from the ADB".(62) Beijing 
then launched a strong protest against the amendment, and accused 
the US of still pursuing its long-standing policy of Two Chinas. 
Washington was not perturbed by the accusation, its staunch stand 
towards Taiwan' s membership of the ADB remains. After the settle­
ment of the Hong Kong issue, the PRC demanded that the ROC's name 
in the ADB should be changed to "Taiwan, China" in order to match 
its One Country Two Systems policy. (63) But the US again rejected 
the suggestion. It is clear that although the US supports the One 
Country Two Systems model to solve the Hong Kong issue, it will 
not join efforts to pressure Taibei into accepting it.
The bilateral relations between Taibei and Washington in the 
past decade have generally been stable and built on mutual trust, 
but not always smooth. It appeared that the result of the TRA was 
to keep the Americans in and the Chinese Communists out of 
Taiwan, yet the Act has operated as a mechanism for ensuring the 
continued viability of Taiwan. In the past decade, economic ties 
between Taiwan and the US have prospered to a greater extent than 
before. Two-way trade in commodities, which in 1979 was US$ 9 
billion, reached US$ 38 billion in 1988, an increase of over four 
fold. Taiwan became one of the world's main trading countries and 
the fifth biggest trading partner of the \1S. (64) As trade grew, 
the imbalance of surplus in favour Taiwan followed. By the end of 
1988, Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves surged to a staggering
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US$ 78 billion, and its trade surplus with the US increased from 
2.3 billion in 1978 to US$ 19 billion in 1988.(65) To the people 
of Taiwan it has been both a blessing (being in the lime light of 
the world), and a serious problem ( with the US policy of trading 
retaliations and protectionism). The US has become unhappy about 
the growing trade imbalance which Taiwan runs and the foreign 
exchange reserves it has accumulated. Tension and quarrels have, 
therefore, developed between the two countries.
The background to the Taiwan-US trading imbalance was not 
purely market-oreintated. Following the normalisation of US-PRC 
diplomatic relations, the US government has continued to treat 
its obligations to Taiwan as one of the key factors in its China 
policy. As China has acquired greater status in the international 
community, the US has supported Taiwan, mainly by enabling Taiwan 
to maintain its peace and prosperity.(66) Up to this point, the 
bilateral relations between Taibei and Washington were conducted 
primarily through their commercial activities. The US trading 
deficits with Taiwan were, not only the inevitable outcome of the 
market mechanism, but more importantly, the consequences of 
political determinations.
From the viewpoint of the KMT regime, the worst period of 
relations between Taibei and Washington, i.e., that of the Carter 
administration, had passed. It believed that bilateral relations 
during the Reagan administration had stabilised.(67) This was due 
partly to Reagan's previously mentioned anti-Communist stance and 
partly to the US assessment of Beijing's diminished role in the 
containment of the former Soviet expansionism after 1983. Since 
the co-existence of Washington^Taibei and Washington-Beijing
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relations within the carefully planned context of the US foreign 
policy has proved to be functional and effective, it was clear 
that Taibei would not expect Washington to play any vital role on 
the issue of China's reunification. On the other hand, Taibei 
still very much relies upon the US continuing to play a deterrent 
role to protect Taiwan, so long as the threat from mainland China 
exists. In particular, Taibei tries hard to convince US decision­
makers that Washington should not give an impression to the 
people of Taiwan that America is gradually shifting her position 
to accommodate Beijing's endless demands on the issue of China's 
reunification, otherwise, due to the strong Taiwanese feeling of 
separatism,political changes in Taiwan could possibly involve the 
unleashing of the Taiwan independence movement. This would be a 
high-risk development, because, the KMT argues, both the US and 
the Chinese Communists would be likely to become entangled in 
direct conflict.(68)
In the US Congress, there is a strong voice in support of the 
people of Taiwan pursuing self-rule and this is incompatible with 
the policy of One Country Two Systems. Soon after the Democratic 
Progressive Party (the DPP) was formed in Taibei, Senator Pell, 
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented 
that ".... Though the DPP's political position is not yet secure, 
its political attitude is clear.It seems to me that the new party 
does not call for separation; it calls for self-determination. 
The DPP does not say that Taiwan should declare its independence 
from the mainland; it says the people of Taiwan must be free to 
determine their own future....If the people in Taiwan vote freely 
for independence, the world should respect their judgement, and I 
fully support that position. America was built on the principle
that the American people should determine their own destiny. We 
cannot and should not expect the Taiwanese people to settle for 
anything less,"(69) Senator Edward Kennedy, Congressman Steven 
Solarz, Chairman of the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, and many others on Capitol Hill shared 
Senator Pell's view.(70)
In the foreseeable future, Beijing's Taiwan policy will still 
be an important factor in Taibei-Washington relations. How far 
the PRC will change its policy of reunification, is certainly a 
matter about which it is difficult for the US to make an accurate 
judgement. Nevertheless, since 1979, the US has been pursuing a 
flexible policy; Washington would preserve its option to react 
passively and/or actively to the development of the situation 
between China and Taiwan. US efforts were expected to create an 
enduring friendship with the PRC, so as to lower the likelihood 
of an armed attack on Taiwan from China. As from the time that 
Secretary of State Shultz made his significant speech in Shanghai 
the US has been talking about its support for an "evolutionary 
process" towards a possible peaceful resolution of the issue of 
Taiwan, therefore, Washington has shown tolerance in response to 
the increased contact between the people of China and Taiwan.(71) 
The documents and speeches of US policy-makers reveal, however, 
that Washington does not intend to review the TRA. Following the 
pattern which has been built in the past decade, the US-Taiwan 
relations will most probably continue to maintain the status quo. 
The One Country Two Systems formula might be often mentioned by 
the PRC in line with the Sino-US bilateral relations, but it will 
have little influence on the development of the Washington-Taibei
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relations, unless unexpected factors emerge to compel Washington 
into taking extraordinary measures to change course over Taiwan.
E .  SUMMARY
Apart from holding firmly to the principle of the peaceful 
solution of the Taiwan issue, how can the US act practically in 
response to the PRC's initiative of One Country Two Systems ? In 
the past decade, both Beijing and Taibei have been in the throes 
of political and economic transformation. Most US politicians 
have reacted positively to the easing of the political control 
over the mainland and Taiwan by the PRC and KMT• (72) Studying the 
question, one finds that Beijing has shown its determination in 
pursuing the aim of national reunification. Any option of the US 
government in support of a specific outcome of the Taiwan settle­
ment, other than reunification,would be regarded as having an axe 
to grind - a challenge to the PRC's territorial integrity. The US 
policy options on the resolution of the Taiwan problem, in the 
foreseeable future, will have to keep a balance between the 
Washington's committed principles and Beijing's attitude which 
its priority is to achieve national reunification with the tag of 
One Country Two Systems.
However, in terms of the future of Taiwan, there are three 
possible different options available, namely: unification with
China; an indefinite continuation of the status quo; and Taiwan 
independence.(73) Since the trend of contacts between both sides
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of the Taiwan Straits is already under way, there is reason to 
believe that the US will continue to "talk" about its support for 
China's peaceful reunification. But certain questions remain. 
Should the present Bush Administration and his future successors 
move their Taiwan policy beyond the "process" of a peaceful reso­
lution to actively helping the PRC to recover Taiwan ? Or should 
the US government back down from the PRC's peaceful proposal and 
support Taiwan independence, in the event of Beijing using force 
to attack Taiwan ? Furthermore, how could the US effectively 
maintain the present situation of non-unification,non-separation, 
when even Secretary of State, Shultz has realised that the status 
quo does not mean the situation in the Taiwan Straits is static ? 
All these questions are strategically related to US China policy 
and its national interests in East Asia.
Some influential political figures in the US did argue that 
the US government should play a more active and positive role on 
the issue of China's reunification. For example, Henry Kissinger 
praised the One Country Two Systems policy, and proclaimed that 
the formula will provide for the continuance of British role in 
maintaining the prosperity of Hong Kong after 1997. Kissinger 
hinted that if the Taiwan issue were resolved satisfactorily with 
US involvement, Washington-Beijing relations would be improved 
and regional peace and stability enhanced.(74) Nevertheless, the 
politicians who made decisions in Reagan's administration and in 
the present Bush government, were inclining to consider that the 
PRC's initiative for the "recovery" of Taiwan with direct US help 
should be approached with the utmost caution.
Strategically, maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait
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has been, as discussed, of great interest to the US. Leaders and 
policy analysts in Washington would certainly not like to see any 
big change in the area. Compared to the 1950s, 60s, or even 70s, 
American policy on the Taiwan issue in the 80s was to keep a low 
profile, but with firm position. In particular, Washington would 
not wish to give an impression that it was prepared to promote 
China's unification because that would severely weaken Taiwan's 
bargaining position,should Taiwan have considered negotiating the 
unification issue with the mainland. Beijing was also aware that 
Washington had always been Taiwan's main supporter in the inter­
national community. A US position in favour of unification would 
have been regarded in Beijing as depriving Taiwan of its other 
options for a solution, and could seriously damage the interests 
of the people of Taiwan. In the 1980s, the US approach to deal 
with the issue of Taiwan was to quietly follow the lead of the 
people, as opposed to the governments, on the both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait, while protecting its interest in a peaceful 
settlement of the issue. To support any specific outcome of the 
Taiwan problem (unification or independence), would have been 
regarded in Washington as a dangerous move, and the US decision­
makers are unwilling to take that unnecessary risk.
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C H A P T E R  7 : T A I W A N ’ S R E S P O N S E S  TO T H E  P O L I C Y  OF
ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S  1 9 7 9  - 8 7 .
"Influenced by the Chinese Communist stratagems, 
some people have made free China an issue - the so- 
called 'Taiwan Issue' which has caused potential
instability in the East Asian area. This is putting
the cart before the horse......  The Republic of
China on Taiwan has achieved progress, prosperity 
and stability under the ideals of our founding
father Dr. Sun Yat-sen ........ Our people here,
enjoying a modern life of freedom, democracy and 
happiness will never accept the Communists'
proposal of the so-called One Country Two Systems 
model. Most importantly, the ROC on Taiwan is 
always a constructive member of the international 
community, therefore we are neither a problem nor 
an issue in the arena of world politics• " (1)
Chiang Chingkuo, January 1987
Chiang Chingkuo's proclamation was designed to suggest that 
those who were concerned with the future of Taiwan have been mis­
led by Chinese Communist propaganda. The PRC's proposal over 
peaceful reunification with Taiwan has, indeed, led some people 
to think that the obstacles to the resolution of the Taiwan issue 
come from Taiwan's intransigence. The KMT argued that Beijing's 
manoeuvre in changing tactics was, in fact, another form of the 
Communist struggle; an attempt to defeat the ROC on Taiwan 
without fighting a battle. Taibei authorities, therefore, had to 
find ways of resistance to the CPC's peaceful offensive.
A .  T H E  K M T ’ S O F F I C I A L  A T T I T U D E  TOWARDS  
“ ONE C O UN T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S "
The first reaction of the ROC on Taiwan to the PRC's overture
for reunification under the policy of "One Country Two Systems",
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was outright rejection.But the peaceful initiative has placed the 
government of Taiwan under great pressure. Not only would it be 
difficult for the authorities to continue indefinitely refusing 
to negotiate, but, also, should they consider any negotiation, 
they would lose their so-called "Fatong" (legal continuation).^^ 
"Fatong" was used by the KMT as an unassailable excuse for 
retaining power without the consent of the people of Taiwan. 
Furthermore, they fear that the slightest flexibility towards the 
Communists would shake the political foundation of the anti­
communism stance on which their rule has been built for the last 
four decades. Initially after 1979, the ROC government on Taiwan 
gave an impression of inconsistency and confusion in its position 
on the proposal for peace talks, and then changed to adopt its 
new strategy vis-a-vis the problems caused by the "One Country 
Two Systems" proposal.
WHY TAIWAN REJECTED THE PRC'S PROPOSALS
In an interview with the U.S. Newsweek International, Chiang 
Chingkuo frankly responded to the question "Under what conditions 
would it be possible to begin talks and/or negotiations on 
peaceful reunification with China ?" His answer was:
"In the Communist lexicon, negotiations are another 
type of war. When the Chinese Communists cannot 
subdue us with guns, they will turn to negotiations 
to divide our ranks and create opportunities for 
our destruction. The unification of China will be 
possible only when the Communist regime and system 
have disappeared from mainland China".(3)
This uncompromising attitude was maintained for some years
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after Beijing had moderated its attitude. Nevertheless, it has 
been persistently reported that Taibei and Beijing do communicate 
privately.(4)
The Nationalists constantly claimed that they had had long 
experience in dealing with the Chinese Communists and understood 
the nature of Communism. The official statements supplied several 
reasons and principles for the refusal of the PRC offer of 
peaceful negotiations. They did not believe that Taibei and 
Beijing possessed any common basis for talks, since both strongly 
maintain their ideological standpoint. The KMT then insisted that 
"Unless the CPC could accept Dr.Sun Yat-sen's policy and ideology 
of 'San-min-zhu-yi', (the Three Principles of the People) in the 
whole of China, there will be no chance that the ROC leaders will 
sit at the same table with them to discuss the matter of unifica­
tion."^^ Because under Sun's principles as guideline for nation- 
building, Taiwan has developed into a free and prosperous region; 
while the Chinese mainland under Communism has,in sharp contrast, 
became a land where people suffer misery from poverty and dicta­
torship, and that as a result, the people on the mainland have 
lost confidence in Communism.(6)
Moreover, Taibei has repeatedly claimed to be the sole legal 
government of the whole of China, despite being, in reality, 
control of Taiwan only. The KMT is far from willing to accept an 
arrangement that would turn it into a local government under the 
PRC. Those tired, yet familiar slogans, such as "liberate Taiwan 
by force", "Peaceful liberation of Taiwan", "democratic transfor­
mation of Taiwan", "a third co-operation between the KMT and the 
CPC", "party to party talks on a recipro-cal basis", and the most
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recent Hong Kong Model, were all regarded as plots. For decades, 
the CPC's tactical political struggles; indicated that Beijing 
intends to eliminate the KMT and to annex Taiwan by keeping it as 
a province or a Special Administrative Region. Nevertheless, the 
KMT has tried hard to retain power on Taiiwan, and will not submit 
to any plan which would tie its hands.
In particular, the KMT foresaw many serious problems, should 
it have agreed to start negotiations with Beijing. (7) The first 
difficulty concerns the legitimacy of Its claim to be the sole 
legal government of China. Since the international community 
withdrew recognition in the 1970s, such legitimacy hardly exists; 
but the myth is still vital to the KMT government in dealing with 
internal politics in Taiwan. Internationally, Taiwan has been 
gravely isolated, due to the PRC's high profile of forcing the 
vast majority of countries in the world to cease their formal 
relations with Taiwan. Intranationally, the CPC has, however, 
failed to convince the people on Taiwan that a peaceful solution 
of the Taiwan issue will be beneficial for most of them. At the 
same line there is a fear on the island that the KMT might make a 
deal with the CPC in the interests of Chinese unity, and thereby 
betray the local population.(8) Hence, If the KMT leaders were to 
start talks with the CPC, Taiwan could be destabilised rapidly. 
The government in Taibei, therefore, has been mindful of the 
potential explosiveness of the issue.
The second problem which worried the KMT and which had been 
regarded as its Achilles heel, was the fear that peaceful talks 
might dismantle Taiwan's defence capability. Once negotiations 
were to start, the impression that tension in the Taiwan Straits
had been reduced would be created and there would no longer be a 
necessity for the US to sell defensive arms to Taiwan,as provided 
under the TRA. The PRC would then be in a stronger position to 
demand that the US and other countries do not sell advanced arms 
to Taiwan. Eventually, if Taiwan's defensive strength should be 
weakened, the PRC might risk a military adventure.
The third possible crisis was the danger to Taiwan's economic 
stability should negotiations begin. Hong Kong suffered from 
economic disturbance and agonising uncertainty during the Sino- 
British negotiations of 1982-84. In the case of Taiwan, it could 
be worse, as there would be no country to act as Taiwan's 
protector, in the way the British government protected Hong Kong. 
Foreign investment and local capital would certainly move to other 
parts of world. Emigration and a brain drain would be inevitable.
The fourth reason for the Taibei authorities refusing direct 
talks with Beijing was that they did not trust in the Communists 
to keep the promises implicit in the conditions the PRC has 
offered i.e.Ye Jianying's Nine-Point proposal and Deng Xiaoping's 
Six-Point assurance for "One Country Two Systems". Some people in 
Taiwan,however, argued that this policy was perhaps the best they 
could expect and they should consider it more carefully, provided 
Beijing could honour its commitments. But, the case of Tibet 
suggested that as circumstances changed, Beijing might break its 
word, and it also suggested that the proposal of One Country Two 
Systems could be a trap. According to the Agreement signed by the 
PRC and the Tibetan in 1951, on the peaceful liberation of Tibet, 
the Chinese would not alter the existing political system in 
Tibet and would not change the established status, functions and
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power of the Dalai Lama.(9) Tibet was given only "titular" 
autonomy, following Beijing's exerted pressure on it to undertake 
socialist transformation. Consequently, a mass uprising broke out 
in 1959. This is a painful example of peaceful talks producing 
negative results.
The fifth reason for the KMT's refusal to talk with the PRC, 
has been Beijing's repeated claim that the Taiwan issue to be 
solved according to the Hong Kong formula. As was discussed in 
chapter 5, the differences between the issues of Hong Kong and 
Taiwan made the Sino-British solution inapplicable. Hong Kong is 
a colony and Taiwan has its own government to conduct internal 
and external affairs. Furthermore the latter has a strong defence 
capability to deter Communist "invasion" and Hong Kong has none. 
As a colony the fate of Hong Kong is in the hands of the British, 
Taiwan, however, is still very much like an independent state, 
although it has suffered from official de-recognition in the 
international arena in the last two decades. Last but not least, 
with the Taiwan Straits as a natural barrier, Taiwan is not under 
such immediate threat from Beijing as is Hong Kong. Therefore the 
KMT could reject the CPC's demands.
Finally, after four decades of authoritarian rule by a semi- 
Leninist style party, the KMT, a considerable democratisation in 
Taiwan had at last emerged in the late 1980s. The change in the 
power distribution restrained the KMT government from freely 
handling vital issues such as unification without consulting the 
majority of people in Taiwan. After the authoritarian leaders, 
Chiang Kaishek and his son Chiang Chingkuo, disappeared, no one 
had the power to bring this sensitive issue openly on to the
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table for negotiation with the long-term archenemy. Not until a 
representative government to be democratically elected by the 
people of Taiwan, or the issue to be confirmed by a referendum, 
the chance to negotiate the future relations of Taiwan with the 
PRC would appear.
KMT'S COUNTER-OFFER TO THE REUNIFICATION
Although the above mentioned problems and anxieties have 
prevented direct negotiations between the KMT and the CPC, some 
subtle, yet important, shifts in the KMT's "Mainland Policy" have 
been implemented in the past few years. The Taiwan authorities 
have developed their policy towards Beijing's peaceful offensive 
in several counter-offers.
First, in rebuffing the NPC Standing Committee's "Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan", the KMT offered the defensive strategy of 
the so called "No contact, No negotiation, and No compromise" (10) 
In the first two years after the KMT formulated the "Three Noes" 
policy, any one who mentioned the unification issue in Taiwan was 
accused of "Wei-fei-xuan-chuan" (pro-Communism propaganda), and 
faced punishment.(11)
But the "Three Noes" policy was condemned by many overseas 
Chinese communities and foreign countries as too negative to meet 
the new international situation in East Asia. As a result,the KMT 
regime was seen as unreasonable and stubborn. When the KMT's 12th 
National Party Conference convened in March 1981, it recognised 
that its inflexible policy could damage its "National Images"[Guo 
Jia Xingxiang] and therefore started to re-adjust its defensive 
attitude towards the PRC's proposals. The Premier of the ROC, Sun
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Yunsuan, in his political report on "The Current National Policy 
for Unification", then suggested s
" ...... In keeping with the aspirations of Chinese
at home and abroad, our party has proposed unifying 
China on the basis of the doctrines and advocacies 
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, ( because ) developments on the 
two sides of the Taiwan Straits during the past 30 
odd years have proved that the 'Three Principles of 
the People' are suited to the national development 
of China. It can also solve the China problem and 
assure the freedom, affluence and happiness of the 
Chinese people. Therefore I call for unifying China 
under the principles of San Min Zhu Yi"(12)
The above argument, represented a new KMT strategy using the 
moderate-sounding slogan of "Unifying China under the Three Prin­
ciples of the People"(Sanmin Zhuyi Tongyi Zhongguo) to "decorate" 
its hard-line policy of "the Three Noes". The KMT proposed these 
ideals of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, as a basis for a future settlement of 
China's unification because, since 1979, the Chinese Communists 
had often expressed their respect for Dr. Sun, and regularly held 
celebrations on the "Double Tenth Day" - the KMT's National Day.
In September 1984, when the Sino-British Agreement on the 
future of Hong Kong was completed, the KMT, still took its hard­
line stance, declared that "all treaties and agreements made by 
the unlawful regime of the CPC bandits, will be regarded by the 
Government of the ROC on Taiwan as null and void." (13) However, 
under growing pressure from local Taiwanese for further political 
democratisation, Chiang Chingkuo delivered an important message 
of major party reform and to review his mainland policy in March 
1986. He claimed; "Times have changed, currents have changed, and 
our ideas and actions must change accordingly(14)TY\e phrase has 
thereafter, become a catchword for all promoters of new mainland 
policies and domestic reform programmes in Taiwan. To prove that
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"ideas and actions have changed", Chiang lifted Martial Law which 
had been in force since 1949. Meanwhile, Taiwan residents were 
permitted for the first time in nearly four decades, to visit 
relatives on the Chinese mainland via a third country. The people 
of the mainland over 70 were later allowed to visit relatives on 
Taiwan. Participation in international activities in the scienti­
fic and cultural fields, where the participants of Taiwan could 
be seen sitting side by side with representatives from Beijing, 
were also endorsed.
After the death of Chiang Chingkuo in January 1988, Taiwan 
and mainland communications were extended in many other respects. 
In July 1988, the KMT government drafted "the Current Mainland 
Communication Regulations" as a guideline for the management of 
affairs related to the mainland. Apart from setting up the travel 
regulations both sides of the Taiwan Straits, it also opened and 
legalised unofficial people-to-people communications in the fields 
of trade, investment, sport, publications, movies and academic 
exchanges.(15) Although Taibei still upheld the principle of no 
direct negotiations on the official level, the principles of no 
compromise and no contact proved impratical to implement.
According to records revealed in Beijing and Taibei, indirect 
trade increased from US$ 50 millions in 1979 to US$ 4.1 Billions 
in 1989.(16) Hong Kong became the third biggest trading partner 
of Taiwan. Since the PRC claims that Taiwan is part of China, 
imports from Taiwan were not considered international trade, but 
"Chinese products transferred from one place to other areas in the 
country".(1 7) Therefore all Taiwanese products were treated as 
locally manufactured goods with a special tariff. When travel to
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the mainland was permitted, many travellers were involved in some 
sort of trading or investment business. Taiwan became the biggest 
"foreign" investor in mainland China.(18) The PRC government has 
directly benefited by more than $ 2 Billions of hard currency 
from the people of Taiwan who visited China in the year of 1989 
along. (IP,) "Tai Bao" (the Taiwan compatriots) who were taunted as 
"Qian Bao" (Money Bags), could be found all over China.
The most sensational move taken by Taibei was sending Shirly 
Kuo, the Finance Minister, with a delegation of nine (including 
the President of the Central Bank, a Deputy Foreign Minister,) to 
Beijing for the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank in 
May 1989 . Kuo was the first official of the KMT government to set 
foot on the mainland since 1949.It was strongly rumoured that the 
PRC was planning to take the opportunity to demonstrate that the 
Taiwan authorities had abandoned the "Three Noes" policy and would 
eventually accept the model of "One Country Two Systems". (20) But 
when the Taiwan dele-gates arrived in Beijing, several hundred 
thousand students were occupying Tiananmen Square and the PRC 
leaders were in no mood, nor did they have the time, to pursue 
their propaganda purposes. Taibei, for its part, took the 
opportunity to argue that the CPC was being spurned by its own 
people, and should give up the "Four Cardinal Principles" as the 
basis for unification.(21)
Chiang Chingkuo's successor, Li Denghui, a native Taiwanese, 
became President of the ROC in Jan. 1988. In a certain sense, Li 
is in a better position to deal with Beijing's proposals on the 
Taiwan issue than was Chiang. That is because not only has Li 
less historical involvement with the CPC, but also he will not be
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accused of betraying the local population. At his first press 
conference after taking office in Feb. 1988, when he was asked 
about the national reunification issue, Li deliberately avoided 
mentioning the policy of "Three Noes". Instead, he asserted that 
future Taiwan-China relations should be concerned with the people 
of the ROC's interests as the first priority. He also rebutted 
the CPC's peaceful proposal which stated that the possibility of 
using military force against Taiwan would never be surrendered. 
Li argued; "if the Chinese Communists' overture of peaceful talk 
is sincere, why do they not solemnly renounce the use of force 
against the people of Taiwan. Otherwise how can people believe 
that peaceful negotiations will bring a peaceful life."(22) A few 
months later, on his first formal state visit to Singapore, the 
international press describing Li as " a President from Taiwan". 
He responded that it was "unsatisfactory, but acceptable, to be 
called the Taiwanese President".(23) It seems obvious that Li's 
flexible and practical attitude towards future relations with PRC 
could certainly reverse the disadvantages of the rigid & negative 
anti-Communist policy of the KMT.
When Li Denghui agreed to his Finance Minister attending the 
ADB annual meeting in Beijing, he instructed his Foreign Minister 
Lian Zhan to review the feasibility of the policy of "One Country 
Two Governments". Lian, also a native Taiwanese, was a notable 
and active supporter of the Taiwan independence movement in the 
US whilst reading for his advanced degree in the late 1960s. Lian 
looks to the West for inspiration, and unreservedly proclaims; 
"Our government's wishful hope is that foreign countries may yet 
recognise both us and the CPC on the mainland rather as they
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do the two Germanies." (24) Although the PRC was unhappy about the 
new initiative of "One Country Two Governments" from Taibei, it 
did not threaten the KMT with military might. Interestingly, the 
PRC was more concerned about another political proclamation made 
by Taiwan's opposition party, the DPP, which suggested holding a 
plebiscite to decide Taiwan's future relations with the mainland. 
The PRC sees Taiwan self-determination and Taiwan independence as 
synonymous, which challenging the basis of territorial integrity 
and sovereignty.
As has been analysed, Taibei's response to Beijing's olive 
branches of the last decade was rather cautious. The KMT has 
conducted its relations with Beijing strictly on the following 
principles: 1). Limited adjustment: The official statements have 
never abandoned the basic guideline of "Three Noes", although at 
the non-official people-to-people contact was permitted. 2). 
Careful selection of areas of openness: Only those dealings with 
the mainland are allowed, which could not directly jeopardise the 
KMT's rule and the security of Taiwan, i.e., indirect trade, 
individual trips to visit relatives on the mainland and cultural 
and sports contacts. 3). Step by step build-up of its informal 
relations with Beijing: The strategy pursued by the KMT is to 
take one small step, then wait until it is safe to take another; 
from the sidelines to the main stream; from one-way to dual 
inter-communication. 4). The retention of its defensive position 
vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists. Unless it could foresee a clear 
advantage, the KMT would never initiate a new policy to change 
existing Taiwan-China relations.
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B .  T A I W A N ’ S F O R E I G N  P O L I C Y  AND  
ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S .
The PRC's foreign relations were marked by a triumphant 
expansion in the 1970s, ranging from admission into the U.N. to 
the normalisation of relations with the United States. The 
de-recognition of the ROC by the US government was a decisive 
victory for Deng Xiaoping's new open door policy, initiated after 
his rehabilitation. From the viewpoint of international politics, 
the policy of One Country Two Systems is a continuation of the 
anti-Taiwan strategy of the PRC. (25) On the one hand, the PRC, 
tried to show its intention to compromise on the Taiwan issue, on 
the other, it fought stubbornly in the international arena to 
stifle Taiwan's external relations. It is clear that while making 
efforts to expand its foreign relations, Beijing has never over­
looked the aim of eventually gaining control over Taiwan by means 
of cutting its international connections.
This intention of the PRC is suggested by its unwillingness 
to tolerate any formal relations between Taiwan and countries 
which establish diplomatic relations with Beijing.(26) Moreover, 
foreign governments have had to recognise the PRC as the sole 
legal government of China or at least acquiesce in Beijing's 
claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Although the question of diplo­
matic recognition was not essential in a number of international 
organisations, (27) the PRC seems always to have insisted that its 
participation in the organisations is subject to the expulsion of 
the ROC. Faced with the great challenge from the PRC, an alterna-
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tive effort for developing unorthodox bilateral relations with 
countries by which it is not recognised diplomatically, was made 
by the Taiwan authorities.(28) The PRC government then repeatedly 
announced to the rest of world that China would not tolerate any 
country maintaining official or semi-official relations with 
Taiwan after it had established formal diplomatic relations with 
Beijing. In other words, the PRC would never stop trying to foil 
Taiwan's intention of being an independent political entity.
TAIWAN'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE CHIANG CHINGKUO PERIOD.
Since the ROC was expelled from the United Nations in 1972, 
its external relations have been handicapped by the loss of diplo­
matic recognition. In order to mitigate the effects of diplomatic 
isolation, the ROC government made concerted efforts to expand 
its non-political, especially commercial, relations with the rest 
of world. When dislocations between Taiwan's economic capacity 
and its political status became acute in the 1980s, the KMT had 
no other option but to adopt a less ideologically rigid foreign 
policy to meet the international reality.
1. A re-definition of the "One China” Principle.
In the 1970s, the ROC suffered gravely from diplomatic set­
backs, mainly because it adamantly insisted that she was the only 
authentic representative of all the people of China,a stand which 
the world community regarded as unrealistic. During the period 
when the US resorted to the containment policy against the PRC in 
the 50s and 60s, the "One China" policy did provide a good reason 
for the KMT to claim, with justification, to govern Taiwan pre­
dominantly with people from the mainland. The justification would
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disappear, should the ROC government claim to represent only the 
territory it controls. Throughout the 1970's, the greatest 
dilemma for the KMT leaders was how to maintain its international 
identity without changing its "One China" policy.
The Sino-US diplomatic normalisation and the PRC's peaceful 
negotiation proposal came on the same day, Jan. 1, 1979. Not only 
did the KMT government experience the utmost frustration, but it 
was also forced to review the rigid "One China" policy. Although 
the KMT regime explicitly rejected the concept of "Two Chinas" or 
"One China, One Taiwan", in his response to the Joint Communique 
on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and 
the PRC, Chiang Chingkuo made an important recommendation of Five 
Principles for conducting US-ROC relations in the post normalisa­
tion era. These five underlying principles include "reality, 
continuity, security, legality and governmental relations".(29) 
Instead of again claiming the KMT regime as sole legitimate ruler 
of the whole of China, Chiang clarified the five principles, in 
the light of the KMT's expectations for future ROC-US relations, 
as follows;
"...The complex nature of the activities of mutual 
interest to our two countries (the ROC and the US) 
makes it impossible for them to be carried out by 
any private organisation or individual.To facilitate 
the continuation and expansion of all relations 
between our two countries, it is necessary that 
government-to-government level mechanisms be set up 
in Taipei and Washington. This model alone can serve 
as the framework on which the future relationship of 
our two countries can be conducted."(30)
This was the first time the ROC government asking for retain 
"official" (government-to-government) relations with a country 
which had abandoned it to establish diplomatic relations with the
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PRC. When the US Congress later enacted the Taiwan Relations Act, 
the semi-official relations between Taibei and Washington were 
enshrined in the articles of the Act. For practical purposes, a 
"One China and Two governments" formula shapes US policy by which 
Taibei-Washington relations are maintained and which functions 
under the TRA. Since then the Taiwan authorities have not 
insisted that the ROC is "the sole legal government of China" 
when developing its external relations with other countries with 
which it has no diplomatic connections. The main task of Taiwan' s 
foreign policy became the promotion of its practical governmental 
relations with states that did not recognise it diplomatically.
2. Taking positive measures to up-grade Taiwan's international 
status as an independent political entity.
From very beginning, the negative "Three Noes" policy towards 
the PRC was not applied to relations with foreign countries or 
international organisations.In international affairs, Taibei took 
a "No Keep-off, No Evade, and No Give-up" policy to confront the 
PRC's diplomatic pressure. (31) As a result, both Taiwan and China 
participated in the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angles. Although 
Taibei was forced by the World Olympic Committee to take the name 
of "Chinese Taipei" and its flag and national anthem were banned 
in the games, the Taibei authorities, nevertheless, endured the 
humiliations, in order to show the world that the ROC on Taiwan 
was still an independent political entity. Substantially, the 
name of the "Taipei" team was less important than having the same 
rights as the other hundred and sixty two members to contest in 
the Olympic Stadium.(32) Such device for keeping the status of 
Taiwan equal with that of China in international activities has
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been a primary concern of the Taiwan government in the 1980s.
On the issue of whether to join new institutions or to retain 
its membership of some of the more politicized organisations, the 
KMT government technically adopts some expedient measures. For 
instance, in 1986 the ADB Executive Committee accepted the PRC's 
application to join the ADB. Taibei was informed that it could 
either remain in the ADB but change its name from the Republic of 
China to "Chinese Taipei" or be expelled. The Taiwan authorities 
did not make a swift decision. Instead, they challenged the ADB 
Executive Committee's right to invent a new name for a sovereign 
state and founding member of the Bank. The Executive Committee 
replied to the KMT that "Chinese Taipei" was not invented by the 
the ADB, as it had been used internationally (e.g.,at the Olympic 
Games). Taibei then claimed that the Olympics is a non-official 
organisation, but that only an independent state would have the 
right to attend the ADB. The KMT government regarded the "Chinese 
Taipei" device as a plot recommended by Beijing to make Taiwan 
appear to be a local government under its proposal of One Country 
Two Systems and as such it was utterly unacceptable. (33) To 
protect at being treated unfairly, Taibei absented itself from 
the ADB annual conference for two years. But soon after President 
Li Denghui came to off ice, he suggested that the ROC should return 
to this important international organisation and "Chinese Taipei" 
was, since 1988, tacitly accepted as the ROC's alternative name 
in the ADB.
3. Economic Strategy as an instrument of Taibei's Foreign Policy.
Being the tenth largest trading state and the second biggest 
foreign exchange reserve country in the world, Taiwan's economic
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prowess has its international advantage. The leaders in Taibei 
believed that a totally different economic system would make the 
integration of Taiwan by their Communist rivals more difficult. 
The widening of the economic gap between the two areas would also 
be less beneficial for Beijing. Furthermore, it would be more 
difficult for the PRC to interfere with economic than with 
political relations. A great proportion of economic relations are 
not always necessarily directly operated by governments. Dis­
guised under the "unofficial" orientation, the economic strategy 
would be less vulnerable to an "official" China on the mainland, 
challenge to Taiwan's new foreign policy.
In a conventional sense, the term diplomacy normally refers 
to either the process by which governments, acting through 
official agents, communicate with one another, or the modes and 
techniques of foreign policy affecting the international system. 
By implication, therefore diplomacy may be regarded as the art of 
state-to-state (government-to-government) interaction. In the 
contemporary world, however, these characteristics have gradually 
been attenuated by the emergence of growing international economic 
interdependence and an increasing volume of transnational commer­
cial activity.
Since the late 1970s, Taiwan has adopted economic diplomacy as 
a rather unorthodox approach to conducting its foreign affairs. 
As Chiang Chingkuo admitted s
"...... we are doing our best to maintain relations
with friendly countries and to expand in various 
ways our substantial relationships in the inter­
national community Our strategy is to forge the
political, economic, spiritual and other forces of 
our country into a strong combat entity."(34)
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Another top officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs also 
pointed out "In my thirty years of diplomatic service, diplomacy 
has seemed mostly concerned with trade, economic exchanges, and 
similar business, so even though we cannot prevent the continued 
erosion of official relations we can replace them with substan­
tive unofficial r e l a t i o n s (35) Consequently, Taiwan's interna­
tional trade and economic exchanges became the essential features 
of its external relations, replacing to a substantial degree, the 
traditional form of diplomacy.
TAIWAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST CHIANG CHINGKUO PERIOD
Throughout the period of Chiang Chingkuo's rule, Taiwan did 
not openly give up its long-term policy of "Anti-Communism and 
Mainland Recovery". But owning to internal and external pressure, 
a year before his death, Chiang finally announced major political 
reform. The proposals for the reform, outlined in six main areas, 
later allowed his successor, Li Denghui, to take a rather free 
hand in adjusting Taiwan's foreign policy.(36)
Despite embarking on certain new approaches to the expansion 
of external relations, no real break-through had been achieved in 
Taiwan's foreign relations before 1988. Apart from a handful of 
countries such as South Korea and South Africa, none of any other 
influential countries retained formal relations with Taiwan. 
Nonetheless, since Jan. 1988, following Chiang Chingkuo's demise, 
formidable obstacles to foreign diplomatic development have been 
removed. Two months after his inauguration, President Li Denghui 
broadly stated his government's future policies for improving 
Taiwan's external relations and domestic politics.(37) When asked
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about the ROC's new strategy for overcoming the problems of its 
isolation, Li replied frankly: "It would be inconceivable for us, 
simply to advocate an empty promise, or a remote dream to tackle 
current issues. In the future our foremost foreign policy concern 
will be the interests of our people".(38)Unlike his predecessors, 
Li Denghui supports participation in international activities 
which, he thinks, will be more likely to lead Taiwan back into 
the world community. Li believes his government should try its 
best to rejoin or remain in international organisations if 
possible. With this fundamental change in the strategy for 
foreign relations, "the spectre of Fatong" which dictated the 
outmoded One China and anti-Communist diplomacy, will gradually 
lose its importance as a factor dominating Taiwan's external 
relations.
Furthermore, a testing proposal was made by Wei Yung, the 
Director of the National Policy and Research Council, that the 
ROC government was ready to consider the possibility of "Cross 
Recognition" with those countries with which the Chinese 
Communists have formal relations. Wei said "Both West Germany and 
South Korea are able to have diplomatic relations with the vast 
majority of countries without being handicapped by the problem of 
national division. That is because they have separated the issue 
of national reunification from that of diplomatic recognition. 
Although the situation in Taiwan is a little different from that 
in other divided nations,it is still valuable for us to look into 
how the Germans and Koreans handle the issue of cross recognition 
and dual representation."(39) According to Wei, dual recognitions 
would not necessarily destroy the principle of One China, neither 
was the sovereignty of the nation overridden, simply because,
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before the conditions for unification are "ripe”, the governments 
of either side in a divided country should have equal rights to 
build their external relations with other states. The purpose of 
Wei's proposition, indeed, was to find a rationale to justify the 
government's new foreign policy and to ease the attacks from the 
conservatives inside the Kuomintang.
To strengthen its international influence, Taiwan set up a 
one billion dollar "Overseas's Economic Co-operation and Develop­
ment Foundation" in October 1988*(40) Third World developing 
countries will have priority in obtaining grants from the fund. 
In 1989, sixteen countries received economic aid from Taiwan and 
three African and Caribbean countries, Liberia, Belize, and 
Grenada established or re-established diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. As the PRC will only allow Taiwan to be considered a 
local administrative region of China and to retain non-official 
relations with other countries, it responded promptly by termina­
ting diplomatic ties with the aforementioned countries.(41)
The other important move that Taiwan took was to expand its 
economic relations with the Socialist bloc countries, including 
the former Soviet Union and Vietnam. It is true that hitherto 
Taiwan had consistently and adamantly opposed Communism at home 
and contacts with Communist states abroad. Chiang Chingkuo took 
his father's view that "Internally the ROC government should 
never compromise with the Chinese Communists. Externally they 
should never approach the Soviet Union. This is like two security 
locks, as long as we lock the doors and hold the keys tightly we 
are safe". (42) It is thus evident that dealing with Moscow was a 
contentious issue in Taiwan's foreign strategy.
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When Li Denghui approved Taibei's direct contacts with Moscow 
in Oct. 1988, there was an acrimonious debate on the subject. (43) 
The most influential figure in Taiwan's foreign policy in the 
last three decades, the Chief Secretary of the President's Office 
Shen Chanhuan, disagreed with Li, and was then forced to resign. 
Indeed, Taiwan had to be rather cautious in dealing with Moscow, 
delicately avoiding any possibility of up-setting Washington and 
Beijing. At that time,even a slight change in the attitude of the 
US towards Taiwan, or any suspicion in Beijing of the motivation 
behind the Taibei-Moscow contact could cause unnecessary damage.
In December 1989, Taibei put aside the principle of the One 
China policy and took a big step forwards towards assuming the 
status of a "de facto" independent political entity. In applying 
for re-entry into the international organisation of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), instead of using its 
official title of the ROC, it opted a new title "Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu"(the actual territory it controls) for the "GATT 
Custom's Operation Zones".(44) The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
commented: "Let the political football of the One China debate be 
in the court of the mainland. So long as we are politically 
stable, economically prosperous and military solid, no one can 
ignore us or deny our existence,no matter by what name we are
called."(45) In the early 1960's, Chiang Kaishek explained his 
strategy for mainland recovery as "Thirty Percent Military Might, 
and Seventy Percent Political Counter-attack."(46) The slogan 
proved futile as an attempt at anti-Communist propaganda and was,
in reality, just a fantasy of empty words seeming to promise a
return to the mainland. At the end of 1980s, however, the new
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slogan of "Thirty Percent Political Challenge and Seventy Percent 
Economic Counter-attack", initiated by Li Denghui, could be more 
meaningful as a framework for resisting the pressure of the PRC's 
peaceful offensive.
C .  ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S  AND T A I W A N ’ S 
S E L F - D E F E N C E  S T R A T E G Y
In the 1980s, despite the PRC's repeated claim that it would 
prefer to solve the Taiwan issue by means of negotiations under 
the formula of One Country Two Systems, leaders in Beijing, how­
ever, never concealed their intention of using force if necessary 
to achieve China's unification. Why should the Chinese Communists 
have to take these sharply contrasting measures of offering their 
"beloved compatriots" a peaceful proposal to solve their differ­
ences, while at the same time maintaining that it would, if the 
need arose, take the military offensive ? The reason is evident! 
without military pressure, the KMT group and the people of Taiwan 
would almost certainly not take any notice of the appeal for 
China's reunification from Beijing. Furthermore having a military 
option open could mean that the PRC is determined to repulse any 
attempt by a foreign power to wrest Taiwan from China. As Deng 
Xiaoping told Professor Lee Yuan-che, a Taiwanese Nobel laureate, 
"If we do not exert a little bit of military pressure on that 
handful of deviationists who choose to serve foreigners and 
prefer our country to be divided, one day Taiwan may again be 
taken over by foreigners." (4 7) The KMT did not share Deng's view,
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it argued that negotiations were the CPC's other type of war: 
when the Chinese Communists can not subdue their foes with guns, 
they then turn to a tactic of talks. The Nationalists, therefore, 
insisted that they were still facing the uncertainty of potential 
military threat from the Communists. Commenting on the PRC's 
peaceful proposal of One Country Two Systems, Taiwan government 
spokesman, Shaw Yuming stated: "It is undeniable that the Chinese 
Communist threat to the ROC has up to the present, not diminished 
in the least". (48) The ROC government, thus, justified itself in 
finding all possible defence measures to counter the PRC's 
military pressure.
In response to Beijing's tactics coupling threats with 
promises, Taiwan's defence strategy in the last decade employed 
many ploys to ensure its survival. The following three ploys are 
essential and need further discussions.(49)
1. Retaining the US Commitment to Taiwan's Security
No one would doubt that the firm US military commitment to 
protect Taiwan in 50's, 60's and 70's was one of the main factors 
that effectively deterred the People's Liberation Army from a 
military offensive against the Nationalists and the people of 
Taiwan. The crucial change in the PRC's language since Jan. 1979 
that "it is desirable that the Taiwan issue be solved by peaceful 
means rather than by armed force" stems largely from the resump­
tion of diplomatic relations between China and the US, the latter 
having accepted the three conditions for normalisation.(50) Two 
out of the three conditions actually concern the termination of 
the US military commitment to the protection of Taiwan. According 
to the Joint Communique on the establishment of Sino-American
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diplomatic relations, the US should no more play military role in 
Taiwan. In practice, however, the TRA confirmed that America 
would continue to be concerned for the island's safety and would 
supply defensive weapons to Taiwan. But the US assurances written 
in the TRA seem somewhat tarnished, if not completely discredited 
by the third Sino-US Joint Communique, signed on August 17, 1982, 
specifically stipulating that the US would reduce - and gradually 
end - arms sales to Taiwan. From the KMT's point of view, the US 
government could opt either for the rules of the TRA or the 
agreement of the August 17, Communique, in dealing with the issue 
of arms sales to Taiwan. "In the long run, how much the US will 
support the ROC militarily, no one can really tell" one of the 
KMT legislators warned.(51) In a certain sense, Taiwan's security 
would have to rely upon the goodwill of the US government and 
congress, this has gravely worried the KMT and the people of 
Taiwan.
To highlight the need for continuing US protection, both for 
the security of the island (indeed the KMT regime on Taiwan), and 
to serve US strategic interests in East Asia, the KMT has made 
strenuous efforts to demonstrate that Taiwan still faces mounting 
military threats from the CPC. It predicated that the PRC's soft 
peaceful initiatives combined with its hard stand of military 
intimidation was simply a stratagem to subdue its enemy without 
fighting a battle. It also suggested that the US decision-makers 
had been deceived by Deng Xiaoping and his fellow Communists. As 
a notable pro-KMT commentator, Hu Chiu-yuan, once noted: "So long 
as the military threat remains, proclaiming that One Country Two 
Systems formula will eventually disentangle the old complicated
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problems between the ROC government and the Chinese Communists is 
merely a ploy for dismantling the ROC's will to self-defence. 
Truly, it is no more than a device to pull the wool over naive 
American eyes on the proposal of the peaceful solution of the 
Taiwan i s s u e (52)
In the last ten years, the Taibei authorities have spent most 
of their time and resources in strengthening relations with the 
US. Their paramount aim was to secure the American commitment to 
Taiwan's security which the TRA had pledged. To influence US 
policy in East Asia, Taibei has funded numerous American agencies 
to lobby politicians to promote the island's security.(53)Echoing 
Taibei's arguments, these lobbyists have stressed particularly 
that the US should not merely emphasise the PRC's "intentions" of 
a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, rather it must also 
accurately calculate the "military capabilities" of the Chinese 
Communists. They warned that outside evaluations of the PRC's 
intentions were highly subjective and easily changed. Moreover, 
the US government was often reminded, that if the defence capabi­
lities of Taiwan were greatly downgraded, the Communists might be 
motivated by their military superiority to attack Taiwan. (54) In 
order to convince the US government that Taiwan was under serious 
military threat, the KMT even tolerated, since 1982, such Taiwan 
Independence organisations as "The Formosan Association in North 
America", to lobby the US public on support for Taiwanese self- 
rule and against a PRC take over of Taiwan. Much of the pressure 
from Congress to the executive department was also to push the US 
government to honour its promises, stipulated in the TRA of which 
concerning the safety of the people of Taiwan. (55) Indeed, how to 
retain US military commitment to protect Taiwan has been a main
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strategy for the ROC's Taiwan defence.
2. Developing Taiwan's Self-Defence System.
After the PRC planned to increase its military strength under 
the scheme of the Four Modernisations, relatively modernised air 
and naval weapon systems were steadily built-up in the 1980s.(56) 
On the contrary, suffering from political isolation in the world 
community, Taiwan found it difficult to gain access to advanced 
military equipment in order to upgrade its defence capabilities. 
Some strategists have further pointed out that the total military 
imbalance between the PRC and Taiwan was, in fact, widening in 
the past decade.(57) Although under the PRC's peaceful proposal, 
Beijing promised that Taiwan would be allowed to retain defence 
force after Taiwan re-unified with the mainland, nonetheless, the 
PRC government had made concerted efforts to persuade the world 
community that no country should sell advanced weapons to Taiwan. 
In many cases, using its advantage in international political 
status, the PRC had put great pressure on those countries that 
Taiwan attempted to approach for arms purchasing. Other than the 
US, and cautious supply of two submarines from Holland, Taiwan 
failed to buy any substantial defence items from Western powers 
such as France, Germany and the Great Britain.(58)
The leaders of the KMT realised that to meet the foreseeable 
threat of the PLA and to overcome the difficulties of obtaining 
advanced defence equipment, Taiwan had no alternative but to 
develop a self-sufficient defence system. The KMT has determined 
that the modernisation of Taiwan's defence system should be the 
first priority, although Taiwan's defence industry was unable,
282
and it was in effect unnecessary, to outproduce the PRC in terms 
of quantity. The KMT believed that their military capability 
should, at least, match the PLA in the quality of its weapons and 
be superior in the training of its military personnel. Taibei 
decided to pursue a military strategy of a "strategically long­
term and tactically quick-ending" policy, i.e., to build an elite 
strong force, and to ensure its readiness to take on the PLA. (59) 
Following its economic development, Taiwan decided to increase, 
at what ever the cost, its military ability to deter the PLA from 
a military adventure. Since Sino-US diplomatic relations were 
normalised in 1979, the KMT has redoubled its efforts on national 
defence. The defence budget of the ROC government in Taiwan for 
1988-89, for instance, came to US$6.7 billion, and this was 
almost US$ 1 billion more than the PRC's military budget in the 
same fiscal year. (60) If all defence-related expenditures are 
taken into account, the defence allocation reached about 52% of 
the Taiwan government's US$ 20 billion budget. On a per capita 
basis, the island's defence spending is around US$ 200 compared 
to the PRC's US$ 6. Taiwan had and still has one of the highest
defence expenditures of any country in the world. As Taiwan's GNP
is only one-tenth the size of the PRC's, the KMT is clearly
prepared to spend a great deal on defence and to show its deter­
mination not to compromise with the 1?RC,(61)
Such obvious preference given to high defence priority so as 
to check possible PRC military action is based on the KMT's
perception of an unabated threat. When questioned by opposition 
legislators whether it was a wise policy to increase Taiwan's 
defence expenditure while the PRC was not only planning military 
reforms e.g. reducing by 1 million troops and decreasing military
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deployment in Fujian areas, but also proposing to Taiwan a peace­
ful settlement their disputes, the Premier of the ROC government, 
Yu Guohua, rebuffed any suggestion of cutting the huge military 
budget.(62) To the Nationalists, maintaining a high budget allo­
cation on defence is indispensable for survival. The peaceful 
proposal of One Country Two Systems did not decrease the Taiwan's 
military spending at all.
3. Planning to Build Nuclear Weapons
As Taiwan's military policies have only defensive objectives 
and have only to consider deterrent effectiveness, developing 
nuclear weapon could be a very tempting option. Since Taiwan's 
archenemy, the PRC, possesses nuclear weapons, and has threatened 
to use military force against Taiwan, would the ROC on Taiwan be 
justified in having nuclear weapons ? Furthermore since the 1968 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by the US and the former 
Soviet Union guaranting non-nuclear nations protection from those 
with nuclear weapons has not been signed by the PRC,^J^and since 
none of the nuclear powers recognises the ROC diplomatically, is 
Taiwan protected by the treaty ? These two questions are often 
raised with regard to Taiwan's self-defence strategy.
In respect of the first question, the answer is obviously "no", 
although Taiwan has the technology and money to build nuclear 
bombs, and, indeed, until 1988, did secretly develop nuclear 
weapons. However, in early January 1988, Chang Hsianyi, the Vice­
director of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research at Longtan, 
Taiwan, mysteriously disappeared. Few days later, the US govern­
ment confirmed that Chang had safely left Taiwan for America with
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documents of Taiwan's nuclear projects.(tf^The KMT government was 
embarrassed and in great wrath over the incident as it had always 
denied that the ROC had any plan to develop nuclear weapons. In 
the end, Taibei abandoned its nuclear programme at Washington's 
behest.(65)
In terms of the second question, indeed, no one can be assured 
that Taiwan is under US nuclear protection. However, Taiwan may 
not need nuclear weapons for defence. Should Taiwan develop 
nuclear weapons, it would certainly provoke Beijing and hamper 
the US-Taiwan relations, in particular, the PRC has promised that 
it will uphold the principle of no first use of these destructive 
weapons. In fact, Taiwan's pursuit nuclear weapons could actually 
provide an opportunity for the PRC to take military action. Most 
importantly, it would discredit the KMT government's efforts to 
win over the international community to support Taiwan's 
political cause, the main point of which seem to be to refuse 
Beijing's reunification offers.
D .  ONE C O U N T R Y  TWO S Y S T E M S  AND T A I W A N ’ S 
P O L I T I C A L  D E V E L O P M E N T
It would be inaccurate to say that Taiwan's political develop­
ment in recent years was due entirely to the repercussions of the 
policy of One Country Two Systems. However, like the exercise of 
political democratisation in Hong Kong, the progress of Taiwan's 
political modernisation would certainly re-shape the meaning and 
contents of the PRC's strategy for reunification.(66)
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The changes in Taiwan's politics in the past decade, were 
remarkable, especially after 1986. The autocratic "dynasty" of 
the Chiangs had finally ended following the death of Chiang 
Chingkuo in January 1988. After forty years of authoritarian rule 
the KMT was at last forced to accept some compromise with the 
opposition. The forty-year-old decree of martial law was lifted. 
The prohibitions on the formation of political parties and on the 
publishing of new newspapers was dismantled.The "Long Parliament" 
which enabled the KMT to dominate, with political power exclu­
sively in the hands of mainlanders, has been phased out. And most 
significantly, the KMT has granted permission to the people of 
Taiwan to travel to mainland China. Apart from internal political 
pressure, these new political measures were, to a great extent, 
directly or indirectly, related to the PRC's peaceful proposal. 
In other words, the development of Taiwan's democratisation is 
interlocked with the policy of One Country Two Systems.
The PRC's changing policy towards Taiwan in the last decade 
has offered an opportunity, which allows the KMT government to 
opt for a reform programme. Beijing's initial proposal has, on 
the one hand, stimulated the KMT leaders into pursuing reform and 
democratisation faster, in order to justify their rejection of 
peaceful talks, to draw the attention of the outside world and to 
widening the gap in economy and politics between the mainland and 
Taiwan. On the other hand, any subsequent success of the reform 
will reduce political pressure from the opposition inside Taiwan. 
The opposition groups have been using the ideas of plebiscite and 
Taiwan independence to challenge the KMT, and to prove its 
incompetence in handling external relations and the unification 
issue. (67) The KMT has been aware that political reform would be
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the best way to resist Communism from the mainland and separatism 
from inside Taiwan.
Throughout the four decades of its rule in Taiwan, the KMT 
has confronted with a dilemma; it could neither give up its claim 
to sovereignty over mainland China, nor openly support Taiwan 
independence. As the former Chairman of the opposition party, 
Huang Hsin-chieh, pointed out; "For the past 40 years, there has 
been one thing our government always talked of but has never done 
anything about, that is 'Mainland Recovery', and there is one 
thing it has always been pursuing but never dared to speak about, 
that is 'Taiwan Independence.'"(68) Huang's comment, of course, 
was meant ironically, to show how absurd are the excuses the KMT 
has made for ruling Taiwan undemocratically. He did not actually 
mean that the KMT has practically endorsed Taiwan independence.
The reform granted in Taiwan after 1986, has simultaneously 
emphasised two main points;the so called internal democratisation 
and the open door for travellers to the mainland. These two 
synchronised steps of liberalisation, have been taken in "symme­
trical action" by the KMT regime, because the dilemma that of "no 
unification, no separation", must be tackled simultaneously, 
otherwise, the conflict of interests among different sub-groups, 
which separated the Taiwanese from the mainlanders,would paralyse 
the KMT's power functions.(69) If the government were inclined 
only to domestic political democratisation, it would immediately 
face a challenge to the legitimacy of the regime on Taiwan. The 
majority i.e.,the Taiwanese, undoubtedly would no longer tolerate 
the prolonged undemocratic political structure, and the KMT, how­
ever reluctantly, would have to review the vitality and legality
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of the Constitution which has long been ridiculed as the writings 
of a Rip Van Winkle (the KMT's Blue Print for Mainland Recovery). 
Should the Taiwanization of the KMT be completed too hastily, the 
conservatives and the military would, most likely, intervene in 
Taiwan's internal politics,and an unstable situation would become 
inevitable. On the other hand, if the KMT merely considered the 
interests of the minority i.e., the mainlanders, and opened the 
door for those who were longing to visit their relatives on the 
mainland, the KMT regime might still be regarded by the local 
Taiwanese as an evil refugee government. The Taiwanese have been 
particularly apprehensive that they might one day be betrayed by 
the KMT,while it and the CPC make a deal behind closed doors. (70)
The KMT leaders' real expectation was that the reform would 
extend their domination of politics in Taiwan. However, due to 
changes in the socio-economic conditions, the well-educated local 
elite has decided to acquire new concepts of the role of politics 
in their lives and new goals for which they may strive. (71) On 
September 28, 1986, before the KMT officially lifted Martial Law 
and the ban on forming political associations, 283 anti-KMT acti­
vists established a new political party, the Democratic Progress­
ive Party. Instead of suppressing it, the KMT was then forced to 
change its long-held policy of "no party outside the Party, no 
faction within the Party", and has had to tolerate the formation 
of the new party. (72) The name of the DPP was a compromise. 
Originally the opposition leaders planned to name the new party 
"the Taiwan Democratic Party". However, both the KMT and the CPC 
have repeatedly threatened that any person overtly supporting 
Taiwan independence would be destroyed by "all proper means".
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Therefore,in order to avoid a premature clash with the government 
and over-provoking the PRC, neither the word "Taiwan" nor "China" 
was used. Perhaps this was a symbol of real "progress" in Taiwan's 
politics.
Many people, including the KMT and the DPP leaders, believe 
that the best relationship for Taiwan and mainland China in the 
foreseeable future would be to retain a situation of non­
unification. But changes in international factors and internal 
politics have compelled the people in Taiwan to realise the needs 
of further conciliation(normalisation) of Taiwan-China relations. 
Despite the attitudes and intentions towards bilateral relations 
are, as yet, far from reaching a consensus agreement, the varia­
tions of opinion could be illustrated as follows:(73)
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Unification by 3 Taiwan
force ii Independence
1
i
2 ----------- > j
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------------- 1---------
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Judging from the above spectrum, one can see that unification 
and independence are the two extreme solutions. The more the PRC 
emphasises the issue of unification, the more tension and anxiety 
emerge in Taiwan. The voice of Taiwan independence was, by and 
large, a reaction to anxiety about political exploitation and 
coercion. When the PRC offered the policy of One Country Two
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Systems to solve the issue, the people of Taiwan responded more 
actively than the government of the KMT, and eventually forced 
the authorities to take the conciliatory measure of granting 
political liberalisation. As a consequence, limited contact with 
the PRC has been achieved. Since 1987 many non-governmental or 
semi-official relations have developed, even though the model of 
One Country Two Systems was known to be unpopular with the people 
of Taiwan. The tendency of Taiwan/China relations has already been 
made clear: should the PRC further moderate its measures towards 
Taiwan, the people of Taiwan would show themselves more amicable 
and the solution of the Taiwan question could become easier. By 
extending mutual respect, for example, by recognising the right 
of Taiwan to co-exist with the PRC and to enjoy the same status 
in the international community, it may be possible later to reach 
a situation of total reconciliation. In fact, more and more 
people consider that the models of confederation or federation to 
to be the alternatives for One Country Two Systems proposal.(74)
Further possible non-compulsory ways of amalgamating two 
political entities or social systems have been discussed in the 
academic field. The functionalist theory has provided a profound 
rationale, having turned the governmental and non-governmental 
sectors' attention to economic development.(75) Nations, in the 
last decades, sought to establish either national unification, 
domestic stability, or military security, seem uniformly ready to 
embrace material progress through active membership in the world 
economy. If this hypotheses is supported by fact, then the 
emerging atmosphere of economic fusion could positively enhance 
the relations between Taiwan and China. Despite the setback caused
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by the Tiananmen Square incident, the economic reform and open- 
door policy of the last ten years, had certainly strengthened the 
tendency of reintegration of the PRC's economic regions. If the 
functionalism develops further, the general international 
environment in the area will encourage the PRC to pursue economic 
interests. At the same time, the continuing stability of military 
and political conditions and retaining of the status quo of non­
unification may be more attainable.
Indeed, one should not neglect to point out that there is no 
political interest or reason for the people of Taiwan to support 
the notion of reunification. When Taiwan has eventually achieved 
its goal of democracy, a representative government might positi­
vely respond to the China's offer regarding future Taiwan-China 
relations. However, if Chinese leaders still insist on eventual 
seizure of Taiwan, then they may both ruin the island and destroy 
their long dreamed aim of China's reunification. As the Chinese 
philosopher Lao Zi said 2,500 years ago, "Ruling a big country is 
like cooking a small fish, too much handling will spoil it".
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CHAPTER 8 C O N C L U S I O N
Over the past decade, the PRC's policy towards reunification 
with Taiwan has changed both in principle and in application. The 
impact of the One Country Two Systems policy on the Taiwan issue 
has been conspicuous in these changes. Since the policy was pro­
posed, tensions between Taiwan and mainland China have reduced 
significantly. The initiative also symbolised a new mutual under­
standing over the Taiwan issue between Beijing and Washington in 
the post normalisation period. More evidently, it enabled China 
to settle the issues of Hong Kong and Macao in a peaceful manner. 
The One Country Two Systems formula has, indeed, been a strategy 
of the PRC's internal,as well as external policy,towards national 
reunification in the 1980s. Of the possible futures for Taiwan, 
and the policy options available to mainland China, it seems 
obvious that Beijing's current policy of One Country Two Systems 
has a deep impact on the situation in East Asia and in the Taiwan 
Straits in particular. Though this peaceful initiative has so far 
failed to produce a final settlement of the Taiwan issue, never­
theless, both the PRC and the ROC governments are slowly working 
out mechanisms for increasing contacts, and it behoves Beijing to 
remain positive on the reunification issue. In this conclusion, 
apart from summarising the prime arguments of the study, the 
problems of Taiwan-Mainland relations under the new trend of 
developments across the Straits, will be considered.
The PRC has repeatedly argued that it has every right to gain 
control over Taiwan, using such reasons as; Taiwan is an insepar-
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able part of China; the people of Taiwan are patriotic and have 
an earnest desire to reunite with people on the mainland; and the 
issue is an internal affair. All these reasons have often been 
applied by the PRC to back-up the One Country Two Systems policy. 
However, many contentious problems, as revealed in this research, 
indicate that the controversial Taiwan issue is more complicated 
than Beijing has suggested, and is more difficult to solve than 
the PRC would anticipate. In other words, Beijing's stated 
position has to be distinguished from the actual facts entangling 
the Taiwan issue. The One Country Two Systems policy, Beijing has 
argued, is the best,if not the unique,way to settle the difficult 
issue of Taiwan.From the point of view of the Taibei authorities, 
however, the policy is no more than a bauble, if not purely a 
ploy, and credible neither to the Chinese people on either side 
of the Taiwan Straits, nor for the aim of national reunification. 
In reality, as the study concludes, this policy reflects a new 
battle in the long war of (a). intranational antagonism between 
the two regimes of the PRC on the mainland and the ROC in Taiwan; 
and (b). international contentions over how to peacefully solve 
the Taiwan issue. It is a distinctive paradox that,after a decade 
since it was first proposed, it is void of results (in terms of 
China's reunification), but full of consequences (in terms of 
domestic and external reconciliation).
The question of Taiwan is compounded of historical, domestic, 
international, and ideological factors. After having examined 
these factors in the analytical framework of the four arenas, it 
becomes apparent that the fundamental problem is the insuperable 
intransigence of the PRC, the ROC, the local Taiwan inhabitants,
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and the international powers. Any overture proposed for the 
peaceful settlement of the dispute will inevitably have to deal 
with the interwoven particularities of these thorny issues and 
the intricate conflicts of interest among the parties involved. 
The five "issues", argued in Chapter one, are still the most 
obvious problems of the Taiwan question. In applying the policy 
of One Country Two Systems, the PRC has tried to play down these 
crucial problems, but the inherent difficulties will ultimately 
have to be confronted.
The PRC argument that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China 
is historically weak. Till the late 17th century,Taiwan developed 
its own history,little influenced by China; rather,the aborigines 
and the European colonial powers played the key roles.The Chinese 
from Fujian and Guangdong who, over the centuries, crossed the 
Taiwan Straits and settled on the island, harboured no particular 
political desires.(1) Like those millions of emigrants who went 
to South-East Asia and other parts of the world, they were merely 
looking for a place to earn a better living. The majority of 
people in Taiwan are culturally Han Chinese, but after having 
suffered from maladministration under the Manchus, enduring half 
a century of Japanese colonial rule, and a further four decades 
of separation from China in the post World War II period (except 
in 1945-49), a sense of opposition to rulers from outside, i.e. a 
proto-type of nationalism (separatism) perhaps, has increasingly 
emerged in Taiwan. While proposing the idea of One Country Two 
Systems, Deng Xiao-ping emphasised that the history of Taiwan 
should not be neglected. The dilemma confronting Beijing,however, 
is that the historical record does not support the claims made by 
the PRC for sovereignty over Taiwan. On the contrary, it suggests
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that the island is not quite a piece of China's inalienable 
territory: it would be more appropriate to say,it is an unsettled 
frontier of China.
After the PRC was established, Beijing constantly swore to 
liberate Taiwan by force; and this was completely different from 
the previous policy of the CPC which had supported Taiwan 
independence. Before the Nationalists retreated to the island, 
the CPC's position towards Taiwan amounted, in effect, to what 
might be called "One System (Communism) and Two Countries (Taiwan 
and China)". When Chiang Kai-shek decided to move his defeated 
government to Taiwan, the unfinished Civil War was extended to 
the Taiwan Straits area. The leaders of the new PRC determined to 
rid themselves of the KMT remnants, and its Taiwan policy changed 
accordingly, from support for a separate Taiwan nation to that of 
a new policy, the goal of which was the inclusion of Taiwan in 
what might be called "One Country (the People's Republic) and One 
System (Communism)". The PRC's peaceful proposal after 1979,which 
has been articulated in the phrase of "One Country (the PRC) Two 
Systems (Capitalism and Socialism)",becomes the Communists' third 
adjustment to settle the issue between the mainland and Taiwan.
Initially, the One Country Two Systems policy was conceived 
as a solution to the Taiwan question, but it was first applied to 
settle the Hongkong and Macao issues. The original meanings of 
the policy were enshrined in official documents and the speeches 
of PRC leaders made during the past decade. Most notably, Article 
31 of the Constitution revised in 1979, Marshal Ye Jianying's 
"Nine-Point Proposal" and Deng Xiaoping's "Six-Point Assurance" 
were unprecedented measures for such a Socialist country as China
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overtly to accommodate to the Capitalist system. The concepts of 
One Country Two Systems are ideologically unorthodox for the the 
CPC, and certainly represent an imaginative creation for laying 
claim to sovereignty over territories which are not under the PRC 
rule.
The settlement of the Hong Kong and Macao issues marked a 
pivotal point of the One Country Two Systems policy. No longer 
was it a theoretical initiative for reunifying China: it became a 
feasible policy for national reunification. The concrete contents 
of Beijing's Agreements with London and Lisbon, imply a viable 
structure for the co-existence of the two adverse systems of
Capitalism and Socialism. The policy implementation indications 
of these Agreements have also given a new importance to foreign 
relations between the PRC and its counterparts involved in
disputes with China over territorial integrity. Although the 
issue of Taiwan remains substantially different from the Hongkong 
and Macao problems, the One Country Two Systems solution already 
provides a living example for the future settlement of the Taiwan 
issue. Substantially, Beijing has stated that negotiations should 
be conducted on a Party-to-Party basis and that Taiwan should 
enter the PRC as a "Special Administrative Region", but continue 
its existing political, economic and social system, its external 
relations with quasi-diplomatic character, and even retain its
own army, for a period of no less than half a century.
In the 1950s and 60s, the Taiwan problem was a main subject 
of Sino-US confrontation and a barometer of the interactions 
between Beijing and Washington. During the contentious years of 
the Cold War period, both peaceful and non-peaceful measures were
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considered by the PRC leaders to solve the Taiwan issue, but 
neither the US nor the KMT would give up Taiwan. There were two 
hot crises that led Beijing and Washington to the brink of war. 
Nonetheless, the prolonged tension, or as it could perhaps be 
considered,a mutually understood stand off, was maintained in the 
area. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, international politics 
changed drastically. Due to the Sino-Soviet rifts and the growing 
Soviet military threat, the PRC leadership perceived that the 
USSR had replaced the US as China's prime enemy, and a US-China 
rapprochement would serve the PRC's strategic interests. The US 
also realised that to "play the China Card" to offset Soviet 
military ambitions was becoming not only possible but necessary. 
The Sino-US reconciliation, therefore, was put in train. Because 
the global strategic issues had become more salient, the question 
of Taiwan, though still remaining a main obstacle to the 
improvement of relations between the PRC and the US, became less 
significant and was temporarily put aside. However, by the time 
the Sino-US normalisation was accomplished on January 1, 1979, a 
tacit mutual understanding that China would settle the Taiwan 
issue without resort to the use of force was reached by both 
sides. In return, the US would not directly challenge the PRC 
claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. To a large extent, the proposal 
of the One Country Two Systems policy is a new strategy of the 
PRC in response to the international consequences of the 1970s.
From the early 1980s, Sino-US relations underwent a number 
of complex changes. In 1981 - 1982, Washington considered setting 
up strategic cooperation with Beijing, in order to check the 
military expansion of the USSR. But due to many shifts occurring 
in the Washington-Moscow-Beijing tripartite relationship after
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1983, the need for a Sino-US strategic alliance diminished, and 
the issue of Taiwan in Sino-US relations was also affected. In 
response to the policy of One Country Two Systems, the US had 
maintained,throughout the 1980s, a positive attitude, while still 
up-holding some fundamental principles: it would not play any 
role as mediator in China's unification; nor would it force 
Taibei to negotiate with Beijing. More importantly, America would 
not support a specific outcome of China's unification, but might 
act to ensure the peaceful resolution of the issue. Because of 
this steadfast stance, Beijing still thinks that a potential US 
intervention in the Taiwan issue is the greatest obstacle to the 
aim of recovering the island.
As has been discussed, the KMT, trapped by its own political 
system in Taiwan, repeatedly refuted the coaxing tactics of the 
Communist peaceful initiative in the early 1980s. However, the 
"Three Noes" policy in the face of Beijing's blandishments 
appeared over-defensive at first, and self-defeating later. While 
the KMT vigilantly defended its policy of refusing contact, 
compromise and negotiation with the CPC, a substantial number of 
people in Taiwan were motivated to travel or expand business in 
China by nostalgia, curiosity or profit seeking. Although the KMT 
kept harping on the unreliable nature of the Communists, Taibei 
finally dropped its policy, rigidly held for nearly four decades 
of banning any one from setting foot on the mainland. The fast 
increasing two-way trade across the Taiwan Straits and the 
roaring success of the family-reunion activities forced the KMT 
to be more open and more positive in its mainland policy. The so- 
called "Mainland Fever"(Dalu Re), with its increasing momentum of
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contact with the mainland,an unstoppable initiative from ordinary 
people, became an epidemic in Taiwan.(2) Not until the bloody 
suppression of the demonstrators in Beijing in June 1989 could 
the government in Taibei persuade its people not to overdo the 
rush to the mainland. It is hard to believe that without such a 
policy as One Country Two Systems, the above-mentioned changes 
would ever have been possible.
Other than the fast development of personal contacts and 
trade links between mainland China and Taiwan, the strengths of 
the new reunification policy of the PRC had an immense impact on 
internal politics on Taiwan. Under the challenge of Beijing's 
peaceful initiative, Taibei worked hard to avoid being depicted 
as inept and inert in handling the national reunification issue. 
However, the anti-KMT activists among the people of Taiwan who 
have long claimed that the island is being undemocratically ruled 
by the KMT, argue that Beijing's unification overtures do not 
consider Taiwanese political rights, nor respect their wishes. 
Warnings were also given by these people that the One Country Two 
Systems arrangement would either merely prolong the minority rule 
of the KMT, or lead to the betrayal of the local residents by the 
two parties, since the Chinese Communists are only interested in 
dealing with the Nationalists. To resist pressure from the PRC 
and to ease the internal antagonisms, Chiang Ching-kuo, then the 
President of the ROC, launched a major political reform in 1986. 
To gain leverage, the reform has not only been pursuing a policy 
of Taiwanization (allowing the KMT to seek support from the grass 
roots in Taiwan), but more importantly, it seeks to widen the 
differences in the economic and political systems of Taibei and 
Beijing, so that the One Country Two Systems policy becomes leiss
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attractive. Although the PRC might not have foreseen that its 
initiative for China reunification would accelerate political 
democratisation in Taiwan, yet, this has been another consequence 
of the One Country Two Systems proposal.
The Tiananmen massacre on 4th June 1989 marked a serious set­
back for the PRC's internal politics and external relations. When 
the tragedy occurred, the Taibei authorities felt vindicated in 
their rejection of Beijing's overtures for reunification. If, 
unlike the Communist regimes of the East European countries and 
the USSR which have rapidly collapsed in the past few years, the 
CPC can retain power, then the formula of One Country Two Systems 
will, in the foreseeable future,be maintained as China's official 
policy towards reunification with Taiwan. However, under changing 
world circumstances and with the situation between mainland China 
and Taiwan still deadlocked, four serious difficulties of the 
formula are apparent.
First, there is no reason to be sceptical about the repeated 
protestations of successive leaders in Beijing that they regard 
reunification as a sacred duty, and would even contemplate force 
to accomplish it if peaceful means were thwarted. However, the 
longer the One Country Two Systems policy is being advanced as 
the favoured option for national reunification, the less likely 
becomes any attempt by the PRC to impose a solution by force. In 
particular, as the unpopularity and vulnerability of the govern­
ment of the PRC has been clearly revealed by the need to resort 
to bullets to control civilians, strong doubt has been raised ini 
Taiwan (as well, indeed, as in Hong Kong and Macao) as to whether 
peaceful reunification will bring the people a peaceful lif<e*
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Since the massacre, Beijing has consistently argued that it does 
not contemplate the use of force against the people of Taiwan, 
but that, by retaining the option of the use of force,it seeks to 
ensure that Taiwan will not be taken over by foreign powers.(3) 
Yet, unless Beijing formally announces that the army will not be 
used, promises of non-interference under the arrangement of One 
Country Two Systems will appear hollow and the KMT will continue 
to challenge the PRC's sincerity with regard to peaceful 
reunification. Moreover, since the KMT terminated the so-called 
"Period of National Mobilisation for Suppressing Communist 
Rebellion", signifying its determination not to use force in the 
process of settling differences with the CPC, it has demanded a 
similar renunciation by Beijing. But, the PRC is fully aware that 
open renunciation of its military option towards Taiwan, would 
mean "the extraction of tiger's teeth". "It is obvious that some 
elements in Taiwan are opposing us with foreign encouragement, 
and we must not tie our hands when tackling the issue", was Deng 
Xiaoping's bellicose response to the demand for abandoning the 
use of armed force.(4) Nevertheless, it is awkward for Beijing to 
commit itself to a peaceful solution while still avowed to war 
with Taiwan.
Second, as the KMT perceives that the device of One Country 
Two Systems is more than a mere ploy, they appreciate that,should 
they negotiate with the Communists on the proposal, the Nation­
alists could write themselves out of history. Taking the 1989 
popular uprising as the greatest propaganda opportunity, the 
KMT's media could not resist gloating that the ROC achieves 
unprecedented prosperity in Taiwan under a system guided by Dr. 
Sun Yatsen's Principles, while at the same time, the mainland
under the Communist system has totally failed both in politics 
and economy and the CPC has been seriously humiliated by its own 
people. The government in Taibei, headed by President Li Denghui, 
taunted "the Communists have pledged that the so-called One 
Country Two Systems policy will be sustained for at least fifty 
years, but the people on the mainland might not tolerate the 
Communist regime for another five years or even five months. How 
can the CPC inspire our confidence in its promises ?",(5) In the 
past two years, Taibei has tried hard to work out a more positive 
proposal for its mainland policy. The fundamental positions of 
such a policy include: a). One China, Two Areas, Two Political 
Entities; b). Peaceful and Democratic Reunification of China; and 
c). The timing and format of reunification must first respect the 
rights and interests of the Taiwan people and safeguard their 
security and welfare.(6) On the face of it, this proposal is a 
revision of the PRC's formula of One Country Two Systems. 
However, there is one essential point: the KMT still insists, in 
effect, that it is the legitimate government of China, while at 
the same time, allowing that the Beijing regime could be accepted 
as a political entity which controls the mainland area. In other 
words, Taibei has suggested a "one country two political entities 
in two areas" concept based on a pragmatic charaterisation of the 
political reality across the Taiwan Straits, while allowing 
sufficient "creative ambiguity" for each side to live with*(7) 
But Beijing views this as a move in the opposite direction from 
the one which the CPC wants. The leadership of the PRC regards 
with particular suspicion this "Taiwan reality" policy of paying 
lip service to the idea of "One China", while vigorously seeking 
new grounds for indefinitely postponing national reunification.,
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However, it seems that, by making this counter proposal, the KMT 
has seized the initiative over the ramification issue.
Third, the political liberalisation in Taiwan, first started 
in 1986, has become an irreversible process. Especially after the 
death of Chiang Ching-kuo, political reforms put forward by Li 
Denghui, have speeded up. The Constitutional link with the 
mainland will be seriously weakened, since the KMT government has 
promised that all the surviving mainland-elected representatives 
of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan will have to 
retire and be replaced by new,locally elected deputies.(8) As the 
KMT prepares its final session of Taiwanization, the opposition 
party(the DPP) increases its pressure to opt for independence and 
to aspire to a seat in the United Nations, making these the two 
main issues in Taiwan's current politics. To the PRC, the issues 
are seen as being in opposition to the One Country Two Systems 
policy, because they signify that Taiwan will not acknowledge 
Beijing as its central government, nor should any other power act 
and speak for the inhabitants of Taiwan in international bodies.
The last point is perhaps the most important. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union has dramatically reduced Beijing's ability to 
play off Washington against Moscow as contending corners of what 
was once regarded as a strategic triangle. With the diminishing 
number of Communist regimes elsewhere in the world, the leaders 
in Beijing are having tremendous battles to resist the so-called 
"Peaceful Evolution" (Heping Zhuangbian). The catch-phrase, which 
is synonymous with de-Communisation, has haunted the Chinese 
Communists like a nightmare. Since the 1989 crackdown, the term 
"Peaceful Resolution" applied to the Taiwan issue under the One
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Country Two Systems policy has been mentioned less often than 
"Peaceful Evolution",seen as encouraging China to follow the East 
European nations and the Soviet Union and shake off Communism. A 
specific result of the PRC's loss of international options caused 
by the demise of the Communist regimes, is the loss of opportuni­
ties for China to squeeze Taiwan out of a role in world affairs. 
Taiwan has already benefited from the collapse of Communism, with 
a steady stream of visitors from the former socialist bloc and 
the opening of semi-official trade offices. The major premise of 
One Country Two Systems policy is based on the view that Communist 
ideology is viable in a vast socialist society, and that the 
Capitalist system in Taiwan and Hong Kong would eventually be 
Communised. But, the crumbling of Communism turns out to be in 
impediment to the PRC's plan of using the policy of Two Systems
in One Country as a stepping stone to transform Capitalist
society into main-stream Socialism. In other words, the so-called 
"International Big Atmosphere"(Guo Ji Da-Qihou)(9) has shown its 
unfavourable weathers: in terms of external influence on China's 
national unification, Beijing might have to endure another long 
winter.
Finally, a Taiwan folk legend might aptly sum up this study. 
Once upon a time, the island was ruled in turns, by two ferocious 
dragons: a "Water Dragon" from the south,and a "Fire Dragon" from 
the north. They were completely different in colour, size, and
character. Yet, they had one thing in common: when the dragons
got upset, disasters and calamities would befall the island. This 
legend reflects some truth in reality. In the four hundred years 
recorded history of Taiwan, the two sorts of catastrophes most 
frequently afflicting the inhabitants were floods, caused by the
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seasonal monsoon typhoons bringing heavy rain from the south; and 
death, caused by war or massacre that often involved China from 
the north. As the research has revealed, the 1980s was an unusual 
decade; for the first time, the PRC was prepared to moderate its 
attitude, and Beijing expressed its lukewarm friendship through 
the proposed formula of One Country Two Systems. The people of 
Taiwan may not accept this proposal for reunification. They must, 
however, learn how to avoid annoying the "Fire Dragon".
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CORRECTIONS
1. Page 2, line 38,   has continued to f a l l ......
2. Page 26, line 19, While as ......
3. Page 43, line 10, (i.e., with the U.S.) over Taiwan, .....
4. Page 61, line 4, Shimonoseki Treaty, signed in April 1895,...
5. Page 66, line 21, Marshall
6. Page 71, line 1, .... share, somewhat, a simi l a r ......
7. Page 71, line 15, country
8. Page 106, line 23, maintaining
9. Page 108, line 13, adjustments
10. Page 109, line 25, representative ...
11. Page 122, line 8, .... the fact" and ....
12. Page 133, Footnote 1, line 5, Hsiao Hsin-yi, are transcribed 
in Beijing as Xiao Xinyi, see Bibliography, page 322.
13. Page 143, line 3, Efforts made by the P R C ......
14. Page 226, line 20, ...the problems which caused the third...
15. Page 258, line 28, reciprocal
16. Page 265, line 17, delegates
17. Page 298, lines 20-21, ... a decade after it was f i r s t.....
18. Page 319, line 36, Taisheng (Voice of Taiwan)
